DONALD SMITH V CHRISTINE MELCHER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DONALD SMITH,
UNPUBLISHED
December 3, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 177748
LC No. 92-6704-CZ
CHRISTINE MELCHER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Saad and W.J. Giovan,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this breach of contract action, plaintiff sought to obtain the value of labor and materials he
expended to construct a home on defendant’s property. Following a bench trial, the court entered a
judgment of no cause of action in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals as of right and we reverse.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that an express contract did not
exist between the parties. We find no error. This Court will not set aside findings of fact by the trial
court unless they are clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C); Attorney General v Acme Disposal Co, 189
Mich App 722, 724; 473 NW2d 824 (1991). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is
evidence to support it, this Court, after reviewing the entire record, is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
A valid express contract requires a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms. Kamalnath
v Mercy Memorial Hospital Corp, 194 Mich App 543, 548; 487 NW2d 499 (1992). Here, the trial
court determined that plaintiff had provided most of the material, labor, and cost of constructing the
house on defendant’s land, but that no express promise had been made by defendant at that time to
compensate plaintiff. Indeed, plaintiff had testified that he did not feel the need to have a written
contract setting forth the specifications and costs of construction because the parties were
“boyfriend/girlfriend.” Thus, the court did not commit clear error in finding that no express contract to
compensate plaintiff existed between the parties.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Moreover, with regard to defendant’s alleged oral promise to sell her land to plaintiff, the court
incorrectly based its holding on the lack of express contract terms. Even if plaintiff could prove all the
elements of an express oral contract, an oral promise to sell land is not enforceable because it violates
the statute of frauds. MCL 566.108; MSA 26.908 (a contract for the sale of an interest in land is void
unless in writing and signed by the seller). See also DeWald v Isola, 180 Mich App 129, 135; 446
NW2d 620 (1989). Thus, the court reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in failing to find the existence of a contract implied
either in law or fact. In In re Lewis Estate, 168 Mich App 70, 74-75; 423 NW2d 600 (1988), this
Court explained the distinction between contracts implied in law and implied in fact:
A contract implied in law is not a contract at all but an obligation imposed by
law to do justice even though it is clear that no promise was ever made or intended.
Calamari & Perillo, Contracts (2d ed), § 1-12, p 19. A contract may be implied in law
where there is a receipt of a benefit by a defendant from a plaintiff and retention of the
benefit is inequitable, absent reasonable compensation. Moll v Wayne Co, 332 Mich
274, 278; 50 NW2d 881 (1952), overruled on other grounds Brown v Dep't of
Military Affairs, 386 Mich 194, 201; 191 NW2d 347 (1971). However, this fiction is
not applicable where there exists a relationship between the parties that gives rise to the
presumption that services were rendered gratuitously. Roznowski v. Bozyk, 73 Mich
App 405, 409; 251 NW2d 606 (1977). See also In re Parks' Estate, 326 Mich 169,
172-173; 39 NW2d 925 (1949). A presumption of gratuity arises where the plaintiff is
related by blood or marriage to the decedent, In re Jorgenson's Estate, 321 Mich
594, 598; 32 NW2d 902 (1948), and where the parties lived together as husband and
wife although never married, Roznowski, supra. See also Anno: Establishment of
"family" relationship to raise presumption that services were rendered
gratuitously, as between persons living in same household but not related by
blood or affinity, 92 ALR3d 726. Where a presumption of gratuity arises, the plaintiff
may still recover for services rendered under the theory of contract implied in fact.
Roznowski, supra at 408-409. A contract implied in fact arises "when services are
performed by one who at the time expects compensation from another who expects at
the time to pay therefor." In re Spenger Estate, 341 Mich 491, 493; 67 NW2d 730
(1954), quoting In re Pierson's Estate, 282 Mich 411, 415; 276 NW 498 (1937).
Here, there is no doubt that a personal relationship existed between the parties which gave rise
to a presumption that plaintiff’s work on the house was rendered gratuitously. The trial court correctly
held that plaintiff had not stated a cause of action for an implied in law contract. See Roznowski, supra
at 408-409. However, as this Court noted in Lewis, supra, a contract may be implied in fact where the
presumption of gratuity is rebutted with proof that at the time services were rendered both parties
expected the plaintiff to be compensated.
In order to recover, the plaintiff must establish a contract implied in fact.
Without proof of the expectations of the parties, the presumption of gratuity will
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overcome the usual contract implied by law to pay for what is accepted. The issue is a
question of fact, to be resolved by consideration of all of the circumstances, including
the type of services rendered, duration of the services, closeness of the relation of the
parties, and the expressed expectations of the parties. [Roznowski, supra at 409.]
Here, plaintiff, a residential builder, testified that the house was part of his dream to build a
portfolio of rental properties from which he would earn a living. He testified that he and defendant
agreed the house would be his but the two of them would share future rental income in proportion to the
value of their separate interests. Defendant, who at the time was a journeyman carpenter, testified that
she provided some assistance in completing construction of the house. Although she believed the house
was part of a “shared dream for a future together” with plaintiff, he had never told her the house was a
gift. She also admitted asking plaintiff to pay for the increase in property taxes because of plaintiff’s
“project house.” For a few months during 1990 the parties engaged in weekly meetings at which the
topic of the house was discussed, along with other issues regarding their relationship. The minutes taken
at these meetings generally indicate that the parties intended to keep their individual interests in the
property separate, but do not indicate that a specific agreement was reached regarding ownership of the
property. In sum, although neither party testified to any agreement to compensate plaintiff for the
materials and labor expended in building the house, there was an implicit understanding that both parties
would reap a benefit from rental income generated by the house. Clearly, plaintiff’s services were not
intended to be gratuitous. In Roznowski, supra at 409, the plaintiff was allowed to recover under an
implied in fact contract for services of a commercial, as opposed to a domestic, nature. See also In re
Estate of Morris, 193 Mich App 579, 583; 484 NW2d 755 (1992); Carnes v Sheldon, 109 Mich
App 204, 213; 311 NW2d 747 (1981). Here, plaintiff was a residential builder and his construction of
the house had a monetary value independent of his personal relationship with defendant. Accordingly,
we find that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of gratuity and we reverse
that portion of the judgment which held that plaintiff had not stated a cause of action for a contract
implied in fact.
Although plaintiff requested $42,000 based on the fair market value of the house (independent
of the value of the land), he is only entitled to quantum meruit or restitution damages. Quantum meruit is
measured by the cost of materials used and the value of labor expended. Morris, supra at 583. See
also 5 Corbin on Contracts 1109, p 583. Here, plaintiff claimed a total of $38,000 expended in labor
and materials, but submitted proof to support, at most, an outlay of $19,600 in materials and no proofs
regarding labor costs. Plaintiff admitted that he did not keep track of the time he or his friends spent
building the house. Thus, at this point, plaintiff’s labor costs appear speculative. Nevertheless, because
the trial court did not reach this issue, we remand for consideration of that question.
Reversed and remanded.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Henry W. Saad
/s/ William J. Giovan
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