HARRY JAVENS V RUEL MCPHERSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HARRY JAVENS and JOYCE JAVENS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 1996
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 184776
Oakland County
LC No. 94-481252-AS
v
RUEL MCPHERSON and CITY OF HAZEL PARK,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Neff and M. A. Chrzanowski,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to
defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) in this constitutional and legal challenge to one of defendant
Hazel Park’s ordinances. We affirm.
I
Plaintiffs first argue that summary disposition was improper because plaintiffs correctly asserted
in their complaint that the challenged ordinance violated their right to procedural due process under US
Const, Am XIV, and Const 1963, art 1, § 17. We disagree.
City ordinances, like statutes, are clothed with every presumption of validity. Detroit v Qualls,
434 Mich 340, 364; 454 NW2d 374 (1990). The touchstone of validity is the reasonableness of the
ordinance. Cryderrman v Birmingham, 171 Mich App 15, 22; 429 NW2d 625 (1988). The party
challenging the ordinance bears the burden of proving affirmatively that the ordinance is unreasonable,
and thus constitutionally invalid. Qualls, supra, at 364.
We review de novo the trial court’s determination that the ordinance was constitutionally
sound. Scots Ventures, Inc v Hayes Twp, 212 Mich App 530, 532; 537 NW2d 610 (1995). Here,
plaintiffs have not proven affirmatively that the ordinance is unconstitutional. While plaintiffs have
1
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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presented protected property rights, namely the right to pursue a cause of action, Williams v
Grossman, 409 Mich 67, 103; 293 NW2d 315 (1980), and the right to make legitimate use of their
property, People v McKendrick, 188 Mich App 128, 136; 468 NW2d 903 (1991), they have not
shown that the procedures attendant upon the deprivation of these rights were constitutionally
insufficient. Jordan v Jarvis, 200 Mich App 445, 448-449; 505 NW2d 279 (1993). Plaintiffs also
have not shown that they are unable obtain a rental or a landlord license and thus gain access to the
district court to sue for unpaid rent and repossession. Further, plaintiffs are not left without an
opportunity to defend themselves and to be heard. Id. at 449. The ordinance specifically provides that
all code violations, which provide grounds for deprivation of rental licenses and landlord licenses, may
be appealed to the City Code Commission.
Plaintiffs also ignore the fact that a property owner’s right to full and free use and enjoyment of
his property is subject to reasonable regulation by the state in the legitimate exercise of its police power.
McKendrick, supra, at 137. Cities may enact provisions for the protection of the safety, health,
morals, prosperity, comfort, convenience and welfare of the public, so long as they do not run contrary
to the constitution or any general statute. MCL 117.3(j); MSA 5.2073(j). Ordinances having for their
purpose the stabilization of the use and value of property and the attraction of desirable citizenship and
fostering its permanency are among the legitimate goals of such provisions. McKendrick, supra, at
138. These state interests are strong enough to support the legitimacy of the ordinance’s code violation
procedures.
The trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition on this ground
because it correctly held that the ordinance did not deny plaintiffs their right to procedural due process.
II
Plaintiffs’ second issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition because plaintiffs correctly asserted in their complaint that the challenged ordinance
is preempted by or in conflict with the summary procedure provisions of the Revised Judicature Act,
MCL 600.101 et seq.; MSA 27A.101, et seq. and the enforcement provisions of the Housing Act,
MCL 125.523, et seq.; MSA 5.2891(3), et seq. We disagree.
A municipality may not enact an ordinance if (1) the ordinance directly conflicts with the state
statutory scheme, or (2) the state statutory scheme preempts the ordinance by occupying the field of
regulation that the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of the ordinance, even where there is no
direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation. John’s Corvette Care, Inc v Dearborn, 204
Mich App 616, 618; 516 NW2d 527 (1994). Preemption may be established (1) where state law is
expressly preemptive; (2) by examination of the legislative history; (3) by the pervasiveness of the state
regulatory scheme, although this factor alone is not generally sufficient to infer preemption; or (4) where
the nature of the subject matter regulated demands exclusive state regulation to achieve the uniformity
necessary to serve the state’s purpose or interest. Id.
