DONALD BRYAN V AUTO CLUB INS ASSOC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DONALD BRYAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 13, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 176215
Wayne County
LC No. 93-321299-CK
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P. J., and Reilly and E. Sosnick,* JJ
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the May 20, 1994, trial court order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendant in this insurance action. We affirm.
Plaintiff was severely injured in an automobile accident. At the time, plaintiff had coordinated
medical benefits coverage with the Health Alliance Plan (HAP), a health maintenance organization
operating out of Henry Ford Hospital, as his primary coverage. Plaintiff also had a no-fault policy
issued by defendant as his secondary coverage. After HAP physicians apparently told plaintiff that they
provided him with all the services they felt were medically appropriate, plaintiff sought various services
from non-HMO affiliated physicians and filed suit against defendant for breach of contract when
defendant refused to pay the bills. Defendant subsequently moved for summary disposition arguing that
as plaintiff’s secondary insurer, it was not responsible for plaintiff’s medical bills which were covered by
HAP, plaintiff’s primary insurer, pursuant to Tousignant v Allstate Ins Co, 444 Mich 301; 506 NW2d
844 (1993). The court granted defendant’s motion and this appeal followed.
In Tousignant, our Supreme Court held that a no-fault insurer is not liable for medical expenses
that the insured’s health care insurer is required under its contract to pay for or provide. 444 Mich 303.
Plaintiff does not dispute that his policy provided for coordinated benefits or that the services plaintiff
sought by non-HAP providers were covered by HAP. Rather, plaintiff argues that Tousignant does
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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not preclude his claim where the necessary medical care was unavailable or of inadequate quality at
HAP facilities. Plaintiff relies on the following language from that case:
Tousignant does not contend that HAP would not or could not provide the
medical care needed. Nor is this a case in which it is claimed that the quality of the
available care was such that it can be said that the benefit was not available.
Where there is no claim that the health insurer would not or could not provide
the necessary medical treatment, there is no basis for a finding that the benefits were not
available—not “payable” or “required to be provided”—from the health insurer. [444
Mich 313.]
This language suggests that an exception to the general rule of Tousignant may exist when the
primary health care provider could not or would not provide the medical care needed or where the
quality of the available care from the primary health care provider was such that it can be said that the
benefit was not available. See also Owens v ACIA, 444 Mich 314; 506 NW2d 850 (1993).
Nevertheless, this Court need not resolve the issue of whether the above-quoted language from
Tousignant was mere dicta or whether it actually limited the scope of the holding because, in this case,
plaintiff failed to provide medical evidence that necessary medical care was unavailable or of inadequate
quality at HAP facilities. The only evidence to support plaintiff’s claim was his own affidavit. Summary
disposition affidavits must show affirmatively that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify
competently to the facts stated in the affidavit. MCR 2.119(B)(1). Plaintiff’s opinion regarding the care
he received from HAP facilities would not be admissible since he is not competent to testify to the facts
stated in the affidavit. A lay witness may not testify to a medical question beyond the scope of lay
knowledge. Howard v Feld, 100 Mich App 271, 273; 298 NW2d 722 (1980). Whether necessary
medical care was unavailable or of inadequate quality at HAP facilities requires medical knowledge
beyond the scope of a lay person. Plaintiff is not himself a physician and is thus not qualified to give an
opinion regarding this issue. Compare Owens, supra. If plaintiff could establish a triable issue with
merely his own opinion that his treatment was unsatisfactory in this situation, the statutorily authorized
coordination of benefits concept would be rendered meaningless.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ Edward Sosnick
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