PEOPLE OF MI V RONALD LEWIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 8, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 189618
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 94-011561
RONALD LEWIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Taylor, P.J., and Griffin and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial conviction of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317; MSA 28.549. We affirm.
I
Defendant first contends that the jury should have given an “imperfect self-defense” instruction.
We disagree.
In Michigan, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense applies only where the defendant would have
had a right to self-defense but for his or her actions as the initial aggressor. People v Amos, 163 Mich
App 50, 57; 414 NW2d 147 (1987). Imperfect self-defense is a qualified defense which can mitigate
an act of second-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter because it serves to negate the element of
malice Amos, supra; People v Kemp, 202 Mich App 318, 323; 508 NW2d 184 (1993).
In determining whether an initial aggressor is entitled to a claim of imperfect self-defense, the
focus is on “the intent with which the accused brought on the quarrel or difficulty.” Kemp, 202 Mich
App at 324. A defendant is not entitled to invoke the doctrine of imperfect self-defense if the
circumstances surrounding the incident indicate that he initiated the confrontation between himself and
the victim with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm. Id. Furthermore, under Michigan law, a
defendant is not entitled to claim imperfect self-defense if he acted with excessive force. Id., at 325.
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Here, the jury was instructed on self-defense because, according to defendant’s testimony,
Jacque (the victim) was the initial aggressor, and defendant attacked Jacque in self-defense. If Jacque
was the initial aggressor, then the imperfect self-defense theory is inappropriate. However, had
defendant been the initial aggressor, the evidence here showed that defendant acted with excessive
force. He continued to stab Jacque while they were fighting in the street, and after Jacque broke free
and ran away, defendant followed after him with the knife. Defendant repeatedly stabbed Jacque on the
porch, stopping only when threatened at gunpoint by a witness. Jacque sustained sixteen stab wounds,
while defendant was stabbed once in the hand. Clearly, there was no error in refusing to give an
imperfect self-defense instruction.
II
Defendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that the prosecution failed
to negate his claim of self-defense. We disagree.
In Michigan, the killing of another in self-defense is justifiable homicide if the defendant honestly
and reasonably believes that his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm.
Kemp, 202 Mich App at 322. A defendant is not entitled to use any more force than is necessary to
defend himself. Id.
We have previously noted that multiple stab wounds to a victim are more consistent with murder
than self-defense, and that multiple stab wounds may indicate that the defendant had the intent to do
great bodily harm or acted in a manner that created a high risk of death or great bodily harm with the
knowledge that such was a probable result. People v Rushlow, 179 Mich App 172, 179; 445 NW2d
222 (1989), aff'd 437 Mich 149 ( ). Here, the excessive stabbing showed defendant’s intent to inflict
great bodily harm or the intent to create a very high risk of death with the knowledge that the act would
probably cause death or great bodily harm. Although it is possible that defendant honestly and
reasonably believed that his life was in imminent danger or that there was a threat of serious bodily harm
when Jacque stabbed defendant in the hand, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that defendant used excessive force to defend himself. A rational trier of fact
could conclude that sufficient evidence had been presented to support all of the elements of second
degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
III
Defendant also argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court permitted the
prosecutor to reopen his proofs. Generally, the reopening of proofs for either the prosecution or
defense rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. People v Collier, 168 Mich App 687, 694
695; 425 NW2d 118 (1988). There was no abuse of discretion here.
Prior to defendant’s testimony, defendant brought a motion in limine to exclude the admission of
his prior convictions for attempted robbery and larceny from a vehicle. The trial court excluded the
robbery conviction, but ruled that the prosecutor could ask defendant about his prior larceny conviction.
After the defense rested, the prosecutor told the trial court that he had forgotten to ask defendant about
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the larceny conviction and requested permission to reopen the proofs so that this one question could be
asked. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to reopen the proofs and pose this question to defendant.
No undue advantage was afforded the prosecutor by this question and it was no surprise to defendant
that this question was asked in light of the extensive discussion that occurred prior to defendant’s
decision to testify. Collier, 168 Mich App at 694-695.
IV
Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court erred in scoring Offense Variables (OV) 3 and 4.
Pursuant People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 175-177; 560 NW2d 600 (1997), appellate review is
unavailable for claims of error based on alleged misinterpretation of the guidelines, instructions regarding
how the guidelines should be applied, or misapplication of guidelines variables. Because defendant’s
claims of error involve an alleged misinterpretation of the guidelines and/or instructions regarding how
the guidelines should be applied, we do not address this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Henry William Saad
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