MICHELLE MORRIS V SELECTCARE INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHELLE MORRIS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 183483
LC No. 93-466179
SELECTCARE, INC., BRIAN CROSS and
JOHN DILLAMAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Hood and H.D. Soet,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the order of the trial court granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10) and dismissing her claims for race
discrimination, retaliation, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm in
part and reverse in part.
I
On appeal, plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition as to her claim of race discrimination because she submitted evidence to establish a
prima facie case of race discrimination and evidence to show that defendants’ articulated reason for her
disparate treatment was merely pretext for illegal race discrimination. We agree that the trial court erred
in holding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. We reverse the grant
of summary disposition as to count I (race discrimination) and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. In its dismissal of Count I, the trial court opined that plaintiff hadn’t established a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination.
Reviewing the factual evidence supporting plaintiff’s race discrimination claim and resolving the
benefit of any reasonable doubt in her favor, we find that plaintiff succeeded in establishing a prima facie
case of race discrimination. Plaintiff is black, and thus within a protected class of employees. Sisson v
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, 174 Mich App 742, 747; 436 NW2d 747 (1989).
Evidence showed that plaintiff’s supervisors, defendants Brian Cross and John Dillaman, closely
monitored her behavior and frequently faulted her for “visiting” with co-workers. Cross and Dillaman
did not document the behavior of white employees with whom plaintiff socialized during work hours.
Additionally, evidence showed that Cross and Dillaman required plaintiff to follow a different procedure
than similarly situated employees were required to follow when she desired secretarial assistance.
Because plaintiff submitted evidence to show that she was within a protected class of employees and
that defendants treated her differently from her white co-workers for engaging in essentially the same
behavior, we find that plaintiff succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination.
While it is true that defendants explained why plaintiff was treated differently from other
employees, including documented numerous instances of plaintiff’s insubordination, unwillingness to
cooperate, and failure to meet deadlines, the court did not assess the quality or quantity of evidence
submitted by plaintiff that defendants asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its action, were
perceptual. On remand the court must decide, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff,
whether a jury question was raised as to whether race discrimination played a significant roll in the
decision to discipline plaintiff and or in failure to promote or consider plaintiff for promotion. Howard v
Canteen Crop, 192 Mich App 427, 432; ___ NW2d ___ (1992).
II
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims for retaliation under the
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act and civil conspiracy. The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act prohibits
employers from retaliating against an employee for making a charge, filing a complaint, testifying,
assisting, or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the act. MCL 37.2701;
MSA 3.548(701); McLemore v Detroit Receiving Hospital and University Medical Center, 196
Mich App 391, 395-396; 493 NW2d 441 (1992). In order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful
retaliation under the Act, a plaintiff must establish (1) that (s)he opposed violations of the Act or
participated in activities protected by the act, and (2) that the opposition or participation was a
significant factor in an adverse employment decision. Booker v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co,
Inc, 879 F2d 1304, 1310 (1989). After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the
employer is allowed the opportunity to set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment decision. Id.
The evidence showed that plaintiff filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Civil
Rights (MDCR) on June 22, 1993, alleging that SelectCare discriminated against her on the basis of
race and gender. On August 6, 1993, plaintiff received her yearly evaluation from Cross and Dillaman.
The evaluation gave plaintiff an overall assessment rating of one, which meant “needs improvement.” In
connection with her unfavorable review, Cross and Dillaman placed plaintiff on a ninety-day
probationary period during which she was required to meet the performance goals Cross and Dillaman
set for her. Plaintiff’s employment review provided for a reevaluation at the end of the probationary
period and possible termination if her performance failed to improve. On August 19, 1993, before her
probation ended, plaintiff walked off the job and never returned. Subsequently, Cross wrote that two
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of his achievements in 1993 were successfully documenting plaintiff’s misbehavior and finally causing her
departure from SelectCare.
Reviewing the evidence and granting plaintiff the benefit of any reasonable doubt, we conclude
that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. First, evidence established that plaintiff
was evaluated in July of each year she was employed at SelectCare. Regardless of her civil rights
complaint, plaintiff was due for an evaluation in July or August of 1993. Therefore, the timing of the
poor evaluation is, contrary to plaintiff’s position, of little significance. See Booker, supra at 1314.
Second, well before plaintiff filed her complaint, Dillaman and Cross began documenting
instances of her misbehavior. Evidence also showed that plaintiff was reprimanded for her unacceptable
behavior and insubordination. Hence, the evidence strongly suggests that plaintiff’s poor evaluation was
the culmination of an on going investigation for inadequate performance and not a retaliatory
employment decision.
