RONALD FIELD V JUANITA FORD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD FIELD and KENNETH J. LASALLE,
UNPUBLISHED
March 11, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellees,
v
No. 176056
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 93 333693 CZ
WAYNE COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
Defendant,
and
JUANITA FORD, LARRY LEWIS,
OLLIE MCKINNEY, CHARLES MORTON,
and SUE E. RADULOVICH,
Defendant-Appellants.
Before: Jansen, P. J., and Reilly, and M.E. Kobza,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The individual defendants (defendants) appeal by leave granted a circuit court order granting
plaintiffs’ motion to compel defendant Lewis to answer deposition questions. The issue in this case is
whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel in spite of
defendants’ assertion of an evidentiary privilege. We affirm.
Plaintiffs Field and LaSalle were employed as Vice President for Academic Affairs and Vice
President for Finance, respectively. Defendants were on the board of trustees of Wayne Community
College on November 23, 1993, when they voted to terminate the employment of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
filed a complaint alleging, among other claims, racial discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, defamation, invasion of privacy and conspiracy to interfere with contractual relationships.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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During the deposition of defendant Lewis, defense counsel informed plaintiffs’ counsel that he
would be instructing Lewis not to answer any question that dealt with Lewis’ motives in voting to fire
plaintiffs. Defense counsel stated his reliance on Sheffield Development Co v City of Troy, 99 Mich
App 527; 298 NW2d 23 (1980) and Chonich v Ford, 115 Mich App 461; 321 NW2d 693 (1982).
Plaintiffs’ counsel ended the deposition, and filed a motion to compel pursuant to MCR 2.313(A)(2)(a)
and 2.306(D)(3) and (G). Plaintiffs argued that defendants’ motive for voting to terminate plaintiffs’
employment was relevant to plaintiffs’ claims and that there was no privilege prohibiting inquiry into
Lewis’ motives for firing plaintiffs.
In their response to the motion, defendants again relied on Sheffield and Chonich to support
the assertion of a privilege. Defendants’ brief did not identify whether they were asserting an evidentiary
privilege1 or the defense of privilege2 and did not distinguish between the two in their arguments. For
example, they asserted that the alleged defamatory statements would be absolutely privileged. They
also stated, “Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains numerous allegations but do [sic] not include any allegations
which would avoid the privilege asserted.” These statements suggest that defendants were arguing that
the claims were barred by a defense of privilege. However, defendants also argued that Sheffield held
that there was limited judicial review for any inquiry into legislators’ motives behind their decisions and
that Chonich held that the board of trustees is a legislative body. The thrust of defendants’ argument in
their response to plaintiffs’ motion was that Sheffield precluded plaintiffs from questioning defendants
about their motives for their votes. Thus, the argument essentially asserted the existence of an
evidentiary privilege.
The trial court held that Chonich and Sheffield did not preclude plaintiffs from inquiring about
the individual defendants’ reasons for the decision to terminate plaintiffs’ employment because that
decision was not legislative in nature. The court distinguished between the legislature’s “enacting laws
and carrying out public business” and its “dealing with their own in-house personnel matters . . . .” The
court granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel.
A motion to compel discovery is a matter within the trial court’s discretion, which we review for
a an abuse of discretion. Linebaugh v Sheraton Michigan Corp, 198 Mich App 335, 343; 497
NW2d 585 (1993). Michigan law is strongly committed to open and far-reaching discovery, and
generally provides for discovery of any relevant, non-privileged matter. Ostoin v Waterford Twp
Police, 189 Mich App 334, 337; 471 NW2d 666 (1991). In accordance with MRE 501, the
existence of an evidentiary privilege is governed by common law, except where modified by statute or
court rule. Id.
Because we are reviewing the court’s ruling on plaintiffs’ motion to compel, defendants’
arguments concerning the defense of privilege are not properly before us. Citing Tenney v Brandhov,
341 US 367; 71 S Ct 783; 95 L Ed 2d 1019 (1951), defendants assert that the doctrine of legislative
immunity protects the defendants from liability for their conduct “while acting in the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity.” The defense of privilege is properly raised in a motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (“[t]he claim is barred because of . . . immunity granted by law . . . .”)
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Whether the individual defendants are immune from liability on any or all of the claims raised by plaintiffs
is not properly before us now when we are reviewing the court’s ruling on the motion to compel.
Defendants appear to assert the evidentiary privilege that is applicable to state legislators and is
based on the Speech or Debate Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 4, § 11. The
Clause states in pertinent part:
Except as provided by law, senators and representatives shall be privileged from civil
arrest and civil process during sessions of the legislature . . . . They shall not be
questioned in any other place for any speech in either house.
