WILLIE CLAYTON V VICKERS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIE CLAYTON,
UNPUBLISHED
June 20, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 191793
WCAC
LC No. 89-000853
VICKERS, INC., a/k/a LOF/VICKERS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Neff and A. L. Garbrecht*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted a decision on remand by the Worker’s Compensation
Appellate Commission (WCAC) reversing the decision of the magistrate and denying him benefits. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff began working for defendant Vickers, Inc., in 1974. In 1982, plaintiff began working
as a janitor under the supervision of David Heinrich. He performed his duties without difficulty until
September 5, 1984. At that time he returned from a two-week vacation and was told by his union
steward that he would receive a warning from his supervisor. The next day plaintiff was told that he had
violated company policy by failing to keep his work area clean, by not being on the job, and by being
out of his area. Plaintiff filed a grievance and stated that he felt that the warning was unjustified because
no one had cleaned his area while he had been on vacation.
Plaintiff stated that after this incident Heinrich and B.J. Shelton, the personnel manager, often
walked through his work area, which was on a major thoroughfare, looking for debris. Heinrich took
notes on plaintiff’s work habits. Plaintiff felt nervous and apprehensive, and was unable to sleep. In the
ensuing months plaintiff was given a warning for violating company policy, a three-day suspension for
failing to clean an area, and a two-day suspension for using abusive language to a member of
management. Plaintiff grieved the suspensions. On each occasion defendant denied the complaint.
Plaintiff sought treatment for emotional problems. On May 31, 1985, his physician took him off work.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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In August 1985, plaintiff received a letter from defendant indicating that if he did not return to
work he would be terminated. He returned to work in August. He stated that Heinrich continued to
harass him by walking through his area and criticizing him. On September 11, 1985, Heinrich told him
that he was wanted in the office for a conference because he was standing around and not doing his job.
Plaintiff asked for union representation, but was told that a steward was not available. Plaintiff was
approached by Shelton, who told him that he was suspended for five days. Plaintiff was escorted from
the premises. His physician put him on sick leave. Subsequently, plaintiff received a letter from
defendant indicating that if he did not return to work he would be terminated. Plaintiff indicated that he
was emotionally unable to return to work. On October 17, 1985, defendant terminated plaintiff’s
employment. Plaintiff filed a grievance and, after arbitration, was reinstated. However, he did not
return to work.
Plaintiff filed a petition for worker’s compensation benefits. Before the record was closed, the
parties entered into a voluntary pay agreement.
After defendant terminated compensation payments, plaintiff filed an amended petition for
benefits. He testified that he felt that he had done a good job for defendant and that he had been
treated unfairly. He stated that he thought that the company and the union had conspired to force him to
leave his employment. Plaintiff acknowledged that he had entertained thoughts of doing physical harm
to those persons who, in his opinion, had treated him unfairly. Heinrich testified that on occasion plaintiff
had to leave his work area to perform duties and obtain equipment. He acknowledged that he had kept
notes on plaintiff’s performance. Shelton testified that plaintiff’s areas was not as clean as other areas.
He conceded that plaintiff’s performance was monitored. He denied that the company and the union
had conspired to remove plaintiff.
The medical testimony differed. Some experts opined that plaintiff was disabled and that his
condition had been aggravated by his employment, while others concluded that he suffered from no
disability and could return to work without restrictions.
The magistrate found that the evidence showed that, beginning in September 1984, plaintiff’s
job performance was criticized, and disciplinary reports were filed. Plaintiff viewed these actions as
harassment, and became angry and depressed. The magistrate stated that while plaintiff’s perception
that defendant harassed him might have been misinterpreted, the proofs indicated that plaintiff’s
perception was based on actual events of his employment. The medical testimony supported a finding
that plaintiff’s condition was work-related. The magistrate concluded that plaintiff established that he
was psychiatrically disabled as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on
May 31 and September 11, 1985.
The WCAC reversed the decision of the magistrate. The WCAC found that the magistrate
misapplied the law regarding mental disability. The magistrate did not find that the actual events of
employment constituted harassment. The WCAC concluded that plaintiff was entitled to compensation
only if his disability arose out of actual events of harassment, and not out of an unfounded perception of
harassment.
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This Court denied plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal for lack of merit. Plaintiff sought
leave to appeal to our Supreme Court, and after holding the application in abeyance, our Supreme
Court remanded the case to the WCAC for reconsideration in light of Gardner v Van Buren Public
Schools, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 (1994).
In its decision on remand, the WCAC again reversed the decision of the magistrate and denied
benefits. The WCAC reasoned that under Gardner, causation is not determined by the honest
perception of the employee. Rather, in determining whether actual events of employment caused or
aggravated a mental disability in a significant manner, the factfinder must consider the totality of the
occupational circumstances along with the claimant’s mental health in general, and must compare
employment and nonemployment factors. Once actual events of employment are shown to have
occurred, the significance of those events to the claimant must be judged against all relevant
circumstances to determine if the mental disability is compensable. The WCAC found that the
magistrate’s finding that plaintiff might have misinterpreted the actual events he described as harassment
was insufficient under Gardner. The WCAC noted that in Iloyan v General Motors Corp, 187 Mich
App 595; 468 NW2d 302 (1991), this Court held that an employer’s efforts to obtain compliance with
standards did not necessarily constitute harassment. Gardner, supra, did not expressly or impliedly
overrule Iloyan, supra; to hold otherwise would be to conclude that an employer could not supervise or
evaluate employees. The WCAC concluded that plaintiff’s claim failed because he did not establish that
any disability was caused by actual events of employment, and not unfounded perceptions thereof.
