PEOPLE OF MI V TONY TOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 30, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 178408
LC No. 94-0145-FH
TONY TOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and M.J. Talbot,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a conviction for possession with intent to deliver less
than 50 grams of cocaine in violation of MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). He
pleaded guilty to being a fourth-felony offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084, and was sentenced to
3-1/2 to 25 years imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant contends that his conviction cannot be upheld because the proof that he
knowingly possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver was insufficient because it was based upon layers
of inference. “Inference upon inference” is improper when both inferences are based on the same
evidence, People v Delongchamps, 103 Mich App 151, 160; 302 NW2d 626 (1981), or evidence
that is merely conjectural, People v McWilson, 104 Mich App 550, 555; 305 NW2d 536 (1981). A
factfinder is not prevented from making more than one inference in reaching a decision. Id.
Defendant’s contention fails because each element of defendant’s offense was inferred
from the evidence, not from another inference. The element of possession was not based upon an
inference, but was based upon testimony by the police officers that an object, that subsequently was
determined to be a baggy containing crack cocaine, came out of the passenger window of defendant’s
car as the officers were stopping defendant. The element of knowledge that the substance was cocaine
was not based upon an inference, but was based upon the evidence that the police officers and the lab
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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technician believed that the recovered substance contained cocaine and the testimony that defendant
threw it out of the car window.
Also, there was plenty of evidence for a rational trier of fact to infer that defendant
intended to deliver. Defendant possessed a large amount of cocaine, thirty rocks, and a police officer
testified that a person in possession of that large an amount of cocaine was not just a user, but a dealer,
People v Ray, 191 Mich App 706, 708-709; 479 NW2d 1 (1991). In addition, other evidence
allowing the inference of intent included that defendant told the police officers that he did not use
cocaine, which indicated that the cocaine was not for personal use but for sale; that defendant had a
pager; and that defendant possessed a number of bills of small denomination. See People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 524-525; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Thus, the elements of
knowing possession of cocaine with intent to deliver were properly based on inferences from the
evidence, not layers of inference. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
People v Herbert, 444 Mich 466, 473; 511 NW2d 654 (1993), the evidence was sufficient for a
rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly possessed the
cocaine with the intent to deliver.
Next, defendant contends that the circuit court improperly instructed the jury that it must
find that defendant possessed the cocaine if the jury believed the lab technician’s testimony that the
substance found contained cocaine. This issue is unpreserved because defendant failed to object to the
instruction and defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546
547; 520 NW2d 123 (1995). Defendant cannot show prejudice because the premise of his argument
is incorrect. The court did not instruct the jurors that they must find possession if they believed the lab
results, as defendant contends, but instructed the jurors that they must find the substance was cocaine if
they believed the lab results.
Next, defendant raised several allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. These
arguments are unpreserved because defendant did not object and an instruction would have cured any
error. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994), cert den sub nom Michigan
v Caruso, ___ US ___; 130 L Ed 2d 802; 115 S Ct 923 (1995). For instance, defendant contends
that the prosecutor improperly adduced evidence regarding defendant’s failure to claim his forfeited
property. Even though this evidence was irrelevant, an instruction by the court could have cured any
error, had defendant brought the matter to the court’s attention.
Defendant cannot show prejudice regarding his remaining allegations of misconduct,
because the allegations are without support in the record and the challenged remarks were reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 284; 545 NW2d 18
(1996). Defendant contends that the prosecutor made an improper “drug profile” argument to show
that he was guilty. See People v Hubbard, 209 Mich App 234, 241-243; 530 NW2d 130 (1995).
The record shows that the prosecutor did not argue that defendant fit a “drug profile,” but argued that
on this specific occasion, the circumstantial evidence indicated that defendant was dealing drugs.
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Defendant also contends that the prosecutor attempted to mischaracterize the evidence
by arguing that defendant was trying to avoid detection by driving a rental car with license plates that
belonged to another car, when the license plate error was the fault of the rental car company. The
record shows that the prosecutor properly characterized this evidence as a basis for the police officers
to stop defendant, and properly argued that defendant was trying to avoid detection based on the
evidence that defendant was in a car that had been rented under someone else’s name, not that his
plates were incorrect.
Next, defendant contends that the prosecutor denigrated defendant and his defense by
suggesting that a witness adjusted his story to make it more believable to the jury. The record shows
that the prosecutor was not denigrating defendant, but was comparing what defense counsel said in his
opening statement to the actual evidence shown at trial. In opening, defense counsel stated that a
witness would testify that he buried the cocaine in the snow, whereas at trial, the witness testified that
the cocaine was thrown, not buried. Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor vouched for the
truthfulness of the police officers in closing argument. The record shows that the prosecutor vigorously
argued that her witnesses were credible compared to defendant’s version of events, and did not vouch
for her witnesses’ truthfulness. Thus, the record does not support any of defendant’s allegations of
misconduct because the prosecutor’s remarks were reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence.
Finally, defendant contends that his sentence was disproportionate because he
committed the instant offense while on parole and now must serve t e maximum term on his prior
h
sentence. Defendant is incorrect because there is no mandate that he complete the maximum term on
his prior conviction. Rather, he will be required to serve the combined minimums of his sentences, plus
whatever portion of the earlier term the parole board may require him to serve. Wayne Co Prosecutor
v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 569; 548 NW2d 900 (1996).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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