The Speech or Debate Clause has been held applicable to individuals other than senators or
representatives when the challenged activity of the individual falls within the legislative sphere. In
Prelesnik v Esquina, 132 Mich App 341; 347 NW2d 226 (1984), the Speech or Debate Clause was
held applicable to the job responsibilities of the defendant who was Legislative Corrections
Ombudsman. Prelesnik, supra at 347-348.3 This Court analyzed the issue of the applicability of the
Clause by inquiring whether the defendant’s activities “fell within the legislative sphere.” Id. at 347.
This Court, quoting Gravel v United States, 408 US 606, 625; 92 S Ct 2614; 33 L Ed 2d 583
(1972), stated that an activity falls within the legislative sphere if it is:
“[A]n integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members
participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and
passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the
Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.” [Prelesnik, supra at 347.]
Defendants’ decision to terminate plaintiffs’ employment does not fall within the legislative
sphere merely because the Legislature provided the board of trustees with the authority to take the
action. In Wayne County Jail Inmates v Wayne County Sheriff, 391 Mich 359, 364; 216 NW2d
910 (1974), the Court, addressing the defendants’ separation of powers argument, recognized that a
local board of commissioners is not necessarily performing a legislative function when it carries out a
duty imposed by the Legislature. Similarly, in Prelesnik, this Court considered not only that the
defendant’s ombudsman position was authorized by statute, but also noted that the “position is pertinent
to legislative functions . . .”, specifically, the Legislature’s ability to investigate of the Department of
Corrections. Id. at 347-348. These cases indicate that the fact that an action is authorized by statute
does not necessarily mean that the action falls within the legislative sphere. Thus, defendants’ decision
to terminate plaintiffs’ employment does not fall within the legislative sphere for the purposes of the
Speech or Debate Clause merely because the Legislature provided the board of trustees with the
authority to “select and employ such administrative officers, teachers and employees . . . as shall be
necessary to effectuate its purposes.” MCL 389.124(b); MSA 15.615(1124)(b).
Cases from federal courts of appeal concerning the defense of legislative immunity support the
trial court’s view that an employment decision is not legislative in nature. In Roberson v Mullins, 29
F3d 132 (CA 4, 1994), a majority of a county’s board of supervisors voted to remove the plaintiff from
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his position as the public works superintendent. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the votes
against him were motivated by his political party affiliation in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the
basis that the claim was barred by “absolute legislative immunity.” The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the district court’s decision that the defendants were not entitled to legislative immunity.
Not all actions undertaken by local governmental bodies that have legislative
responsibilities are necessarily “legislative.” Rather a local governmental body acts in a
legislative capacity when it engages in the process of “adopt[ing] prospective,
legislative-type rules.”
***
Here, the County Board terminated [the plaintiff] as the Public Works
Superintendent for Wise County. Terminating a county employee is plainly unrelated to
the process of “adopt[ing] prospective, legislative-type rules.” We conclude, therefore,
that the Board’s termination of [the plaintiff] was not a legislative action; as a result, the
County Board members did not act in their legislative capacity when they participated in
it.” [Id. at 134-135. Citations omitted.]
See also Gross v Winter, 876 F2d 165; 277 App DC (1989); Smith v Lomax, 45 F3d 402 (CA 11,
1995).
Because the decision to terminate plaintiffs’ employment does not fall within the legislative
sphere, the Speech or Debate Clause did not provide defendants with an evidentiary privilege with
respect to their motives for their votes. We recognize that Prelesnik and the federal court of appeals
cases cited above concern the defense of privilege in the form of legislative immunity, rather than the
scope of an evidentiary privilege, as is at issue in this case. Nevertheless, we find these cases
persuasive regarding the applicability of an evidentiary privilege to defendants’ motives for their votes to
terminate plaintiffs’ employment. Their votes were not “‘an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes’” by which the Legislature participated in the legislative process. Prelesnik,
supra, quoting Gravel, supra. As previously discussed, the employment decision did not become a
legislative matter simply because the Legislature authorized the board of trustees to make the decision.
Therefore, the activity did not fall within the legislative sphere, and was outside the scope of any
evidentiary privilege provided by the Speech or Debate Clause.
