DAVID H ZINNBAUER V COLEMAN SUPPLY CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID H. ZINNBAUER,
UNPUBLISHED
September 5, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 190549
WCAC
LC No. 92-0998
COLEMAN SUPPLY COMPANY,
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and THE ACCIDENT FUND
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appelleees.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Neff and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The sole issue presented in this workers compensation case is whether the Worker’s
Compensation Appellate Commission applied the correct definition of “disability” in reversing the
magistrate’s grant of benefits. We find that it did not and reverse.
I
Plaintiff worked for defendant primarily as a warehouseman and as a truck driver. He suffered
heart attacks in the course of his employment in 1987 and 1990. The magistrate found that both heart
attacks were work related. After each heart attack, plaintiff’s physician released him to return to work
with a fifty pound lifting restriction. After the second heart attack defendant issued a letter indicating that
plaintiff would not be accepted for employment because of the fifty pound lifting restriction, explaining
that the company “could not accommodate this restriction.”
However, defendant later recalled plaintiff to work, only to lay him off a few months later. After
the layoff, plaintiff looked for work unsuccessfully. He was fifty-five years old. He testified that he
could perform the job from which he was laid off and another job he had performed working on a paint
line.
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The magistrate found plaintiff credible and disabled, recognizing that there were some jobs he
was capable of performing but that he had not been able to find any employer which would hire him.
The magistrate concluded that there was a limitation in plaintiff’s wage earning capacity in work suitable
to his qualifications and training as a result of his cardiac status and the weight-lifting restriction imposed
by his treating physician.
The WCAC initially reversed, based on a definition of disability keyed to whether there is any
employment a claimant is capable of performing. This court reversed peremptorily and remanded for
further consideration, in light of the definition of disability articulated in Rea v Regency Olds, 204 Mich
App 516; 517 NW2d 251 (1994).1 Zinnbauer v Coleman Supply Co, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered 9-12-94 (Docket No.174941). While this case was on remand to the
WCAC our Supreme Court decided Michales v Morton Salt Co, 450 Mich 479; 538 NW2d 11
(1995) and remanded Rea for additional findings. 450 Mich 1201; 536 NW2d 542 (1995).
Interpreting Michales, Rea, and Sobotka v Chrysler Corp, 447 Mich 1; 523 NW2d 454 (1994), the
WCAC again found that plaintiff was not disabled because there were jobs he was capable of
performing. We granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal the determination of the WCAC with
regard to the appropriate definition of “disability”.
II
The meaning of “disability” in the context of worker’s compensation law has long been a
subject of controversy. The most recent pronouncement of our Supreme Court on the issue clearly
rejects the definition of the term applied by the WCAC in this case. Haske v Transport Leasing, ___
Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (issued 7-30-97, Docket No. 102444).
In this case the evidence shows that plaintiff suffered work-related heart attacks and the
resultant requirement that he not lift more than fifty pounds disabled him from his employment with
defendant. This was acknowledged in the letter from defendant indicating that plaintiff’s lifting restriction
could not be accommodated. The evidence further shows that plaintiff could not find another job, in
spite of extensive efforts to do so.
This evidence satisfies plaintiff’s burden of proof of compensable disability within the definition
of the term set out in Haske. Specifically, he has shown that (1) he can no longer perform a job suitable
to his qualifications and training as a result of his injury, (2) he has wage loss due to reduction in earning
capacity, and (3) the reduction or elimination of his wages is causally linked to his work-related injury.
Id. at ___ (Slip op at 34).
Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the magistrate’s award of full benefits under MCL
418.301(5)(e); MSA 17.237(301)(5)(e). We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff being the prevailing
party may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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1
“[A]n employee is ‘disabled,’ . . . if the employee suffers from any limitation in wage-earning capacity
in work suitable to the employee’s qualifications and training.” Rea, supra at 523.
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