PEOPLE OF MI V GEORGE LAMONT JACKSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 26, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 190128
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-001485-FH
GEORGE LAMONT JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markman, P.J., and McDonald and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was
sentenced to thirty-two months to four years in prison for the felonious assault conviction, and two years
in prison for the felony-firearm conviction, the two sentences to run consecutively. He appeals as of
right. We affirm.
Shortly after an episode in which defendant allegedly pulled up to a house and fired ten shots
into it, killing one of the occupants, defendant was confronted at his own house by the brother of the
victim who yelled, "I know you did it, you're going to jail." In response, defendant yelled "come on" and
fired six or seven shots in the direction of the brother. The instant conviction is in connection with the
latter incident.
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s instruction to the jury on assault with intent to murder. We disagree. When reviewing a
sufficiency of the evidence argument, we must consider whether the evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the elements of the
offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Ricky Vaughn, 200 Mich App 32, 35;
504 NW2d 2 (1993). “The elements of assault with intent to commit murder are (1) an assault, (2)
with an actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Johnson,
215 Mich App 658, 672; 547 NW2d 65 (1996). “The intent to kill may be proved by inference from
any facts in evidence.” Id. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom may
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constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the offense. People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341,
350; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). In determining the defendant’s intent, the trier of fact may take into
account the nature of the defendant’s acts, his disposition of mind, and his conduct and declarations
before, during, and after the assault. People v Guy Taylor, 422 Mich 554, 568; 375 NW2d 1 (1985).
In the case at bar, a rational trier of fact could infer defendant’s intent to kill from his
declarations and conduct at the time of the assault. The deceased's brother, Shaun Steele, testified that
he was yelling in the direction of defendant’s house when an upstairs window broke out and defendant
repeatedly yelled, “come on.” Defendant then fired several shots and Steele began running. Defendant
fired six or seven shots in total and, by the time defendant was done shooting, Steele was a considerable
distance from the house. From the sound of the gun, the bullets could not have been far from striking
him. Although Steele did not see the direction in which the gun was pointed, a rational trier of fact could
infer defendant’s intent to kill from his repeated statements to “come on,” to Steele, his firing six to
seven shots, the fact that Steele was running away, and the fact that Steele a considerable distance from
the house before defendant finally stopped shooting. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s instruction on assault with intent to commit murder.
Defendant’s second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte
instruct the jury on self-defense. We disagree. “The failure of the court to instruct on any point of law
shall not be ground for setting aside the verdict of the jury unless such instruction is requested by the
accused.” MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052. Defendant did not request an instruction on self-defense at
trial. We therefore review “this issue only to determine if there is manifest injustice.” People v
Johnson, 215 Mich App 658, 672; 547 NW2d 65 (1996). The theory of self-defense applies where
the defendant claims that he used deadly force to defend himself when he honestly and reasonably
believed that he was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm, forcible sexual penetration, or death.
People v Barker, 437 Mich 161, 163; 468 NW2d 492 (1991); People v Deason, 148 Mich App 27,
31; 384 NW2d 72 (1985). Defendant’s own testimony indicates that his theory was not that he used
deadly force against Steele for a legitimate reason, but rather that he did not use deadly force at all: he
merely fired shots “in the upper way” to scare Steele away. We have previously held that manifest
injustice does not result from the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct on self-defense when the
defendant’s testimony indicates that the defense theory of the case is not self-defense. People v
Trammell, 70 Mich App 351, 355; 247 NW2d 311 (1976). We therefore conclude that no manifest
injustice resulted from the trial court’s failure to so instruct in this case.
Defendant’s third argument on appeal is that comments made by the prosecutor during closing
argument effectively shifted the burden of proof and denied defendant a fair trial. We disagree. We
review alleged instances of misconduct in context to determine whether they denied the defendant a fair
trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266-267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). Where, as here, the
defendant fails to object or to request a curative instruction, we will not review this issue “unless the
misconduct is sufficiently egregious that no curative instruction would counteract the prejudice to
defendant or unless manifest injustice would result from failure to review the alleged misconduct.”
People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996). Defendant contends that
the prosecutor’s statement that a reasonable doubt must be a doubt to which the jurors could assign a
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reason improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. Directly on point is the case of People v
Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 254; 537 NW2d 233 (1995). There, the prosecutor made virtually the same
comment that was made here, and we held that the statement was isolated and did not mislead the jury.
Id. We further noted that the trial court properly instructed the jury concerning what constitutes a
reasonable doubt. Id. The trial court in the instant case instructed the jury on the definition of
reasonable doubt and instructed the jury to follow the court’s instructions on the law rather than what
the lawyers say. These instructions cured any prejudice. We conclude that defendant was not denied a
fair trial. For the same reason, defendant’s argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
when his trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments must also fail, since defendant has
not established a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had his
counsel objected. People v Eloby, 215 Mich App 472, 476; 547 NW2d 48 (1996).
