PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT MITCHELL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 184472
LC No. 94-001794
ROBERT MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Sawyer and T.P. Pickard,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Robert Mitchell, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316; MSA 28.548, in the stabbing death of his girlfriend Ruth Faye Roebuck. Following his bench
trial, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals his conviction by
right. We affirm.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, defendant argues that the trial court’s findings of
fact as to the premeditation and deliberation element of first-degree murder were clearly erroneous. We
disagree. In order for a killing to be premeditated and deliberate, defendant must have thought about
the killing before hand and “considered the pros and cons of the killing and thought about and chose
[his] actions before he did it.” CJI2d 16.1(4), (5). All that is necessary to establish premeditation and
deliberation is enough time for defendant to take a second look at his contemplated actions. People v
DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 660; 509 NW2d 885 (1993). Thus, there must be “some time span
between the initial homicidal intent and the ultimate action.” People v Waters, 118 Mich App 176, 186;
324 NW2d 564 (1982). Pursuant to Michigan law, premeditation and deliberation can be inferred from
the surrounding circumstances. See DeLisle, supra at 660; Waters, supra at 186.
Given the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the evidence supports an inference
that defendant’s actions were premeditated and deliberate. Defendant, who had been dating Ruth
Roebuck since 1991, had a prior relationship with the decedent. Moreover, Ronald Roebuck’s
testimony establishes that there was a time lapse between when defendant pulled the knife and when he
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
stabbed Ruth Roebuck. This lapse afforded defendant a sufficient amount of time during which he could
have taken a second look at his intended course of action. See Waters, supra at 187.
Defendant argues, however, that at the time of the killing, his actions were the result of emotion
or passion; thus, the evidence more clearly establishes the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter. We disagree. There are three essential elements of voluntary manslaughter: (1)
defendant must kill in the heat of passion, (2) the passion must be caused by an adequate provocation,
and (3) there must not have been a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his
passion. People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 388; 471 NW2d 346 (1991). Adequate provocation is
defined as provocation “which would cause the reasonable man to lose control.” Id. at 389. The
evidence presented in this case does not establish a situation which would cause an ordinary man to lose
control. Although defendant did find his girl friend alone with her ex-husband, Ronald Roebuck, Ronald
Roebuck was merely fixing a curtain rod. Moreover, the evidence indicates that Ronald Roebuck
regularly visited his ex-wife and that defendant never objected to these visits. Therefore, we find that
the trial court’s finding of premeditation and deliberation was not clearly erroneous.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing two unsequestered witnesses,
Pullum and Wasiak, to testify. We disagree. Pursuant to Michigan law, “one of the purposes of the
sequestration of a witness is to prevent him from ‘coloring’ his testimony to conform with the testimony
of another.” People v Stanley, 71 Mich App 56, 61; 246 NW2d 418 (1976). The only testimony
which Pullum and Wasiak heard prior to being sequestered was that of Ronald Roebuck. Because
Ronald Roebuck testified primarily as to the events which occurred inside Ruth Roebuck’s apartment
and Pullum and Wasiak both testified exclusively as to the events which occurred outside the apartment,
the risk that Pullum and Wasiak’s testimony would be colored by Ronald Roebuck’s testimony was
minimal. Therefore, we find that there was no manifest injustice in the trial court’s admission of the
unobjected to testimony of these two unsequestered witnesses.
Lastly, defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel’s
failure to pursue an intoxication and insanity defense on defendant’s behalf. We disagree. Michigan law
recognizes a strong presumption that the assistance received from counsel was sound. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). In order to overcome this presumption,
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in an
unfair trial. People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 213; 528 NW2d 721 (1995). Although “[a] defendant
is entitled to have his counsel investigate, prepare and assert all substantial defenses,” People v
Hubbard, 156 Mich App 712, 714; 402 NW2d 79 (1986), the failure to bring a defense will not
support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where there is no evidence to support the alleged
defense. People v Emerson (After Remand), 203 Mich App 345, 349; 512 NW2d 3 (1994). After
carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that none of the evidence presented at trial supports a
voluntary intoxication or an insanity defense as to the defendant in this matter.
“Voluntary intoxication is a defense to first-degree premeditated murder if a showing is made
that the [defendant’s] intoxication prevented him from premeditating or deliberating.” People v
LaVearn, 201 Mich App 679, 684; 506 NW2d 909 (1993), rev’d on other grounds 448 Mich 207;
-2
528 NW2d 721 (1995). There was no evidence presented at trial to establish that defendant consumed
any drugs or alcohol on the day of the crime and the testimony of Officer Salisbury establishes there was
nothing in defendant’s demeanor which suggested that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol on
the day in question. Thus, the evidence presented at trial does not establish that defendant was
intoxicated in any capacity.
Similarly, there was no evidence to establish an insanity defense. In order to establish the
defense of insanity, defendant must be found to have been legally insane and that as a result, he lacked
“the substantial ability to appreciate t e nature and quality or the wrongness of his conduct or to
h
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” CJI2d 7.11(9) Although Michigan law
recognizes that “[a] person can become legally insane by the voluntary, continued use of mind-altering
substances like alcohol or drugs if their use results in a settled condition of insanity before, during,
and after the alleged offense,” see CJI2d 7.10(3) (emphasis added), there was no evidence
presented to suggest that defendant’s admitted drug use was continuous or caused a settled condition of
insanity. Moreover, there was also no evidence that defendant was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct. Because there was no evidence to support either an intoxication or an
insanity defense, defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel’s failure to
raise these defenses at trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Timothy P. Pickard
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.