PEOPLE OF MI V RAY RICKY STALEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee
v
No. 188447
Monroe County
LC No. 95-026541-FH
RAY RICKY STALEY, 1
Defendant-Appellant
Before: Doctoroff, C.J., and Corrigan and R.J. Danhof,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of unlawful use of a motor vehicle, MCL
750.414; MSA 28.646. Defendant was sentenced to 2-1/2 to 8 years in prison as a fourth habitual
offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for unlawful
use of a motor vehicle. We disagree. In reviewing this issue, we must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489
NW2d 748 (1992); People v Catanzarite, 211 Mich App 573, 577; 536 NW2d 570 (1995).
The crime of unlawful use of a motor vehicle is committed when a person “takes or uses without
authority any motor vehicle without intent to steal the same.” MCL 750.414; MSA 28.646. The
person must have intended to take or use the vehicle, knowing that he had no authority to do so.
People v Hayward, 127 Mich App 50, 60-61; 338 NW2d 549 (1983). Unlawful use of a motor
vehicle is a lesser included offense of unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle. Id. at 61.
The evidence at trial established that defendant drove the complainant’s vehicle from Erie,
Michigan to Suffolk, Virginia. The complainant testified that he did not grant defendant authority to
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
drive the vehicle on the night in question, nor did he otherwise authorize defendant to drive the vehicle to
Virginia. Upon extradition to Michigan, defendant told a police officer, “I did it ‘cause I was mad and
wanted to get back at him.” This statement supports an inference that defendant knew he was using the
vehicle beyond any authority granted to him. Accordingly, viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of unlawful use of a motor
vehicle.
At sentencing, defendant admitted having three prior felony convictions and was t ereafter
h
sentenced as a fourth-felony habitual offender, MCL 769.12: MSA 28.1084. Defendant now argues
that the trial court erred because it failed to advise him of his various rights in accordance with MCR
6.302(B).
Defendant’s reliance on MCR 6.302(B) is misplaced. Before May 1, 1994, a defendant was
entitled to a jury trial on an habitual offender charge and, accordingly, the trial court was required to
advise the defendant of his rights before accepting a plea of guilty to an habitual offender charge.
People v Brownridge, 414 Mich 393, 397-398; 325 NW2d 125 (1982). Effective May 1, 1994,
however, the procedure for enhancing an habitual offender’s sentence was changed. A defendant so
charged is no longer entitled to a jury trial. People v Zinn, 217 Mich App 340, 345; ___ NW2d ___
(1996). As amended, MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, states, in pertinent part::
(5) The existence of the defendant’s prior conviction or convictions shall be
determined by the court, without a jury, at sentencing, or at a separate hearing
scheduled for that purpose before sentencing. The existence of a prior conviction may
be established by any evidence that is relevant for that purpose, including, but not
limited to, 1 or more of the following:
***
(d) A statement of the defendant.
In this case, the existence of defendant’s prior convictions were established by defendant’s admissions
at sentencing, thereby satisfying MCL 769.13(5); MSA 28.1085(5). Accordingly, the trial court did
not err.
Defendant further contends that the 180 day rule was violated and, therefore, the trial court was
without jurisdiction over defendant with regard to the habitual offender charge. Defendant has not cited
any authority in support of this argument. Arguments before this Court must be supported by citation to
appropriate authority. People v Sowders, 164 Mich App 36, 49; 417 NW2d 78 (1987). Moreover,
this issue is not set forth in or otherwise suggested by defendants statement of the questions presented in
his brief on appeal. MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v Yarbrough, 183 Mich App 163, 165; 454 NW2d
419 (1990). Therefore, this issue is not properly before this Court.
-2
Defendant finally argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that is
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich
630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). We disagree.
Defendant not only took the complainant’s vehicle without authorization, he drove it to Virginia,
thereby causing additional expense to the complainant in order to retrieve the vehicle. The presentence
report indicates that defendant has not shown any remorse for his actions. Defendant is an habitual
offender with three prior felony convictions and several misdemeanor convictions. We find that
defendant’s sentence is proportionate to both the seriousness of the offense and the offender. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion. Milbourn, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
1
Defendant has been identified both as “Ray Ricky Staley” and “Ricky Ray Staley.”
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.