Third, it is not evident that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision. Although Cross
and Dillaman evaluated plaintiff poorly and found overall that she needed improvement, they allowed her
ninety days in which to better her performance. Plaintiff does not allege that she was terminated or
demoted after she made her complaint. When this Court and others have addressed the issue of
retaliation, layoffs, terminations and general workplace harassment have been considered adverse
employment decisions. See id. at 1308; McLemore, supra at 398; Kocenda v Detroit Edison, 139
Mich App 721, 726; 363 NW2d 20 (1984). In light of these cases, we are not convinced that
plaintiff’s poor evaluation and probationary period can be considered adverse employment decisions,
especially since defendants allowed plaintiff time to correct her shortcomings and only considered
termination as a last resort.
Even if plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation under the Act, defendants succeeded
in underscoring her poor performance, and not her civil rights complaint, as the reason that she was
given a low performance appraisal and placed on probation. Reviewing the evidence, we conclude that
plaintiff has not shown that this reason is merely pretext for defendants’ retaliatory conduct. Although
plaintiff contends that Cross’ written comments indicate retaliatory intent, in fact they do not and plaintiff
does not explain her conclusion why this is so. Cross’ statements indicate neither racial animus, nor do
they cast doubt on defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for her poor evaluation.
Indeed, Cross’ statements reaffirm that he considered plaintiff to have engaged in inappropriate
behavior during his tenure as her supervisor. In light of the foregoing, the trial court was correct in
dismissing plaintiff’s retaliation claim pursuant to granting defendants’ MCR 2.116(C)(10) motion for
summary disposition.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her civil conspiracy claim. We
disagree. MCL 37.2701(a); MSA 3.548(701)(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Two or more persons shall not conspire to . . . [r]etaliate or discriminate against
a person because the person has opposed a violation of [the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
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Act], or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the Elliott-Larsen Civil
Rights Act.]
Plaintiff contends that Cross and Dillaman’s joint completion of her 1993 performance
evaluation indicates that they conspired to retaliate against her for filing a complaint with the MDCR.
We have already determined that the evidence does not support plaintiff’s contention that defendants
retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the MDCR. It is settled that in a civil action for damages
resulting from wrongful acts alleged to have been committed in the pursuance of a conspiracy, the “gist
or gravamen of the action is not the conspiracy itself, but is the wrongful acts causing the damages.”
Roche v Blair, 305 Mich 608, 613-614; 9 NW2d 861 (1943); see also Coronet Development Co v
FSW, Inc, 379 Mich 302, 308-309; 150 NW2d 809 (1967). Thus, the conspiracy standing alone,
without the commission of acts causing damage, would not be actionable, since the cause of action does
not arise from the conspiracy, but from the acts done. Roche, supra at 614; see also Tucich v
Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich App 398, 402-403; 309 NW2d 615 (1981) (civil
conspiracy claim dismissed where plaintiff failed to show alleged conspirators caused civil wrong
resulting in damages). In this case, the trial court was correct in dismissing plaintiff’s conspiracy claim
because she failed to show that she was subject to retaliatory conduct which resulted in damages.
III
Lastly, plaintiff advances that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress because she submitted evidence to show that defendants’ behavior was so
extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation;
and (4) severe emotional distress. Doe v Mills, 212 Mich App 73, 91; 536 NW2d 824 (1995).
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress is found only where the conduct complained of has
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id. In
reviewing such a claim, it is initially for the court to determine whether the defendant’s conduct
reasonably may be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Id.
Here, evidence showed that Cross and Dillaman closely monitored plaintiff’s workplace
activities. Additionally, plaintiff testified that Cross once told her that she should find a clerical position
because she needed a brainless job. Plaintiff was also required to obtain permission to receive
secretarial assistance with some of her work, while other employees apparently were not subject to this
procedure.
Granting her the benefit of any reasonable doubt, we conclude that plaintiff did not meet the
threshold showing that defendants’ conduct was sufficiently egregious to support her claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. This Court has stated that liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress does not “extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities. It has been said that the case is generally one in which the recitation of facts to an average
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member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
‘Outrageous!’” Id. Applying this standard, this Court upheld summary disposition where a plaintiff
alleged that her supervisors constantly harassed her and intimidated her on the basis of her religion and
gender, calling her a “Jewish-American princess” and asking her who she slept with to get her job.
Meeks v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 193 Mich App 340, 346; 483 NW2d 407 (1992).
Here, plaintiff alleged managerial conduct that does not rise to the level of misconduct engaged
in by the defendants in Meek. In all, Cross and Dillaman’s behavior seems appropriately viewed as a
“petty oppression” for which this Court does not permit recovery. Moreover, there is simply no
evidence that plaintiff was aware that Cross and Dillaman were closely watching her until after the
commencement of litigation. Because no further factual development could render Cross and
Dillaman’s behavior sufficiently egregious as to be actionable in intentional tort, we affirm the trial court
on this count as to its grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Affirmed in part reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings as to count I of
plaintiff’s complaint consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ H. David Soet
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