AURELIOUS ALSTON V FLINT EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS PC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
AURELIOUS ALSTON and JULIA ALSTON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 1996
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 176065
LC No. 91-005873-NM
FLINT EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.C.,
and DR. FEDEWA,
Defendants,
and
McLAREN GENERAL HOSPITAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Corrigan and P.D. Houk,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this medical malpractice action, defendant McLaren General Hospital appeals as of right from
a jury verdict and monetary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
Plaintiff Aurelious Alston presented at McLaren General Hospital Emergency Room on March
18, 1990, with complaints of pain in his elbow. He was examined by Dr. Fedewa, the emergency
physician on duty. Dr. Fedewa was a resident in training, in her third year of an emergency residency
program. Dr. Fedewa sought a consultation with the hospital’s orthopedic department. Dr. Keller, a
first-year general surgical resident undertaking a rotation in the orthopedic department, examined Mr.
Alston. Dr. Keller then discussed Mr. Alston’s condition with the senior orthopedic resident and the
orthopedic surgeon on call. The surgeon on call formulated a discharge plan for Mr. Alston, which was
related by Dr. Keller to Dr. Fedewa.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Mr. Alston returned to the emergency room the next day and was admitted into the hospital’s
intensive care unit because of an infection in his right arm. The infection resulted in the amputation of
Mr. Alston’s right arm.
Plaintiffs filed this medical malpractice action against Flint Emergency Physicians, P.C., Dr.
Fedewa, and McLaren Hospital. Following a hearing on defendant’s motion for summary disposition,
the trial court determined that Dr. Kwiatowski could not testify to the local standard of care of
emergency room residents and, therefore, dismissed the action against Dr. Fedewa and her employer,
Flint Emergency Physicians, P.C. The court held, however, that Dr. Kwiatowski’s testimony as it
related to the operation of an emergency room was admissible. The court’s ruling limited Dr.
Kwiatowski’s testimony to the standard of care with respect to the operation of an emergency
department.
Using a special verdict form, the jury found that the hospital was negligent in its treatment of Mr.
Alston and that the hospital’s negligence was the proximate cause of Mr. Alston’s injuries. The jury
awarded $1,500,000 to Mr. Alston, and $500,000 to Mrs. Alston on her claim of loss of consortium.
Defendants first claim that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Dr. Kwiatowski, an
emergency medicine specialist from New York, to offer expert testimony regarding the operation of an
emergency room. We disagree. Dr. Kwiatowski testified to the judge’s satisfaction regarding his
qualifications and familiarity with the standard of care for emergency rooms. He testified that he was
familiar with the standard of care applicable to emergency rooms on the basis of his own education,
practice, and development and running of an emergency medicine residency program. Dr. Kwiatowski
also testified that he visited many hospitals in Southeastern Michigan and has had numerous specific
discussions with emergency room physicians in Michigan regarding standards of practice. He has also
had ongoing exposure to the health care system in Michigan, and indicated that the standard of care in
Flint is similar to the standard of care in New York City. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Dr. Kwiatowski was qualified to testify regarding the standard of care
applicable to emergency rooms. Bahr v Harper-Grace Hospitals, 448 Mich 135, 141-142; 528
NW2d 170 (1995); Turbin v Graesser (On Remand), 214 Mich App 215; 542 NW2d 607 (1995).
Defendant contends, however, that because the trial court granted defendant’s motion to limit
the proofs to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff should not have been allowed to argue that the
hospital itself was negligent. Defendant also maintains that a hospital may be liable only if its agents are
liable. We disagree.
The court instructed the jury on plaintiff’s theory of recovery:
When I use the words professional negligence or malpractice with respect to the
Defendant’s conduct, I mean the failure to do something which a hospital through its
agents in an emergency room failed to do in this community, or a similar one would do,
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or the doing of something which a hospital or its agents would not do under the same or
similar circumstances you would find to exist in this case.
It is for you to decide, based upon the evidence, what the ordinary hospital
acting through its agents would do or would not do under the same or similar
circumstances.
First, defendant acceded to the jury instructions, which allowed the finding of fault for the “doing
of something which a hospital or its agents would not do.” Dr. Kwiatowski’s expert testimony helped
define the hospital’s duty. Wilson v Stillwill, 411 Mich 587, 610-611; 309 NW2d 898 (1981).
Second, there is no indication in the record that defendant objected to the jury form, which allowed a
finding of negligence against the hospital itself as a defendant. Finally, despite the court’s ruling that
plaintiffs could present evidence only on the allegations in the complaint, the proofs and instructions
placed the question of the hospital’s negligence before the jury. When issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they are treated as if they had been raised by the
pleadings. MCR 2.118(C)(1).
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Kwiatowski’s
testimony regarding Dr. Fedewa, who had been dismissed from the case. A review of Dr.
Kwiatowski’s testimony, however, reveals that Dr. Kwiatowski was not particularly critical of Dr.
