FRANK J POCKRANDT V GRIP TITE PRODUCTS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FRANK J. POCKRANDT, d/b/a POCKRANDT
PRODUCTS,
UNPUBLISHED
March 21, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 179973
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 91-408038-CK
GRIP TITE PRODUCTS, INC., a/k/a STICTION,
INC., JOHN HARRINGTON, F. DAVID LARSON,
and BENJAMIN T. HOFFIZ, JR.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Young, P.J., and Markey and D.A. Teeple,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right from a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $1,533,000, plus costs
and statutory interest. We affirm.
The parties’ dispute is based on upon an exclusive licensing agreement entered into by plaintiff
and Stiction, Inc. [now known as and referred to herein as Grip Tite Products, Inc.1], to manufacture
and distribute a product called Stiction, a patent-pending product that helps remove stripped nuts, bolts
and screws by providing additional gripping ability. Plaintiff contends that he revoked the licensing
agreement because Grip Tite breached the licensing agreement and, despite this revocation and
subsequent injunctions, Grip Tite continued to use and disseminate material bearing the name and mark
of Stiction but in an identical package containing a product labeled as “Gription,” which omitted any
reference to Pockrandt Products, as on the original Stiction product. Plaintiff filed this action against
Stiction, Inc. a/k/a Grip Tite Products, Inc, and three individuals (who are also officers of these
corporations) to recover damages and obtain injunctive relief under breach of contract and other
theories of liability.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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After this action was filed, the trial court issued a “mutual” injunction to prevent the parties from
marketing Stiction or a similar product. The trial court also appointed an expert to examine the patent
issues and a special master with the power to run Grip Tite’s predecessor, if necessary. The trial court
later entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiff regarding liability on all counts of plaintiff’s verified
second amended complaint as a sanction for defendants’ failure to comply with its order to provide
records to the special master. The trial court then granted plaintiff a permanent injunction against
defendants preventing, among other things, any further manufacture, distribution, or marketing of the
Stiction product. The question of monetary damages was tried before a jury, however. The jury, by
special verdict, found in favor of plaintiff and against all defendants in the amount of $1,500,000 on
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. The jury also found that plaintiff was entitled to $104,000 for
attorney fees and $33,000 for patent work. The trial court later vacated the award for attorney fees
and entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1,533,000, plus costs and interest.
I
We first address defendants’ contentions in issues one, two, three, and seven concerning the
trial court’s appointment of a special master, with receiver and fact-gathering authority and statutory
bond requirements. Because defendants give, at best, cursory consideration to these issues, we could
decline to review them. See Froling v Carpenter, 203 Mich App 368, 373; 512 NW2d 6 (1994);
Community Nat’l Bank v Michigan Basic Property Ins Ass’n, 159 Mich App 510, 520-521; 407
NW2d 31 (1987). In any event, having considered only those arguments identified in the statement of
question presented for each of the four issues, we find no error. See People v Yarger, 193 Mich App
532, 540 n 3; 485 NW2d 119 (1992); Williams v City of Cadillac, 148 Mich App 786, 790; 384
NW2d 792 (1985).
The Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 6, § 5, prohibits only the office of master in
chancery. Under Const 1963, art 6, § 13, the circuit court has a broad grant of authority, which
includes general equitable jurisdiction. Universal Am-Can Ltd v Attorney General, 197 Mich App
34, 37; 494 NW2d 787 (1992). Moreover, the circuit court, rather than a jury, retains the authority to
determine facts as they relate to equitable remedies, although the jury may decide factual issues relating
to the claim for money damages. ECCO, Ltd v Balimoy Mfg Co, Inc, 179 Mich App 748, 751; 446
NW2d 546 (1989).
Plaintiff invoked the trial court’s equitable jurisdiction in this case by seeking injunctive relief.
Universal Am-Can Ltd, supra at 36-37. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court had equitable
power to appoint the special master for the purpose of exercising receiver duties to prevent fraud and
protect property against imminent danger of loss. See Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist Bd of
Education, 393 Mich 616, 644-645; 227 NW2d 736 (1975); Weathervane Window, Inc v White
Lake Construction Co, 192 Mich App 316, 322; 480 NW2d 337 (1991); Band v Livonia
Associates¸ 176 Mich App 95, 104-106; 439 NW2d 285 (1989).
Although no bond was posted by the special master, defendants’ reliance on MCL 600.3510;
MSA 27A.3510 as support for their claim of statutory error is misplaced. The applicable bond statute
is MCL 600.2926; MSA 27A.2926. Moreover, the proper remedy for a failure to require bond is a
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nunc pro tunc order for bond. Band, supra at 107. Because the lack of bond affords defendants no
basis for vacating the judgment, this error was harmless. MCR 2.613(A).
