PEOPLE OF MI V ALFONSO GOINES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 24, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 183233
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 93-126388
ALFONSO GOINES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Hood and Paul J. Sullivan,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant challenges the sentences imposed for his violation of probation, arguing that the
sentences should not have been imposed consecutively to the sentence for the subsequent offense.
Defendant also contends that the cumulative length of his consecutive sentences violates the principle of
proportionality. We affirm.
In July 1993, defendant pleaded guilty to charges of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine,
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv) and conspiracy to deliver less than 50 grams of
cocaine. Defendant also admitted that the charges against him were his second controlled substance
offense, MCL 333.7413(2); MSA 14.15(7413)(2). On September 29, 1993, defendant was
sentenced to lifetime probation.
Subsequently, defendant was arrested on an unrelated matter involving his attempt to injure
another while operating an automobile. On August 29, 1994, defendant pleaded guilty to charges of
assault with intent to commit murder and unlawful use of a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to 3 to 20
years’ imprisonment as an habitual offender. As a result of the assault conviction, a hearing was held
regarding defendant’s violation of probation. Defendant pleaded guilty to violating his probation
regarding both the delivery conviction and the conspiracy conviction. Defendant was sentenced to 1½ to
40 years’ imprisonment for each violation of probation, and the sentences were to be served
consecutively. In addition, the sentences were imposed consecutively to the sentence for the assault
conviction.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Pursuant to MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3), a term of imprisonment for delivery of a
controlled substance “shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for
the commission of another felony” (emphasis added). Therefore, the trial court was obligated to impose
defendant’s sentence for violation of probation on the drug delivery conviction consecutive to the
sentence for the assault conviction. People v Hardy, 212 Mich App 318, 322-324; 537 NW2d 267
(1995). Similarly, MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3) mandates that defendant’s sentence for
conspiracy to deliver drugs (“another felony”) be served consecutively to the sentences for the delivery
of narcotics and assault convictions. See People v Cline, 190 Mich App 1, 2; 475 NW2d 362
(1991). Accordingly, we find no merit in defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in imposing
consecutive sentences rather than concurrent sentences.
Defendant also argues that the total length of his cumulative sentences violates the principal of
proportionality under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), because the aggregate
of the sentences exceeds the sentencing guidelines. We disagree. This Court has determined that each
sentence is to be viewed individually to determine proportionality. People v Warner, 190 Mich App
734, 736; 476 NW2d 660 (1991). The consecutive nature of the sentences has no effect on our
application of the Milbourn standard. Id. Defendant concedes that each individual sentence is within
the guidelines range and would not violate proportionality. Accordingly, defendant’s argument on this
issue is without merit. The fact that defendant’s sentences are to be served consecutively does not
render them violative of the principal of proportionality. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Paul J. Sullivan
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