Fedewa, but rather of the chain of command which left the physicians without guidance. Dr.
Kwiatowski’s primary criticism of defendant’s conduct was that Mr. Alston should have been admitted
to the hospital, and no one knew who was accountable for the decision to discharge. The evidence was
relevant in that it tended to show that the hospital did not have a clearly defined structure for final
treatment and subsequent discharge or admission of a patient. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52,
60; 508 NW2d 114 (1993). Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the testimony did not attempt to
show that the hospital was vicariously liable for Dr. Fedewa’s actions. Rather, the evidence showed
that Dr. Fedewa conducted herself as she believed she should have. Therefore, the evidence, which
was relevant to a material issue of whether the hospital breached a duty of care in the way it organized
and administered the emergency room, was properly admitted.
The trial court also properly denied defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition with
regard to the claim of vicarious liability for the participation of Dr. Fedewa. The issue was not the
vicarious liability of defendant, but whether defendant itself breached a duty of care in the manner in
which it operated the emergency room.
Next, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing plaintiff to cross
examine defendant’s expert, Dr. Mangell, about Dr. Keller’s failure to wear gloves while drawing fluid
from Mr. Alston because defendant was not on notice that such testimony might be elicited.1 Again, we
disagree. On direct examination, Dr. Mangell testified that Dr. Keller did not breach a standard of care.
On cross-examination, Dr. Mangell testified that emergency room physicians may not always wear
gloves when draining or dressing a wound, but that it would be his choice that gloves be worn by
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attending physicians. This testimony related to emergency room procedures and was relevant to the
allegation that defendant owed a duty to establish rules and procedures to be followed in rendering care
in the emergency room.
Defendant next cites twelve illustrative instances in the transcript that allegedly show the
misconduct of plaintiff’s counsel. Of the twelve, defense objections were sustained seven times. One
objection was overruled. One question was withdrawn, and one led to a withdrawal based on
improper recollection of prior testimony. Two of the citations refer to plaintiff’s objections to defense
examination of the witness, and one citation is to a remark in closing argument that was not challenged.
Nonetheless, we have reviewed the comments to which defendant objects and find that the comments
were either proper or had no effect on the verdict. Reetz v Kinsman Marine Transit Co, 416 Mich
97, 102-103; 330 NW2d 638 (1982).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on loss of consortium.
However, defendant did not object to the instruction and, indeed, acceded to the instructions as given.
An appellate court is obligated to review only issues that are properly raised and preserved. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 694; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Generally, an issue is not properly preserved
if it is not raised before and addressed by the trial court. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520
NW2d 123 (1994). A party waives review of jury instructions to which he accedes at trial. People v
Taylor, 159 Mich App 468, 488; 406 NW2d 859 (1987). We decline to disregard the issue
preservation requirement because failure to review the issue would not result in manifest injustice.
Grant, supra at 547.
Last, defendant maintains that the trial court erred in denying its motion for new trial or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, motion for remittitur. The arguments raised by
defendant with respect to the motion for new trial or JNOV have previously been addressed and do not
warrant review.
In deciding a motion for remittitur, the “only consideration expressly authorized by [MCR]
2.611(E)(1)” is whether the award is supported by the evidence. Palenkas v Beaumont Hospital,
432 Mich 527, 532; 443 NW2d 354 (1989)(emphasis in original). A trial court should also examine a
number of other factors, “such as whether the verdict was induced by bias or prejudice,” but the inquiry
should be limited to “objective considerations relating to the actual conduct of the trial or to the
evidence adduced.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Here, the judge considered the evidence and concluded that the “catastrophic event” suffered
by Mr. Alston justified the award of damages to Mr. Alston. We agree. The trial court did not,
however, specifically address the $500,000 award to Mrs. Alston for loss of consortium. Loss of
consortium includes loss of conjugal fellowship, companionship, services, and all other incidents of the
marriage relationship. Berryman v K Mart, 193 Mich App 88, 94; 483 NW2d 642 (1992). The only
testimony regarding the damages suffered by Mrs. Alston was that of Mr. Alston, who testified that
Mrs. Alston has to do all the cooking and vacuuming and has to bring him his clothes and assist him in
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getting dressed. The testimony shows that Mr. Alston is distressed by having to be cared for by Mrs.
Alston, but there is no evidence that Mrs. Alston has suffered. The record in this case simply does not
support an award of $500.000 to Mrs. Alston. Thus, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion. Palenkas, supra. The case is remanded to the trial court for a
rehearing on defendant’s motion for remittitur with respect to Mrs. Alston’s claim of loss of consortium
in light of the scant evidence presented.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Peter D. Houk
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Defendant also suggests that Mr. Alston’s children and g
randchildren were improperly allowed to
testify because they were not listed on the witness list. However, plaintiff’s witness list indicates “family
and friends.” Further, defendant failed to preserve this issue with regard to the family by raising an
objection at trial. People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 673-674; 528 W2d 842 (1995).
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