FIRST NATIONAL BANK ST IGNACE V DONALD P FRANKOVICH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ST. IGNACE,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 1996
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellee,
v
No. 184238
LC No. 91-3216-CH
DONALD P. FRANKOVICH and DIANE F.
FRANKOVICH,
Defendants-Counterplaintiffs-Appellants,
and
FRED A. JACKSON and MARGARET M. JACKSON,
Defendants.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ST. IGNACE,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellee,
v
No. 184240
LC No. 91-31216-CH
DONALD P. FRANKOVICH and DIANE F.
FRANKOVICH,
Defendants-Counterplaintiffs,
and
FRED A. JACKSON and MARGARET M.
JACKSON,
Defendants-Appellants.
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__________________________________________
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and MacKenzie and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases, defendants Frankovich and Jackson appeal as of right from a
judgment for foreclosure on the Frankovichs’ mortgage debt and from an order for sale of the
mortgaged property, which had been redeemed by the Jacksons after a prior foreclosure sale. We
affirm and remand for further proceedings.
The facts in this case are not significantly in dispute. The Frankovichs borrowed money from
plaintiff First National Bank of St. Ignace on three separate occasions: first in 1978, in 1981 and again
in 1984. The loans were secured by mortgage liens on two pieces of property owned by the
Frankovichs -- a rental home and a commercial parcel referred to as “the barbershop property.” In
1990, all three loans were delinquent and the bank initiated foreclosure by advertisement on the 1978
loan, which was guaranteed by the Small Business Administration [SBA]. A few days after initial
publication of the foreclosure, the bank and the SBA entered into a subordination agreement in which
the 1978 loan was subordinated to the 1981 and 1984 loans. T subordination agreement was
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recorded within a week of its signing.
The parties agree that the foreclosure sale extinguished the 1981 loan. At the time of the sale,
the bank erroneously applied the proceeds of the sale to the 1984 loan rather than to the 1978 loan.
Just prior to the expiration of the redemption period and six months after the subordination agreement
had been recorded, the Frankovichs assigned their right to redeem the property to the Jacksons, who
redeemed the barbershop property as an investment. After approximately one year, the Jacksons
reconveyed the property to the Frankovichs via land contract.
The bank originally brought suit seeking a deficiency judgment on the 1978 loan; however,
following a counterclaim by the Frankovichs that the bank had illegally failed to apply the proceeds from
foreclosure to the loan foreclosed upon, the bank corrected its books to reflect application of the
proceeds to the 1978 loan, and filed an amended complaint seeking foreclosure of the 1984 loan and to
quiet title to the barbershop property now held by the Jacksons. Both sets of defendants moved for
summary disposition, claiming that the bank’s original application of the proceeds to the 1984 loan
extinguished that loan and the 1978 loan by operation of law. The trial court denied the motions.
Following a bench trial, the court concluded that the bank’s initial erroneous application of the
loan proceeds to the 1984 loan did not extinguish that loan and that no valid discharge occurred in the
absence of any intent on the bank’s part to discharge the mortgage. The Frankovichs make the same
argument on appeal, contending that the trial court erred in failing to grant their motion for summary
disposition because the bank’s application of the proceeds to the 1981 and 1984 loans satisfied those
loans, and that the subordinated 1978 loan was extinguished by operation of law. However, as the
Frankovichs themselves point out, the bank was legally required to apply the proceeds of the sale to the
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1978 loan. MCL 600.3252; MSA 27A.3252. That loan was extinguished by the sale, and because it
was subordinated to the 1981 and 1984 loans, those loans remained outstanding liens against the
property. Consequently, the trial court did not err when it denied defendants’ motion for summary
disposition.
The Frankovichs next argue that the rental home property should not have been sold at the
foreclosure sale because the proceeds from the barbershop property sale were sufficient to satisfy the
1978 loan. This argument is without merit; the total amount necessary to redeem the mortgage was
approximately $1,400 in excess of the amount bid by the bank for the barbershop property. The
Frankovichs also contend that even if the bank was entitled to sell both properties, it was not entitled to
keep any proceeds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy the 1978 loan and that any surplus
should have been paid to them. This argument also fails. MCL 600.3252; MSA 27A.3252 directs the
seller to pay the surplus funds to claimants who have subsequent mortgages or liens on the property.
