KATHRYN A MCKAY V CLARENCE A MCKAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KATHRYN A. MCKAY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 187346
LC No. 94-472931
CLARENCE A. MCKAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markman, P.J., and McDonald and M. J. Matuzak*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from an order denying his motion to set aside a default judgment
of divorce. We reverse.
Two weeks before trial was scheduled, defendant’s counsel moved to withdraw as attorney of
record. The trial court granted the motion six days before trial was scheduled to begin and five days
before the scheduled friend of the court hearing regarding the child custody issues. In a letter to
defendant, defendant’s attorney informed him she told plaintiff’s counsel defendant “would be amenable
to an adjournment” of both the hearing and trial dates. She also forwarded to defendant a letter from
plaintiff’s counsel to her, which stated plaintiff’s counsel “would like to adjourn the evidentiary hearing
and trial” and it was plaintiff’s counsel’s understanding that defense counsel “notified my office that your
client will agree to these adjournments.”
Although the friend of the court hearing was adjourned, plaintiff and her attorney appeared for
trial on the scheduled date. Neither defendant nor defense counsel were present. The trial court
allowed plaintiff to testify and granted her request for sole physical custody of the couple’s minor child
and her proposed property division in its entirety.
Defendant objected to the entering of the default in a timely manner. Specifically, defendant
objected to the custody arrangements and lack of formal hearing by the friend of the court, the amount
awarded in child support, and the property settlement. The trial court held proceedings on the entering
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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of the default, during which plaintiff’s counsel denied having communicated with defendant or his former
attorney that he would request an adjournment. Thereafter the court entered the default judgment and
ordered its execution.
Defendant filed motions to set aside the default and for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR
2.612 and for reconsideration pursuant to MCR 2.119(F), which were denied. On appeal, he argues
the trial court abused its discretion in denying these motions. We agree and reverse the denial of
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment.
The policy of Michigan courts generally favors the meritorious determination of issues and
encourages the setting aside of defaults. Gavulic v Boyer, 195 Mich App 20; 489 NW2d 124 (1992).
In this case there was no meritorious determination of the issues and the record supports defendant’s
claim he was mislead into believing the trial date had been adjourned. We believe defendant presented
sufficient grounds to obtain relief from the judgment . Defendant has actively defended the action both
prior and subsequent to the date set for trial. Moreover, even assuming defendant was in default and
was without good cause for setting the default aside, because the judgment contained “provisions
different in kind and amount from the relief demanded in the pleading,” defendant was entitled to
participate in the adjudication of the property. See Perry v Perry, 176 Mich App 762, 768; 440
NW2d 93 (1989). Although the trial court, on the date set for trial, heard testimony from plaintiff, no
assessments were made of the value of the parties’ property.
Furthermore, it does not appear from the record that either the friend of the court or the trial
court held an evidentiary hearing on custody and the best interests of the child. To determine the best
interest of children in custody and divorce cases, the trial court must consider and explicitly state its
findings and conclusions with respect to each of the eleven factors enumerated in the Child Custody
Act. Bowers v Bowers, 190 Mich App 51; 475 NW2d 394 (1991). A trial court’s error to consider
all of the factors is error requiring reversal. Id. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment.
Reversed and remanded for trial. We do not retain jurisdiction. Costs to defendant.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Michael J. Matuzak
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