PEOPLE OF MI V PERRINNE GARGILL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 181024
LC No. 94-003901
PERRINNE GARGILL,*
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Wahls and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL
750.83; MSA 28.278, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b;
MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to serve eight to twenty years’ imprisonment for the assault
conviction after the completion of two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether he is entitled to a new trial due to the invalid waiver
of his right to a jury trial. The prosecutor agrees that defendant’s claim is meritorious thereby requiring a
reversal of the conviction and remand of this matter for a retrial. Both the prosecution and defendant
acknowledge that MCR 6.402(B) requires a trial court to “advise the defendant in open court of the
constitutional right to trial by jury. The court must also ascertain, by addressing the defendant
personally, that the defendant understands the right and that the defendant voluntarily chooses to give up
that right and to be tried by the court. A verbatim record must be made of the waiver proceeding.”
These requirements ensure that the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and made with the requisite
understanding of the rights involved. People v Shields, 200 Mich App 554, 560-561; 504 NW2d 711
(1993); People v Reddick, 187 Mich App 547, 548-550; 468 NW2d 278 (1991).
Our review of the record shows that at a March 1994 hearing before Judge Robert L. Evans,
the court discussed defendant’s written waiver of jury trial, as follows:
* The lower court record shows defendant’s last name as both “Cargill” and “Gargill.” Because the
judgment of sentence reflects the spelling as Gargill, we will use that spelling for purposes of this appeal.
-1
THE COURT: Mr. Cargill, you just signed this paper called Waiver of Trial By
Jury?
DEFENDANT CARGILL: Yes.
THE COURT: When you signed it, did you intend to give up your right to
a jury trial?
DEFENDANT CARGILL: Yes.
THE COURT: Your co-defendant wants a jury trial. Are you sure you
don’t want a jury trial, sir? Do you want to think about it?
DEFENDANT CARGILL: I don’t want no jury trial.
THE COURT: The Court finds defendant understands his right to a jury
trial and wants to waive it. The Court accepts the waiver.
Furthermore, at the conclusion of defendant’s April 1994 waiver trial involving other criminal charges of
which defendant was found guilty, defendant and his counsel again informed Judge Evans during the final
pretrial conference that defendant had no objection to the court trying this case. The court asked
defendant whether he wanted another judge to hear this case and whether he had any objections to
Judge Evans hearing the other case, and defendant answered no. This case was eventually transferred,
however, to Judge Townsend, who presided over the bench trial. Our de novo review of the record
convinces us that “it would be unreasonable to believe that defendant did not understand that he had a
right to a jury trial and did not voluntarily waive that right.” Reddick, supra at 550. We believe that
defendant received multiple warnings regarding his constitutional right to a jury trial, he signed the waiver
of jury trial form which repeatedly states that defendant intends to waive this constitutional right, and that
Judge Evans’ questioning exceeded the mandates of MCR 6.402(B). Consequently, we find no error
requiring reversal. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Jane E. Markey
-2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