A
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Plaintiffs first contend that the ordinance conflicts with or is preempted by those sections of the
Revised Judicature Act that establish the jurisdiction of the state’s district courts over landlord/tenant
summary proceedings. MCL 600.5704; MSA 27A.5704, MCL 600.5714; MSA 27A.5714. We
disagree. The purpose of the ordinance is not to alter the jurisdiction of the district court in
landlord/tenant proceedings, but to ensure proper maintenance and prevent deterioration of housing
units. The ordinance does not address the power of the district court; it merely states that landlords
must have a landlord license to be entitled to payment of rent or to evict tenants. The state is not
seeking to regulate this area through the Revised Judicature Act. Presumably, if landlords have the
necessary license, they may sue in the district court for unpaid rent and repossession as provided by
MCL 600.5704; MSA 27A.5704, MCL 600.5714; MSA 27A.5714.
B
Plaintiffs next contend that the ordinance is preempted by the enforcement provisions of the
Housing Act, MCL 125.523; MSA 5.2891(3) to MCL 125.541c; MSA 5.2891(21c), because this
portion of the Housing Act allows landlords to sue in the district court for unpaid rent and repossession
even when their rental units pose a public hazard. Plaintiffs also contend that Hazel Park exceeded its
powers under the Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1, et seq.; MSA 5.2071, et seq., in enacting the
remedy limit portion of the ordinance that blocks unlicensed landlords from suing in the district court for
unpaid rent and repossession. Again, we disagree.
While plaintiffs correctly assert that the Home Rule City Act does not contain an express grant
of authority allowing home rule cities to prohibit what the state permits, Grand Haven v Grocer’s
Cooperative Dairy Co, 330 Mich 694, 698; 48 NW2d 362 (1951), plaintiffs overlook two important
provisions of the Housing Act that provide home rule cities with authority to regulate the procedures a
city may follow in cases of hazardous building violations. First, MCL 125.543; MSA 5.2891(23)
provides that no Michigan city, village, or township is required to adopt the Housing Act. Hazel Park
has chosen not to adopt the Housing Act to regulate building violations within its borders, and instead
uses the National Property Maintenance Code adopted by the Building Officials & Code
Administrators International, Inc. (the “BOCA Code”). Moreover, MCL 125.534(8); MSA
5.2891(14)(8) expressly provides that the act “does not preempt, preclude, or interfere with the
authority of a municipality to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the public through
ordinance, charter, or other means.” Thus, the ordinance does not directly conflict with the state
statutory scheme.
C
Next, plaintiffs contend that the ordinance’s provision creating a nuisance per se in any rental
unit found in violation of the city code, which in turn leads to a denial of a landlord license, conflicts with
and is preempted by the Housing Act, which allows a building to be declared a nuisance per se only
when dangerous to the public. Plaintiffs also argue that Hazel Park incorrectly relied on MCL 125.587;
MSA 5.2937 in creating its nuisance per se provision, because the ordinance is meant to govern housing
violations, not zoning violations. We disagree.
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The ordinance provides that it is deficiencies in the rental unit, and not the landlord’s failure to
obtain a landlord license, that lead to the declaration of a nuisance per se. The ordinance sets out strict
requirements that a rental unit must meet in order to qualify for a rental unit license, including compliance
with Hazel Park’s housing, construction, zoning, and property maintenance codes. In addition, the
ordinance allows conditional rental unit licenses to be issued when “no violations are in existence which
would preclude habitation or threaten the health, safety or welfare of the occupants or community.”