Defendant’s fourth argument on appeal is that the trial court inaccurately scored offense variable
(OV) 2 (physical attack and/or injury – “victim killed”) and sentenced defendant based on improperly
scored guidelines. Michigan Sentencing Guidelines, 2nd ed, at 26 (1988). We disagree. The Supreme
Court recently held that “[t]here is no juridical basis for claims of error based on alleged
misinterpretation of the guidelines, instructions regarding how the guidelines should be applied, or
misapplication of guideline variables.” People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 177; 560 NW2d 600
(1997). “Application of the guidelines states a cognizable claim on appeal only where (1) a factual
predicate is wholly unsupported, (2) a factual predicate is materially false, and (3) the sentence is
disproportionate.” Id. Because defendant has not challenged the proportionality of his sentence, there
is no cognizable claim before this Court. We further reject defendant’s argument concerning the fact
that the sentence information report inaccurately lists the original offense title because the record makes
clear that the trial court sentenced defendant on the offenses of which he was convicted.
Defendant’s fifth argument on appeal is that the trial court at the time of sentencing erroneously
made an independent finding of guilt of murder even though defendant was acquitted of that charge by
the jury. We disagree. Defendant relies on the fact that the trial court scored one hundred points for
OV 2 and thus determined that a death resulted from defendant’s commission of the offense, and on the
court’s statement to defendant that “you’ve destroyed a number of people’s lives.” Whether the trial
court made an independent finding of guilt and then sentenced defendant based upon that finding is a
question of law. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Burgess v Clark, 215 Mich App 542, 545;
547 NW2d 59 (1996). A sentencing court may take into account conduct underlying criminal charges
of which a defendant was acquitted “because an acquittal does not necessarily mean that the defendant
did not engage in criminal conduct, but only demonstrates a lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v Harris, 190 Mich App 652, 663; 476 NW2d 767 (1991). See also People v Ewing, 435
Mich 443, 473-474; 458 NW2d 880 (1990) (Boyle, J.). However, a “trial court may not make an
independent finding of guilt and then sentence a defendant on the basis of that finding.” People v
Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 410; 552 NW2d 663 (1996). In this case, there is no indication on the
record that the court made an independent finding of guilt of murder. Even if the court’s scoring
decision constitutes a finding that death resulted, such a finding does not constitute an independent
finding of guilt of murder since the court made no findings regarding any of the other elements of murder.
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We conclude that there is no indication on the record that the trial court made an independent finding of
guilt of murder and then sentenced defendant on the basis of that finding.
Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that he is entitled to receive his jury voir dire transcript.
We disagree. Under MCR 6.425(2)(a)(i), the trial court is required to direct the court reporter to
prepare and file,
[T]he trial or plea proceeding transcript, excluding the transcript of the jury voir dire,
unless the defendant challenged the jury array, exhausted all peremptory challenges, was
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or shows good
cause.
See also MCR 6.433(A). Here, defendant was not provided a copy of the voir dire transcript but has
failed to raise any issue on appeal that requires review of the voir dire transcript. Nor has he set forth
any other basis for being provided the transcript under MCR 6.425(F)(2)(a)(i). As a result, we find no
error on the part of the trial court.1
Affirmed in all respects.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
1
In People v Bass, 223 Mich App 241, 255; 565 NW2d 897 (1997), amended 7/25/97, this Court
was confronted with the constitutionality of MCR 6.425(F)(2)(a)(i). There, the Court concluded that
the "court rules governing the production of the voir dire transcript do not violate defendant's right to
equal protection [because] defendant raises no issue on appeal that requires review of the voir dire
transcript." Id., slip op at 8. However, it also went on to observe that under "the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in his
first appeal of right". Id. As a result, it concluded that the voir dire transcript must be provided in all
cases where appointed counsel was not the indigent defendant's trial counsel. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court by order stayed the precedential effect of Bass and granted leave to appeal. ___ Mich
___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 109511, issued 8/4/97). Although we are not bound by its
decision, we are persuaded by and adopt the rationale of the Court in Bass that the equal protection
clause does not compel preparation of the voir dire transcript. Rather, the "state is only required to
provide transcripts of the portion of the proceedings germane to consideration of the issues raised on
appeal." Id., slip op at 8. However, we do not agree with Bass in its conclusion that the due process
clause requires something more. Whatever the substantive merits of the standards and directives of the
State Appellate Defender Commission relating to standards of performance by appointed counsel, we
do not believe that these have the effect of transforming the breadth of the state or federal constitutions.
At most, these argue for reconsideration of MCR 6.425(F)(2)(a)(i), a matter within the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. We do not believe that any "substantial injustice" will result from our failure to
further consider defendant's appeal of this unpreserved issue.
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