PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD R SMITH
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 30, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 168556
LC No. 93-003058
RICHARD R. SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Young and H.A. Beach,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to deliver between 50 and 225
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii), and was sentenced to a term
of ten to twenty years of imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the cocaine because the
search warrant was issued without probable cause. Defendant contends that because the affidavit in
support of the search warrant did not address the unnamed police informant’s credibility, it failed to
meet the statutory requirements for probable cause. We disagree.
According to statute, an affidavit based upon information from an unnamed person must include
“affirmative allegations from which the magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal
knowledge of the information and either that the unnamed person is credible or that the information is
reliable.” MCL 780.653(b); MSA 28.1259(3)(b). Defendant argues that the affidavit in question was
deficient because it lacked allegations from which the magistrate could conclude that the informant was
reliable. We disagree. In the affidavit, Officer Foley attested that he searched the informant for drugs
and money before he entered the scene of the buy, provided the informant with prerecorded funds,
observed the informant enter the premises where he remained for eight minutes, searched the informant
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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immediately after he left the scene of the buy, and found a baggy containing a white substance, later
identified as cocaine, and no money. Immediately after this, Officer Foley presented this information to
a magistrate through the prosecutor’s office in order to obtain a search warrant. From these facts, a
magistrate could conclude that the informant spoke with personal knowledge and that the information
provided was reliable. People v Head, 211 Mich App 205, 208-209, 535 NW2d 563 (1995);
People v Stumpf, 196 Mich App 218, 222-224; 492 NW2d 795 (1992). Moreover, Officer Foley
and three other officers executed the search warrant the very next day. Therefore, the trial court did not
err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine.
Defendant also claims that his right against compelled self-incrimination was violated when the
police questioned him about his place of residence without Miranda1 warnings, and subsequently used
his response as substantive evidence against him at trial. We review a Miranda challenge by examining
the entire record and making an independent determination; however, we give deference to the trial
court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. People v Jobson, 205 Mich App 708, 710; 518
NW2d 526 (1994).
After defendant had been detained, Officer Foley asked defendant for his name and address.
Defendant responded with his name and his address. The address stated by defendant coincided with
the address which was the subject of the search warrant and where the contraband was found. When
defense counsel moved to suppress defendant’s response to this question, the trial court denied this
request, reasoning that Officer’s Foley’s question was merely a request for booking information and not
interrogation warranting Miranda warnings. We concur. See United States v Clark, 982 F2d 965,
967 (CA 6, 1993) (routine gathering of biographical data for booking purposes requires no Miranda
warnings).
Defendant next claims that he was denied his right to due process and a fair trial when the trial
court erroneously instructed the jury regarding constructive possession and the presumption of
innocence. We disagree.
Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review because he did not object below and
therefore we will not reverse the lower court’s decision absent manifest injustice. People v Van
Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545; 494 NW2d 731 (1993). We find no manifest injustice as both
instructions were legally sound. Regarding constructive possession, the court defined constructive
possession as “when a person has the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over such an
item” and stated that “the prosecutor must prove . . . that the defendant knew that he was possessing
cocaine.” This instruction mirrors this Court’s holding in People v Sammons, 191 Mich App 351,
371; 478 NW2d 901 (1991). The trial court also provided the standard jury instruction on the
presumption of innocence, CJI 2d 1.9, which mirrors long-standing precedent. See, e.g., People v
Goss, 446 Mich 587, 618; 521 NW2d 312 (1994) (“It is axiomatic that in any criminal case a
defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.”); People v Kayne, 286 Mich 571, 576; 282 NW
248 (1938).
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Defendant next claims that he was denied his due process and confrontation rights when the
police allegedly lost documents and proof of residence that indicated that defendant lived at the house
where the cocaine was found. We disagree. Because defendant through his counsel conceded at trial
that there was no bad faith on the part of the police in failing to preserve this evidence, we conclude that
defendant was not denied his right to due process. See Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51; 109 S Ct
333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). In addition, we conclude that defendant’s confrontation rights were not
infringed by the absence of this evidence. Both the United States and Michigan Constitution provide
that, in a criminal case, a defendant has the right to confront the “witnesses against him.” US Const,
Amend VI; Const 1963, art I, § 20.(Emphasis supplied.) The record indicates that defendant was
allowed full cross-examination of the officer who testified regarding the evidence in question.
Defendant next claims that there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the
cocaine. We disagree. To support a conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1)
that the recovered substance was controlled, (2) the weight of the substance, (3) that defendant was not
authorized to possess the substance, and (4) the defendant knowingly possessed the substance with the
intent to deliver. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 516-517; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich
1201 (1992).
The evidence indicates that defendant admitted to living in the house where the cocaine was
found, that men’s clothing was found in the closet of the bedroom where the cocaine was recovered,
photographs of defendant were found on the dresser in the same bedroom, defendant’s vehicle was
registered to defendant at that address, the other two people present in the house stated that they slept
in other bedrooms, and defendant’s parole card was found in the dresser in the bedroom. This
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to allow a reasonable
juror to infer that defendant had constructive possession of the drugs. Wolfe, supra, 440 Mich 513;
see also Head, supra, 211 Mich App 209-210.
Defendant next claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial
attorney failed to move to suppress testimony regarding identification evidence found in the same room
as the cocaine and in admitting during opening argument that such evidence belonged to defendant. We
disagree.
In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, our review is limited to errors apparent on the current
record. People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 612; 493 NW2d 471 (1992). To establish a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for defense counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303, 312, 314; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
Because it is clear from the record that the evidence belonged to defendant, defense counsel
was merely acknowledging the obvious. Any motion to suppress would have been meritless. People v
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Gist, 188 Mich App 610; 470 NW2d 475, (1991) (defense counsel is not required to bring a frivolous
or meritless motion). Also, although acknowledging that the evidence belonged to defendant, defense
counsel proposed that the presence of these items only supported a finding that defendant may have, at
one time, resided at the location where the cocaine was found, but that he did not live there at the time
that the cocaine was found. Since this course of action was a matter of trial strategy, we find defendant
received effective assistance of counsel. People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721
(1995).
Defendant next claims that he was denied his right a fair trial due to three instances of
prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree. Defendant preserved only one of the three alleged errors.
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor improperly commented on the credibility of defense
witnesses by stating that their testimony was “all over the map,” and, therefore, should not be believed.
We find no error. Prosecutors are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the
evidence as it relates to the prosecution’s theory of the case. People v Gonzalez, 178 Mich App 526,
535; 444 NW2d 228 (1989).
Lastly, as to defendant’s two unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude no
manifest injustice will result from our refusal to review these claims, because a cautionary instruction was
given advising the jury that counsels’ statements were not evidence. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich
643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the sentencing court failed to
articulate the reasons supporting the nature and length of defendant’s sentence. We disagree. The
sentencing court stated that defendant’s sentence was mandated by statute, and that it was sentencing
defendant according to that mandate. This satisfied the articulation requirement. People v Broden, 428
Mich 343, 354; 408 NW2d 789 (1987).
Affirmed.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ Harry A. Beach
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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