KARL WENDT FARM EQUIPMENT CO INC V JERALD R LOVELL PC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KARL WENDT FARM EQUIPMENT COMPANY,
INC., KARL WENDT and DELORIS WENDT,
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 1996
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 183962
LC No. 94-001144
JERALD R. LOVELL, P.C.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and G.S. Buth,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this legal malpractice case, plaintiffs appeal by right from an order granting defendant’s
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10). We affirm.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly determined that their claim of legal
malpractice was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitation, MCL 600.5805; MSA
27A.5805. At issue is when defendant discontinued his representation of plaintiffs within the meaning of
MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838.
A lawyer discontinues serving his client pursuant to § 5838 when the client or the court relieves
him of his obligation or when the lawyer completes a specific legal service that the lawyer was retained
to perform. Maddox v Burlingame, 205 Mich App 446, 450; 517 NW2d 816 (1994); Chapman v
Sullivan, 161 Mich App 558, 561-562; 411 NW2d 754 (1987). The documentary evidence
submitted by the parties reveals that defendant was retained by plaintiffs in a prior federal district court
case involving a contractual dispute between plaintiffs and International Harvester Company after a
judgment of no cause of action was entered against plaintiffs. The retainer agreement provided that
defendant was representing plaintiffs to move for a new trial and to appeal in the event that the motion
was unsuccessful. Since the motion was unsuccessful, plaintiffs appealed to the federal court of appeals
and the case was reversed in part. Thereafter, defendant sent plaintiffs a letter on June 4, 1991, which
stated that his service was “at an end” unless International Harvester appealed to the United States
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Supreme Court. As the trial court noted, an appeal to the United States Supreme Court did not come
to fruition. Thus, defendant’s service was completed on June 4, 1991. The fact that defendant later
signed a substitution of counsel did not render defendant’s termination of his representation of plaintiffs
on June 4, 1991, meaningless. See Dowker v Peacock, 152 Mich App 669; 394 NW2d 65 (1986);
Berry v Zisman, 70 Mich App 376, 379; 245 NW2d 758 (1976); Basic Food Industries, Inc v
Travis, Warren, Nayer & Burgoyne, 60 Mich App 492, 496-497; 231 NW2d 466 (1975).
Furthermore, we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to look to certain federal district court rules or rules
of professional conduct regarding the issue of a lawyer’s termination of service when this Court has
previously addressed the issue. Because defendant discontinued serving plaintiffs on June 4, 1991, and
plaintiffs filed their legal malpractice action on August 20, 1993, more than two years after the
termination of the representation, the trial court properly found that plaintiffs’ claim was time barred.
Having determined that plaintiffs’ cause of action was time-barred, we need not address the
issue of whether defendant’s failure to raise the Farm and Utility Equipment Act, MCL 445.1451 et
seq.; MSA 19.853(51) et seq., in the underlying proceeding caused plaintiffs’ damages.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ George S. Buth
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