PEOPLE OF MI V EUGENE WALKER JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 190096
LC No. 94-008631-FH
EUGENE WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Taylor, P.J., and Markman and P. J. Clulo,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions of two counts of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520c(1)(f); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(f), and his sentencing as an
habitual second offender, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082. Defendant was sentenced to serve twelve to
twenty-two years in prison. We remand for further factual findings.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by finding that a defense expert, Dr.
John Stryker, had not addressed the elements listed in the definition of legal insanity under MCL
768.21a(1); MSA 28.1044(1)(a). We review a trial court’s finding of fact for clear error. MCR
2.613(C); People v Anderson, 112 Mich App 640, 648; 317 NW2d 205 (1981). Upon review, we
agree that the trial court clearly erred.
At trial, after properly raising the issue of insanity by filing a notice of insanity defense, defendant
presented the testimony of Dr. Stryker to establish his claim. MCL 768.21a(1); MSA 28.1044(1)(a)
defines legal insanity by stating in pertinent part:
A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness . . . or as a result of
mental retardation . . . that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Upon being questioned whether defendant met the requirements of the statute concerning diminished
capacity and legal insanity, Dr. Stryker stated he believed that defendant was mentally ill and that, as a
result of his mental illness, defendant could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior. However,
in rendering its findings of fact, the trial court stated that Dr. Stryker had not mentioned the requirements
of the statute and had not put in “any evidence” to show defendant was insane. The prosecution
concedes that this finding was clear error and, therefore, the issue must be remanded to the trial court
for further findings of fact in accordance with the existing record. MCR 6.403; People v Jackson, 63
Mich App 249, 254; 234 NW2d 471 (1975). The trial court must explain whether it finds the
prosecution proved defendant was not insane beyond a reasonable doubt notwithstanding Dr. Stryker’s
testimony that defendant could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
In a related argument, defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his trial attorney did not elicit the appropriate questions in order to establish a defense of
insanity. As counsel did indeed elicit testimony to establish the elements of the statutory definition of
legal insanity as set forth in MCL 768.21a(1); MSA 28.1044(1)(a), defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance is without merit.
Further, in the event the trial court, upon rendition of additional findings of fact, affirms its
verdict that defendant was guilty but mentally ill of second-degree CSC, we address defendant’s
remaining claims on appeal. First, defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction of guilty but mentally ill because the evidence of his insanity was overwhelming. We disagree.
We review a question of sufficiency of the evidence by viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich
508, 516 n 6; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201-1202 (1992). Viewing the evidence
in that light here, we find the evidence sufficient to convict defendant as guilty but mentally ill of second
degree CSC.
The nature and amount of evidence required to sufficiently overcome a defendant’s assertion of
insanity typically varies from case to case. People v Banks, 139 Mich App 45, 47; 361 NW2d 1
(1984). A strong showing of insanity must be rebutted by something more than minimal evidence of
sanity. People v Murphy, 416 Mich 453, 465-467; 331 NW2d 152 (1982). However, sufficiency is
ultimately a question for the trier of fact. People v Walker, 142 Mich App 523, 527; 370 NW2d 394
(1985). Further, the trial court is not required to accept expert testimony where the use of lay testimony
provides competent evidence of sanity. People v McBride, 55 Mich App 234, 240; 222 NW2d 195
(1974); Murphy, supra, at 465.
Here, the trial court heard the testimony of both defendant and defendant’s expert. In rendering
its verdict, the trial court stated that upon listening to defendant’s testimony it believed that defendant
could appreciate the wrongfulness of his act at the time of the commission of the crime. Viewing the
testimony in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and noting that sufficiency is ultimately a question
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for the trier of fact, we find sufficient evidence existed to find defendant guilty but mentally ill. Wolfe,
supra at 515; Walker, supra at 527.
Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the principle of
proportionality when it sentenced him to twelve to twenty-two years in prison as an habitual offender.
We disagree.
In reviewing a sentence for proportionality on a conviction as an habitual offender, we determine
whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the characteristics of the
offender, taking into consideration the defendant’s criminal history and his potential for rehabilitation.
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). We do not consider the
sentencing guidelines for the underlying offense. People v Gatewood (On Remand), 216 Mich App
559; 550 NW2d 265 (1996). Here, defendant’s criminal history demonstrated repeated unsuccessful
attempts by the criminal justice system to rehabilitate defendant. Defendant committed a violent sexual
assault. After reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the lower court did not violate the principle of
proportionality by sentencing defendant to twelve to twenty-two years, a sentence which did not exceed
the statutorily prescribed enhanced maximum sentence allowed under MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082.
We find defendant’s sentence reflected the seriousness of the matter. People v Houston, 448 Mich
312, 320; 532 NW2d 508 (1995).
Remanded for a clarification of the findings of fact. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Paul J. Clulo
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