GREGORY M CAPLER V DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GREGORY M. CAPLER,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 1996
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 185421
LC No. 203980
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P. J., and Reilly and E. Sosnick,* JJ
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals by right a decision of the tax tribunal rejecting his constitutional challenge to
MCL 205.27a(5); MSA 7.657(27a), and assessing him personally for the unpaid single business tax of
Turn-Rite Manufacturing, Inc. for the 1989 tax year. We affirm.
Petitioner was the corporate officer of Turn-Rite in charge of filing the corporation's tax returns
and/or paying its taxes. He was also a shareholder. Petitioner concedes Turn-Rite's liability for unpaid
taxes and penalties but asserts that the corporation's liability does not extend to him personally.
Petitioner first asserts that application of MCL 205.27a; MSA 7.657(27a) to him constitutes a
taking of his property without due process of law in violation of art 1, § 17, of the Michigan
Constitution. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo by this Court.
Gilson v Treasury Dep't, 215 Mich App 43, 49; 544 NW2d 673 (1996). Revenue Administrative
Bulletin 1989-38 states that "[t]he officer liability provision of [§ 205.27a(5)] has been extended to all
taxes administered by the Revenue Act. The amendment to the Revenue Act is the definitive officer
liability statute for all of the specific tax acts." Administrative Guide, RAB 89-38, p 194. The single
business tax is a specific tax act. MCL 208.31(1); MSA 7.558(31). Pursuant to MCL 208.80(1);
MSA 7.558(80) of the Single Business Tax Act, the tax imposed by the act is to be administered
pursuant to §§ 205.1 to 205.30 of the Revenue Act. Section 205.27a(5) of the Revenue Act clearly
falls within §§ 205.1 to 205.30.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Section 205.27a(5) as applied to petitioner does not constitute a taking of petitioner's property
without due process. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and this Court will construe a statute as
constitutional unless it clearly is not. The presumption of constitutionality is especially strong with regard
to tax legislation. The taxpayer must specify the constitutional provision violated as well as overcome
the strong presumption of v
alidity. Caterpillar v Dep't of Treasury, 440 Mich 400, 413-415; 488
NW2d 182 (1992). If a statute is supported by a rational basis, the choices made and the distinctions
drawn by the Legislature are constitutional. A statute comports with due process if it bears a
reasonable relationship to a permissible governmental objective. Verbison v Auto Club, 201 Mich
App 635, 638; 506 NW2d 920 (1993). The Legislature has a strong interest in raising revenue and in
ensuring that revenue is collected. Its objective is permissible. In addition, holding the corporate officer
in charge of paying taxes and filing returns personally liable for unpaid single business taxes is reasonably
related to the objective of collecting revenue. The statute comports with due process.
Petitioner next asserts that Turn-Rite's corporate veil cannot be pierced in order to hold another
person liable for the corporation's debts in the absence of an allegation of fraud, illegality or injustice.
The tax tribunal did not expressly address petitioner's argument that § 205.27a(5) does not state under
what circumstances the corporate veil can be pierced with regard to assessing a corporation's single
business tax on a corporate officer. However, implicit in the tribunal's opinion that the single business
tax is to be imposed pursuant to §§ 205.1 through 205.30, which include § 205.27a(5), is the finding
that the standards for personal liability outlined in § 205.27a(5) apply to taxes assessed under the Single
Business Tax Act as well as to taxes assessed under the Sales Tax Act and the Use Tax Act.
The bulletin does not address issues arising under only the Sales Tax Act or the Use Tax Act. It
addresses issues arising under all specific tax acts. Administrative Guide, RAB 89-38, p 194. The
circumstances under which the corporate veil can be pierced in order to impose personal liability on a
corporate officer for a corporation's single business tax are as follows: (1) the corporation owes a
single business tax; (2) the corporation fails for any reason to pay the tax; (3) the individual is an officer
of the corporation who (a) controls making the returns or paying the taxes; (b) supervises making the
returns or paying the taxes; or (c) is responsible for making the returns or paying the taxes.
Administrative Guide, RAB 89-39, p 195.
The corporate veil is conferred by statute in Michigan. MCL 450.1541a; MSA 21.200(541a).
Section 205.27a(5) is an exception. Generally, when statutes conflict, and one is specific to the subject
matter and the other is only generally applicable, the specific statute controls. Schubert v Dep't of
Treasury, 212 Mich App 555, 559; 538 NW2d 547 (1995). Section 205.27a(5), a statute providing
for personal liability under specific circumstances, is a specific exception to the general protection from
liability conferred by MCL 450.1541(a); MSA 21.200(541a).
Finally, petitioner asserts that the statute is void for vagueness. A statute is void for vagueness,
and thus violates due process, if its prohibitions a not clearly defined. Petrus v Dickinson Co
re
Comm'rs, 184 Mich App 282, 299-300; 457 NW2d 359 (1990). The test for vagueness is whether
the statute: (1) is overbroad such that it impinges on First Amendment freedoms; (2) does not provide
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fair notice of proscribed conduct; or (3) is so indefinite that it confers unfettered discretion on a trier of
fact to determine whether the statute has been violated. Id. Petitioner's challenge falls under the second
prong.
To give fair notice of prohibited conduct, people of common intelligence must understand what
the statute prohibits without having to guess at its meaning. Petrus, supra, 184 Mich App 300. As
discussed above, section 205.27a(5) provides fair notice of when a corporate officer will be held
personally liable for unpaid corporate single business taxes.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ Edward Sosnick
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