Other cases cited by defendants do not support the applicability of an evidentiary privilege in
these circumstances In Wayne County Sheriff v Wayne County Bd of Comm’rs, 148 Mich App
702; 385 NW2d 267 (1983), the plaintiff sought declaratory relief after the board of commissioners
and the board of auditors cut the plaintiff’s budget by eliminating a division. The trial court denied
declaratory relief, concluding that the board of commissioners did not act in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. This Court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff had failed to make the requisite showing
that would warrant “an equity court’s intrusion into an exercise of local legislative power . . . .” Id. at
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705. In dicta, this Court stated, “We note that absent some showing of malicious action, bad faith or
corruption, individual board members’ viewpoints are not relevant since the board exercises its power
as a collective entity and not as individuals, Saginaw County v Kent, 209 Mich 160; 176 NW 601
(1920); Crain v Gibson, 73 Mich App 192, 200; 250 NW2d 792 (1977).” Defendants would have
us believe that this quotation indicates that individual board members’ viewpoints are never discoverable
unless there is a showing “of malicious action, bad faith or corruption . . . .” Having examined the
context in which the statement was made and the cases cited by this Court in support of the proposition,
we decline defendants’ invitation to interpret the sentence in the manner suggested. This Court was not
setting forth a rule of law that extended beyond the issue presented in that case, e.g. whether the plaintiff
had succeeded in showing an arbitrary and capricious action by the board of commissioners such that
declaratory relief was warranted. Wayne County Sheriff case does not indicate the existence of an
evidentiary privilege that would apply in these circumstances.
Likewise, Chonich, a case involving the defense of privilege, does not support defendants’
claim that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to compel. In Chonich, the
plaintiffs brought an action for defamation against Ford, a member of the Wayne County Community
College Board of Trustees. The alleged defamatory statements were made at a meeting of the board.
The trial court granted the defendant summary disposition on the basis that the plaintiffs had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the defendant’s statements, made within the
course of a regularly convened meeting of the board, were absolutely privileged. This Court agreed that
the statements, like those made during the course of legislative proceedings, were absolutely privileged.
In the course of the analysis, this Court referred to the board as a “subordinate legislative body.” Id. at
468. Chonich indicates that, for statements made during the course of a regularly convened meeting of
the board, board members are absolutely privileged, e.g. immune, in terms of a defamation action.
Chonich is not controlling with respect to the applicability of an evidentiary privilege in this case.
Finally, this Court’s decision in Sheffield, supra, concerns the separation of powers doctrine,
rather than the evidentiary privilege afforded legislators by the Speech or Debate Clause. In Sheffield,
the plaintiff, a development company, challenged the city council’s denial of plaintiff’s petition for
rezoning. During discovery, city officials refused to answer questions relating to the reason for their
vote, the plaintiff moved to compel, and the trial court granted the motion. This Court concluded that
“the limitations mandated by the constitutional provision with respect to the separation of powers
preclude[d] this pretrial discovery.” Id. at 532-533. The result of this Court’s holding was that the city
officials did not have to testify regarding their motivations for voting to deny the rezoning request. The
basis of this court’s decision was the doctrine of separation of powers. The case does not provide
support for defendants’ assertion of an evidentiary privilege.
Defendants have not identified the doctrine of separation of powers or 1963 Const, art 3, § 2
as the basis for reversal in this case. However, even if they had done so, the holding of Sheffield does
not apply in this case because the employment decision at issue here is not legislative in nature. In
Sheffield, this Court began its analysis by stating, “The rezoning of a specific parcel of land by a
township or municipality constitutes an act that is legislative in nature.” Id. at 530. The analysis
continues with quotations that concern inquiries regarding legislators’ motives in enacting legislation. As
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previously discussed, the challenged action in this case concerns an employment decision, which is not
legislative in nature. Therefore, Sheffield is distinguishable and the separation of powers doctrine does
not provide a basis for precluding the discovery sought in this case.
In conclusion, we agree with the trial court that there was no evidentiary privilege that precluded
plaintiffs from questioning the individual defendants regarding their motives for their votes to terminate
plaintiffs’ employment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted plaintiffs’ motion to
compel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ Michael E. Kobza
1
Some of the more common evidentiary privileges recognized in Michigan as attorney-client, physician
patient, teacher-pupil, clergy, fiduciary, spousal communications and against self-incrimination. 2
Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules Practice, p 167. See also, Howe v Detroit Free
Press, 440 Mich 203, 210-211; 487 NW2d 374 (1992).
2
In tort law, “privilege” is “the ability to act contrary to another individual’s legal right without that
individual having legal redress for the consequences of that act; usually raised by the actor as a
defense.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed). A privilege in this context may be based upon consent of
the person affected by the actor’s conduct or be created by law irrespective of the affected person’s
consent. See Restatement Torts, 2d § 10, Comment c, pp 17-18. As one example of a
nonconsensual-type privilege, the Restatement discusses the privilege a legislator enjoys with respect to
publication of defamatory matter during the course of performing legislative functions. Restatement 2d,
§ 590.
3
Immunity for the particular act was held not to apply because the act was outside the scope of the
defendant’s employment.
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