Even if plaintiff had not misinterpreted the events, the magistrate’s award would not be supported by the
requisite evidence because the magistrate failed to find that the events aggravated plaintiff’s condition in
a significant manner.
Findings of fact made by a magistrate are conclusive on the WCAC if they are supported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. MCL 418.861a(3); MSA
17.237(861a)(3). Judicial review is of the findings of fact made by the WCAC, not those made by the
magistrate. The findings of fact made by the WCAC are conclusive if there is any competent evidence
in the record to support them. Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257, 263; 484 NW2d 227
(1992).
In Gardner, supra, our Supreme Court revisited the issue of what is required to show a
compensable mental disability. The Gardner Court held:
We hold that to establish a compensable mental disability claim, pursuant to
MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), a claimant must prove: (1) a mental
disability; (2) arising out of the actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions
thereof; and that (3) those events contributed to, aggravated, or accelerated the mental
disability in a significant manner.
All that is statutorily required are “actual events of employment” even if
objectively unimportant, that contribute to, aggravate, or accelerate a mental disability in
a significant manner.
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Although the statutory test embodied in MCL 418.301(2); MSA
17.237(301)(2), does contain objective elements, it is not a purely objective test. If
one concentrates on the individual worker, as opposed to an average worker, the
statutory test has substantial subjective elements as well. [445 Mich at 27-28.]
The Gardner Court also stated:
Under the statutory standard, causation is determined by the factfinder. It is not
determined by the honest, even if unfounded, perceptions of the claimant. In
determining whether specific events of employment contribute to, aggravate, or
accelerate a mental disability in a significant manner, the factfinder must consider the
totality of the occupational circumstances along with the totality of a claimant’s mental
health in general.
The analysis must focus on whether actual events of employment affected the
mental health of the claimant in a significant manner. This analysis will, by necessity,
require a comparison of nonemployment and employment factors. Once actual
employment events have been shown to have occurred, the significance of those events
to the particular claimant must be judged against all the circumstances to determine
whether the resulting mental disability is compensable. [445 Mich at 47.]
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the WCAC erred as a matter of law by reversing the decision of
the magistrate. Plaintiff contends that under Gardner, supra, the events complained of must have
actually occurred and must have contributed to the disability in a significant manner, but need not be of
the type that would be significant to the reasonable person. The magistrate’s analysis was consistent
with the three-prong test announced in Gardner, supra. The finding that plaintiff had difficulty with
depression and anxiety constituted a finding of disability. The depression and anxiety were based on
actual work-related events. The events contributed to the disability in a significant manner because it
was not until he was harassed repeatedly that he became disabled. Plaintiff asserts that even assuming
arguendo that he misinterpreted the actual events complained of, his disability is compensable. The
Gardner Court stated that to read § 301(2) as barring compensation for claims based on unfounded
perceptions of actual events, as opposed to prohibiting compensation based on hallucinations, would
lead to an absurd result. 445 Mich at 44. Section 301(2) requires that a claim be based on actual
events of employment, no more and no less. The claimant need not show that the actual events were in
fact harassment. Similarly, the label placed on the events by the employer does not control the validity
of the claim.
We agree with plaintiff, and reverse the WCAC’s decision. Gardner, supra, does not require
that the events which form the basis of a claim for compensation for a mental disability must in fact
constitute harassment or must be out of the ordinary. The WCAC reversed the magistrate’s decision
based on the magistrate’s finding that plaintiff may have misinterpreted events designed to be an attempt
to have him meet standards. The WCAC found that under Gardner, such misinterpretation of actual
events precludes an award of compensation. This interpretation of Gardner is incorrect. The Gardner
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Court recognized that actual events of employment, even if ordinary, can injure the mental health of a
predisposed individual:
It is, therefore, irrelevant how a “reasonable” person would react to the
objectively established actual events. The relevant inquiry, and the only inquiry
presently required by worker’s compensation law in this state, is: Did the actual events
of employment occur, and do these bear a significant relationship to the mental
disabilities? Reduced to its simplest form, the analysis is this: Given actual events and a
particular claimant, with all the claimant’s preexisting mental frailties, can the actual
events objectively be said to have contributed to, aggravated, or accelerated the
claimant’s mental disability in a significant manner?
This type of inquiry places the focus where it should be: on the authenticity of
the underlying event and the significance of its relationship to the resulting disability.
[445 Mich at 50.]
The events which formed the basis of plaintiff’s claim actually occurred. The WCAC found that a
reasonable person would not have reacted to the events as did plaintiff. Under Gardner, a reasonable
person analysis is irrelevant. Because plaintiff’s claim was based on actual events of employment, his
articulation of those events to the physicians cannot be discounted as unfounded perceptions because a
reasonable person would not have reacted in the same way. The WCAC erred in displacing the
magistrate’s reliance on the medical testimony supplied by plaintiff. Miklik v Michigan Special
Machine Co, 415 Mich 364, 367; 329 NW2d 713 (1982).
We reverse the WCAC and remand for implementation of the magistrate’s decision. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
Reversed and remanded.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Allen L. Garbrecht
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