These provisions indicate that Hazel Park intended its ordinance to parallel MCL 125.486; MSA
5.2858, the provision of the Housing Act defining nuisances per se. The mere fact that the ordinance
authorizes the imposition of a greater penalty than does a state statute does not invalidate the ordinance,
especially where the city is not bound to follow the ordinance. Kalita v Detroit, 57 Mich App 696,
705; 226 NW2d 699 (1975).
Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the ordinance is preempted by or in conflict with state law,
and the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition on the ground that
plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
III
Plaintiffs’ third argument is that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition because plaintiffs correctly asserted in their complaint that the ordinance violates the
separation of powers clause of Const 1963, art 3, § 2. The ordinance, plaintiffs argue, represents an
attempt by a legislative body, the Hazel Park City Council, to interfere with and limit the power and
jurisdiction of a judicial body, the 43rd District Court, by preventing unlicensed landlords from pursuing
actions for unpaid rent and repossession. We disagree.
It is well settled that the separation of powers doctrine mandates the preservation of the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government as entities distinct from one another. Wayne
Co Prosecutor v Wayne Co Bd of Comm’rs, 93 Mich App 114, 121; 286 NW2d 62 (1979).
However, some overlapping of functions between the branches of government is permissible provided
the area of one branch’s exercise of another branch’s power is very limited and specific. It is only
where the whole power of one branch is exercised by the same hands that possess the whole power of
another branch that the separation of powers clause is violated. Berrien Co Probate Judges v
Michigan AFSCME Council 25, 217 Mich App 205, 210; 550 NW2d 859 (1996).
The ordinance at issue here does not violate the separation of powers clause because it does
not represent an attempt by the Hazel Park City Council to exercise the “whole power” granted to the
district court. In passing the ordinance, the Council was not trying to regulate all procedure or
jurisdiction in the court, or to try to perform the functions of the court; rather, it was merely limiting the
access of one class of persons in an attempt to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens.
Hazel Park has both a legitimate interest in protecting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens and the
power to enact ordinances to do so. Moore v City of Detroit, 146 Mich App 448, 462; 382 NW2d
482 (1985).
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Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the ordinance violates the separation of powers clause.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition on this
ground.
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IV
Plaintiffs’ final issue on appeal is that summary disposition was improper because plaintiffs
correctly claimed in their complaint that the ordinance was invalid because Hazel Park, in establishing
the membership qualifications for its construction code appeals board, circumvented the requirements of
the BOCA Code. We disagree.
Neither the trial court nor the parties, either below or on appeal, has specified a constitutional
ground for the proposition that Hazel Park either could or could not amend the construction code
appeals board membership requirements of the BOCA Code, except for due process arguments
mentioned in passing by plaintiffs in their complaint and their brief on appeal. We find that Hazel Park’s
amendment of the membership requirements of the appeals board does not deprive plaintiffs of their
right to due process.
No municipality may enact an ordinance that amends, repeals, or dispenses with the minimum
requirements of the Housing Act. MCL 125.408; MSA 5.2778. However, municipalities may not only
exempt themselves from the State Construction Code by adopting a nationally recognized code, but
also approve amendments to such codes by ordinance. MCL 125.1508(1); MSA 5.2949(8)(1).
Moreover, the membership requirements imposed by Hazel Park are more stringent than those
promulgated by the State Construction Code, MCL 125.1514(1); MSA 5.2949(14)(1), one of the
provisions of the State Construction Code from which a municipality may not exempt itself. MCL
125.1508(7); MSA 5.2949(8)(7).
Because Hazel Park did not act unconstitutionally or in violation of state law in amending the
membership requirements for its construction code appeals board, the trial court correctly granted
defendant’s motion for summary disposition on this ground.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Mary A. Chrzanowski
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The trial court ruled that the ordinance was constitutionally sound in its order denying plaintiffs’ motion
for declaratory judgment, not in its grant of defendants’ motion for summary disposition. However,
defendants based their motion for summary disposition in part on the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s
motion for declaratory judgment.
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