Defendants’ reliance on Senters v Ottawa Savings Bank, 443 Mich 45; (1993), is misplaced because
that case is factually distinguishable. The bank in this case is not seeking an equitable lien or deficiency
judgment, but is bringing a separate suit to foreclose a separate mortgage. For similar reasons,
Pulleyblank v Cape, 179 Mich App 690; 446 NW2d 345 (1989), is inapposite; in that case, the
mortgagee bid more than the total amount of debt d leaving no debt to support a subsequent
ue,
foreclosure. Id. at 696.
The Jacksons’ first allegation of error is that the court wrongly found that the subordination
agreement had been recorded in a timely manner. This issue has not been preserved for review; the trial
court cannot be faulted for assuming that the Jacksons concurred as to the timeliness of the recording
where their attorney failed to contest the issue in even the slightest regard. Moreover, a review of the
record reveals that the recording was both timely and valid.
Although the Jacksons claim they are entitled to recision of the redemption under a host of legal
theories, including estoppel, actual fraud, constructive fraud, breach of duty to disclose, and
unconscionability, all those theories hinge on two key allegations: first, that the bank falsely represented
the mortgage as a first mortgage; and second, that the bank had an affirmative duty to inform the
Jacksons that the property was encumbered by another mortgage due to its superior knowledge and
expertise, which the Jacksons were entitled to rely on. Each of these assertions will be addressed in
turn.
In Flax v Mutual Building & Loan Ass’n of Bay Co, 198 Mich 676, 689; 165 NW 835
(1917), our Supreme Court held that the fact that a foreclosure advertisement failed to allege the
existence of prior mortgages did not provide grounds for setting aside the sale. The advertisement at
issue in this case was not misleading because it contained all the information it was required to contain
pursuant to MCL 600.3212; MSA 27A.3212. The Jacksons also contend that they were misled into
believing that they would receive clear title because the bank bid full price for the property. However,
there is no evidence that the bank’s bid was made for the purpose of misleading potential purchasers,
and no expert testimony was introduced to establish the fair market value of the property or that the
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bank knew of the Jacksons’ interest in purchasing the property at the time of the sale. Consequently, it
is difficult to see how improper motives can be imputed to the bank on those facts.
Fred and Margaret Jackson both testified at trial that there was no communication between
themselves and the bank. Thus, there could have been no affirmative misrepresentation of any material
facts made by an employee of the bank to the Jacksons. The Jacksons did not consult with an attorney,
conduct a title search, or ask the Frankovichs whether there were additional encumbrances on the
property. In Schweiss v Woodruff, 73 Mich 473, 477; 41 NW 511 (1889), our Supreme Court held:
It is the duty of a purchaser of real estate to investigate the title of his vendor,
and to take notice of any adverse rights or equities of third persons which he has the
means of discovering, and as to which he is put on inquiry. If he makes all the inquiry
which due diligence requires, and still fails to discover the outstanding right, he is
excused, but, if he fails to use due diligence, he is chargeable, as a matter of law, with
notice of the facts which the inquiry would have disclosed.
Consequently, because the Jacksons failed to exercise due diligence, they are chargeable with having
had notice of whatever facts the inquiry would have disclosed.
The trial court also correctly determined that the bank owed no affirmative duty to inform the
Jacksons as to the state of the title. The problem of notice is precisely the problem the recording
statutes were designed to resolve. American Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v Orenstein, 81 Mich
App 249, 257; 265 NW2d 111 (1978) (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
However, the parties agree by stipulation that the subject property was later sold (after entry of
the March 8, 1995, circuit court judgment and order) at auction for $43,754.98. Defendants alleged at
oral argument, and plaintiff did not dispute, that the total amount received for the property, at its
redemption and subsequent sale, amounted to significantly more than the mortgage amount. In the
interest of justice, we remand this matter to the trial court for determination whether there is merit to
defendants’ claim of unjust enrichment.
Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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