PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH M DANIELS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 27, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 179494
LC No. 94-001089
KENNETH M. DANIELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and J.R. Weber,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his bench trial convictions of two counts of criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree, MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a), two counts of criminal sexual
conduct in the second degree, MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a), and one count of
felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277. Defendant was sentenced to prison for a term of
twenty years minimum and thirty years maximum on the two counts of CSC I, three years minimum to
fifteen years maximum on the two counts of CSC II and two years minimum to four years maximum on
the charge of felonious assault, concurrent to each other. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the 180-day rule was violated when defendant’s trial began on July
13, 1994, 220 days after he was found guilty of earlier charges in Oakland Circuit Court. Defendant
asserts that the 180-day period began to run on December 3, 1993, when he was found guilty of the
earlier charges, some of which carry mandatory prison terms, and was detained in the county jail
awaiting sentencing. In the alternative, defendant argues that even if the 180-day period did not
commence until he was sentenced on the earlier charges on December 23, 1993, a violation of the 180
day rule still occurred because 202 days passed between the date of sentencing and the commencement
of trial in the instant case and no delays were attributable to defendant. We disagree.
Michigan’s 180-day rule provides in part:
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
Whenever the department of corrections receives notice that there is pending in
this state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against
any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a prison
sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within
180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting
attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is
pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final
disposition of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint. [MCL 780.131(1);
MSA 28.969(1)(1).]
Generally, the 180-day period commences when either: (1) the prosecutor has actual
knowledge that the person is incarcerated in a state prison, or (2) the Department of Corrections knows
or has reason to know that a criminal charge is pending against a defendant incarcerated in a state
prison. MCR 6.004(D); People v Taylor, 199 Mich App 549, 552; 502 NW2d 348 (1993).
Specifically, the 180-day period begins “when ‘the prosecutor knows’ that the person is incarcerated,
not when the prosecutor knows or has reason to know of the incarceration. Thus, a prosecutor must
now have actual, not imputed, knowledge of the incarceration in order for the 180-day period to be
triggered.” Taylor, supra, 199 Mich App 552. Therefore, defendant’s 180-days began to run on the
sentencing date, December 23, 1993, because the prosecutor can only have actual knowledge of an
incarceration when defendant is actually sentenced to jail.
Two lines of reasoning lead us to the conclusion that the 180-day rule was not violated
in this case. First, if a defendant’s preliminary examination begins within the 180-day limitation period
and there is no showing of lack of good faith on the part of the prosecution in proceeding promptly
towards trial, reversal is not required. People v Finely, 177 Mich App 215, 219-220; 441 NW2d 774
(1989). Defendant had a preliminary examination on January 25, 1994. This was well within the 180
day limitation period. Moreover, there is no indication from the record that the prosecution did not
make a good faith effort to proceed promptly to trial.
Defendant’s argument also fails because only 177 of the days which passed from defendant’s
earlier sentencing date to his trial were attributable to the prosecution. To determine the amount of days
that passed, we count the number of days actually passed and subtract the days for which the defendant
caused the delay. Delays must be subtracted because delays which are attributable to the defendant
negate a violation of the 180-day rule. People v Crawford, 161 Mich App 77, 83; 409 NW2d 729
(1987); People v Pelkey, 129 Mich App 325, 329; 342 NW2d 312 (1983). The record shows and
logic leads us to conclude that defendant’s requests for a new attorney and adjournments caused a
twenty-five day delay. Therefore, the trial occurred in 177 days, 202 days less the twenty-five days
delayed.
Defendant’s second argument is that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first
degree criminal sexual conduct. We disagree. In Michigan, a person is guilty of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct if he engages in sexual penetration with another person and if that other person is under
thirteen years of age. MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a). There is no dispute as to the age
-2
element; the complainant was eleven years old at the time of the alleged incidents. Instead, defendant
challenges that the sexual penetration element was not established. He argues that there is no evidence
of sexual penetration because the complainant was not credible because of her inconsistent statements.
We disagree.
The question on appeal is not whether there was conflicting or inconsistent statements, but
rather whether there was evidence that the trier of fact could choose to believe and if it did so believe
that evidence, that the evidence would justify convicting defendant. People v Smith, 205 Mich App 69;
517 NW2d 2 (1994). In this case, the complainant testified to at least two incidents where
55
defendant had sexual intercourse with her. Such evidence, if believed, would justify a trier of fact in
convicting defendant. The trial court believed complainant’s testimony. This Court will not interfere
with the trial court’s role in determining credibility. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514; 489 NW2d
748 (1992).
Hence, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution a rational trier of fact
could find that the essential elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ John R. Weber
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.