SUSAN AMAYA V MOTT COMM COLLEGE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SUSAN AMAYA,
UNPUBLISHED
March 7, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
TAMMY BUTLER,
Plaintiff,
v
No. 186755
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 94-030819-CZ
MOTT COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Marilyn Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and M. Warshawsky,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) in this action that presents the issue whether under Michigan
law an implied contractual relationship exists between higher educational institutions and their students.
We affirm.
Plaintiff became a student at Mott Community College in the winter of 1992 and began working
on meeting the eligibility requirements f r the Associate Degree in Nursing (ADN) program. She
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applied in January 1994 for admission into the fall ADN program. Her overall grade point average was
3.72 (on a 4.0 scale), and she had completed all of the required courses, except for a microbiology
class, which she was taking that semester. Nonetheless, plaintiff was not accepted to the program. She
and another student filed this lawsuit, seeking a declaratory judgment in their favor ruling that the basic
relationship between an educational institution and its students is contractual, and that defendant had
breached its implied contract with plaintiffs. Moreover, plaintiffs asserted they had detrimentally relied
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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on defendant’s promise, sacrificing money for tuition and time that could have been spent with their
families and other employment. They also sought injunctive relief forcing defendant to allow them to
take classes in the fall ADN program.
First, plaintiff contends that the judge erred in finding that there was no implied contract between
a college and its students. We disagree. Plaintiff cites numerous cases from foreign jurisdictions stating
that the relationship between a student and educational institution is contractual in nature. She cites no
Michigan cases or federal cases interpreting Michigan law to support this contention. Indeed, both state
and federal courts have stated that under Michigan law contract and promissory estoppel claims brought
by a student against a college or university fail.
In Regents of the University of Michigan v Ewing, 559 F Supp 791, 800 (1983), rev’d 742
F2d 913 (CA 6, 1984), rev’d 474 US 214, 106 S Ct 507, 88 L Ed 2d 523 (1985), a medical student
asserted a right to retake a required examination that he had failed based on state law actions of
contract and promissory estoppel and a federal law substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The student based his contract and promissory estoppel claims on informational materials
provided by the university. The district court rejected both the state contract and promissory estoppel
claims, “finding no sufficient evidence that the defendants bound themselves either expressly or by a
course of conduct to give Ewing a second chance to take [the examination].” The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the district court on the federal claim, but did not reach the state claims. The
district court’s ruling on the state claims was cited with approval by the United States Supreme Court in
Ewing, supra at 223-224.
In Cuddihy v Wayne State University Board of Governors, 163 Mich App 153; 413 NW2d
692 (1987), a student dismissed from a Master of Education program because of poor academic and
clinical performance filed suit seeking specific performance of the “contract” between herself and the
university. She further claimed “that her academic adviser promised that she would be finished with the
academic program by September, 1978, and she relied on that promise.” Id. at 155. This Court
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), finding that the
plaintiff’s claim appeared to lie in promissory estoppel rather than contract. This Court further held that
plaintiff had no cause of action under a theory of promissory estoppel based on the holding in Ewing
because the statement made by the plaintiff’s academic adviser did not amount to an enforceable
promise, but rather was merely an opinion. Id. at 157-158.
Plaintiff in the present case contends that defendant’s catalog and published information
materials, along with statements by defendant’s employees, established a contract between herself and
the college. However, defendant clearly notes on the first page of its catalog: “The information
contained in this catalog is subject to change. The catalog cannot be considered as an agreement or
contract between individual students and Charles Stewart Mott Community College or its
administrators.” Moreover, an ADN program informational package that plaintiff alleges forms part of
the contract states under eligibility requirements that “[p]reference is given to students who have
completed BIO. 156 [microbiology],” a course plaintiff had not completed before applying. Even if our
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state law recognized the relationship between students and colleges as contractual, and we hold that it
does not, defendant’s disclaimers negate the existence of an implied or express contract.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition because defendant
had moved for an extension of the discovery period. We disagree. As a general rule, a motion for
summary disposition is premature if granted before discovery on a disputed issue is complete. Bellows
v Delaware McDonald’s Corp, 206 Mich App 555, 561; 522 NW2d 707 (1994). However,
summary disposition may be appropriate before the discovery period is completed “if further discovery
does not stand a reasonable chance of uncovering factual support for the opposing party’s position.”
Hasselbach v TG Canton, 209 Mich App 475, 482; 531 NW2d 715 (1995). It is not clear from
plaintiff’s brief what additional discovery she planned to undertake that might lead to evidence that could
defeat defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Moreover, since Michigan does not recognize the
relationship of a college and its students as contractual and plaintiff is not entitled to relief based on a
theory of promissory estoppel, further discovery could not lead to evidence that would defeat
defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Finally, plaintiff argues that a remark made by the trial court demonstrated that the court
considered the possibility of other potential lawsuits if this one were successful and that such a
consideration was improper and showed bias against plaintiff. The court’s remark appears near the end
of a well-reasoned opinion that summarizes the facts and law of the case in an even-handed manner.
“The party who challenges a judge on the basis of bias or prejudice bears the heavy burden of
overcoming the presumption of judicial impartiality.” In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich App
134, 151; 486 NW2d 326 (1992). For a case tried without a jury, “the issue of bias or prejudice
should come to this Court’s attention only when a litigant can show that the trial judge’s views controlled
his decision-making process.” Id. at 153. Plaintiff has not overcome the presumption of judicial
impartiality nor demonstrated that the trial court harbored bias or prejudice that controlled its decision
making.
Affirmed.
/s/ Marilyn Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Meyer Warshawsky
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