We do not agree with defendants’ contention that the trial court delegated full judicial power to
the special master or that any fact-finding role of the jury was preempted by the special master. With
regard to the enforcement of orders, the record reflects that the special master relied upon the trial court
to enforce orders. As to factual issues, the record reflects that the special master only had authority to
make recommendations to the trial court. We also note that, while the special master was permitted to
make preliminary determinations on facts to expedite this case, there is no record evidence that the
special master actually made findings of fact on any issues of liability or damages. Instead, the record
reflects that, with the exception of the questions on monetary damages decided by the jury, all issues in
this case were decided by the trial court. The record also reflects that defendants, through attorney and
codefendant Benjamin Hoffiz, Jr., had requested that the special master be allowed to make findings of
fact. It was only after defendants had a disagreement with the special master and were ordered by the
trial court to turn over information to the special master that defendants challenged the trial court’s
authority to appoint the special master.
Error requiring reversal must be that of the trial court and not error to which the aggrieved party
may have contributed by planned or neglectful omission of action. Harrigan v Ford Motor Co, 159
Mich App 776, 786; 406 NW2d 917 (1987). Moreover, where jurisdiction is proper, a court’s orders
must be obeyed, even if clearly incorrect. In the Matter of Hague, 412 Mich 532, 545; 315 NW2d
524 (1982); State Bar of Michigan v Cramer, 399 Mich 116, 125; 249 NW2d 1 (1976). Under the
circumstances of this case, we hold that the trial court acted within the scope of its equitable powers
when it assigned fact-gathering duties to the special master. Even if the assignment were improper, our
refusal to grant relief to defendants would not be inconsistent with substantial justice because defendants
contributed to this action and suffered no harm until after they failed to comply with the trial court’s own
order. MCR 2.613(A). We also believe that the appointment of an expert witness was permissible
under MRE 706 in this case because the court did not delegate its judicial authority to that witness. Cf.
Carson Fischer Potts & Hyman v Hyman, 220 Mich App 116, 122-124; ___NW2d ___ (1996).
II
We next consider defendants’ contention in his fourth issue that the trial court erred in not
granting their motion, at the conclusion of plaintiff’s proofs at the trial, requesting a finding of no cause of
action on the ground that plaintiff did not present any proof as to damages. Because this issue is given
only cursory treatment in defendants’ brief, we could decline to consider it. Community Nat’l Bank,
supra at 520-521.
In any event, we view the statement of the question presented for this issue as a challenge to the
trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for directed verdict on damages and, hence, confine our
review to the trial court’s decision on that motion. Yarger, supra; Williams, supra. We only review
grounds for sustaining a directed verdict that were articulated to the trial court. Garabedian v William
Beaumont Hosp, 208 Mich App 473, 475; 528 NW2d 809 (1995). Accordingly, the sole issue we
must determine is whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that he suffered any damages at all. Id.
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As the party asserting a breach of contract, plaintiff had the burden of proving damages with
reasonable certainty. In the Matter of the Dissolution of F Yeager Bridge & Culvert Co, 150 Mich
App 386, 401; 389 NW2d 99 (1986); Bonelli v Volkswagon of America, Inc, 166 Mich App 483,
511; 421 NW2d 213 (1988). The type of uncertainty which bars recovery is uncertainty as to the fact
of damages and not as to its amount. See Bonelli, supra and cases cited therein. However, the plaintiff
must lay a basis for a reasonable estimate of the extent of harm, measured in money. Fera v Village
Plaza, Inc, 396 Mich 639, 643; 242 NW2d 372 (1976).
Parties may agree to remedies for breach of contract in the contract itself. Van Valkenburg v
Retirement Homes of the Detroit Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, 7 Mich App 77,
79; 151 NW2d 197 (1967). Where a party elects to disaffirm a contract, the party is still entitled to
consequential damages. Jim-Bob, Inc v Mehling, 178 Mich App 71, 92-93; 443 NW2d 451 (1989).
In the commercial contract context, consequential damages refer to damages, such as lost profits, that
arise naturally from the breach, or which can reasonably be said to have been in the contemplation of
the parties at the time the contract was made. Lawrence v Will Darrah & Associates, Inc, 445 Mich
1, 13; 516 NW2d 43 (1994).
When the evidence is examined in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the jury could find with
reasonable certainty that plaintiff incurred monetary loss as a direct and natural result of the breach of
the licensing agreement (i.e., the nonpayment of royalties and the failure to abide by plaintiff’s election to
terminate the licensing agreement). Hence, the trial court did not err in denying a directed verdict on
whether plaintiff sustained his burden of establishing any damages. In the Matter of the Dissolution of
F Yeager Bridge & Culvert Co, supra.
III
In their fifth issue, defendants contend that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to
differentiate between each defendant in deliberations and by allegedly giving a tort-based instruction
related to damages against all defendants. Having confined our review to the statement of the question
presented by defendants, we hold that this issue was not preserved for appeal because defendants did
not object to the instructions, stating specifically the objectionable matter and the ground for objection,
before the jury retired for deliberations. MCR 2.516(C); Hammack v Lutheran Social Services of
Michigan, 211 Mich App 1, 10; 535 NW2d 215 (1995). Nevertheless, the jury did not decide any
liability issues. Moreover, the record reflects that the individual d
efendants’ liability for breach of
contract was premised on the equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Om-El Export Co, Inc
v Newcor, Inc, 154 Mich App 471, 479-480; 398 NW2d 440 (1986). Hence, the fact that the jury
was allowed to return a verdict of breach of contract against all defendants was, at most, harmless
error. MCR 2.613(A). We also note in passing that the instructions, as a whole, properly informed the
jury that damages in a contract action must be proven with reasonable certainty. In the Matter of the
Dissolution of F Yeager Bridge & Culvert Co, supra.
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IV
For their sixth and eighth issues, defendants raise questions concerning receiver fees and the
patent expert. Because the merits of these issues have not been adequately briefed, we are unable to
review them. See Froling, supra at 373; Community Nat’l Bank, supra at 520-521.
V
As their ninth issue, defendants assert that plaintiff “unilaterally breached” and terminated the
contract, and then request that we determine whether plaintiff is entitled to recover damages based on
this assertion. A party may not merely announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for the claim. In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 477; 484 NW2d 672 (1992).
Moreover, this Court’s jurisdiction is confined to judgments and orders of the trial court. Law Offices
of Lawrence J Stockler, PC v Rose, 174 Mich App 14, 54; 436 NW2d 70 (1989). Because
defendants have failed to identify or brief the particular ruling of the trial court upon which their ninth
issue is based, we are unable to review this issue.
VI
As their tenth issue, defendants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to hear and rule on
their several motions for summary disposition. Because defendants’ argument gives only cursory
treatment of this issue and the record on appeal does not include the transcripts for all lower court
proceedings, we need not address this issue. Community Nat’l Bank, supra at 520-521; cf. Admiral
Ins Co v Columbia Casualty Ins Co, 194 Mich App 300, 305; 486 NW2d 351 (1992). We note,
however, that defendants’ argument misconstrues both MCR 2.119(C) and the record. MCR
2.119(C) is a procedural rule that sets forth the time for the service and filing of motions and responses.
It imposes no affirmative duty on the trial court to decide the merits of each issue raised in the motion.
Also, the available record does not reflect that the trial court refused to hear or rule on defendants’
motions. With regard to the hearings from 1991 and 1994 for which transcripts have been provided on
appeal, the record reflects that the trial court denied relief based on mootness and other grounds.
Although there are exceptions, courts will generally not entertain moot issues or decide moot cases.
Contesti v Attorney General, 164 Mich App 271, 278; 416 NW2d 410 (1987).
We also point out that this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
disposition de novo, G&A Inc v Nahra, 204 Mich App 329, 330; 514 NW2d 255 (1994), but that
defendants have not shown any issue upon which they should have been granted judgment as a matter
of law. Defendants have also failed to address the issue of mootness and have not established any basis
for the “default” remedy sought against plaintiff in this appeal. Hence, defendants have forfeited these
claims. Froling, supra at 373.
In sum, confining our review to the available record and the statement of the question presented
for defendants’ tenth issue, we conclude that defendants have demonstrated no basis for the relief.
MCR 2.613(A).
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VII
As their eleventh issue, defendants raise a claim of attorney misconduct. Having reviewed
defendants’ claim under the standards in Reetz v Kinsman Marine Transit Co, 416 Mich 97, 102
103; 330 NW2d 638 (1982), and Wilson v General Motors Corp, 183 Mich App 21, 26-27; 454
NW2d 405 (1990), we find no basis for a new trial on the issue of monetary damages. Defendants
were not deprived of a fair and impartial trial.
Affirmed.
Plaintiff being the prevailing party, he may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald A. Teeple
1
Grip Tite Products, Inc, is also known as Grip-Tite Products, Inc.
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