RONALD D THOMPSON V DARWIN L CAMPBELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD D. THOMPSON and
AUDREY A. THOMPSON,
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 1996
Plaintiffs-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants,
v
No. 182051
LC No. 93-25592-CZ
DARWIN L. CAMPBELL and
JULIE ANN CAMPBELL,
Defendants-Appellants/
Cross-Appellees,
and
GUARANTY TITLE COMPANY and
SECURITY UNION TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants and Cross-Appellees.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Griffin and M. H. Cherry,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Darwin Campbell and Julie Ann Campbell appeal as of right a judgment limiting
their easement across plaintiffs’ property to rights of ingress and egress. Plaintiffs Ronald D. Thompson
and Audrey A. Thompson cross-appeal as of right from the same judgment, claiming that the trial court
erred in finding that an easement existed and in dismissing plaintiffs' suits for negligence and breach of
contract against defendants Guaranty Title and Security Union Title Insurance. We affirm in part and
reverse and remand in part.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Charles Rodgerson owned a large parcel of land fronting Lobdell Lake. He sold a portion of it
to Carol Eckles. Because the frontage on that parcel was swampy, Rodgerson granted Eckles a
twenty-foot easement on his lakefront property for purposes of ingress, egress and placement of a
dock. Eckles recorded her land contract, which described the easement. The easement was not
otherwise recorded. Eckles sold her land to the Campbells, who placed a dock along the easement.
Rodgerson sold to the Thompsons the parcel of land encompassing the easement. Three witnesses
testified that they informed plaintiff Ronald Thompson of the existence of the easement prior to the
Thompsons’ purchase of the land. Ronald Thompson testified that, upon inquiry about the easement at
the offices of Guaranty Title, he was assured that no such easement existed. The trial court found that
an easement existed and that the Thompsons bought the land with notice of it. The court limited the
scope of the easement to ingress and egress.
I
The Campbells contend that the trial court should have considered parol evidence in determining
the scope and purpose of the easement. Actions to quiet title are equitable and are reviewed de novo
on appeal. Michigan Nat’l Bank v Morren, 194 Mich App 407, 410; 487 NW2d 784 (1992);
Gorte v Dep’t of Transportation, 202 Mich App 161, 165; 507 NW2d 797 (1993). We believe the
trial court erred in refusing to consider parol evidence regarding the scope and purpose of the easement.
The trial court limited the scope of the easement to ingress and egress because the recorded land
contract between Rodgerson and Eckles described the easement by metes and bounds only. This
Court has found no rule of law stating that an easement described only in terms of metes and bounds is
limited in scope to ingress and egress. Rather, the metes and bounds description leaves an ambiguity as
to the scope and purpose of the easement. When a deed is ambiguous, or when it fails to express the
obvious intention of the parties, courts will try to ascertain the parties’ intent and grant or deny relief in
accordance with that intent. Farabaugh v Rhode, 305 Mich 234, 240; 9 NW2d 562 (1943). Where
an instrument's meaning is in doubt, the court considers the "situation, acts, conduct and dealings of the
parties to the instrument and also as to the subject matter." Id. Here, the metes and bounds description
does not inform interested parties of the purpose of the easement and recourse to parol evidence to
determine the scope and purpose comports with ordinary rules of construction of deeds. We remand to
the trial court for consideration of parol evidence regarding the scope and purpose of the easement.
Such parol evidence shall include but shall not be limited to evidence of grantor Rodgerson's intent.
II
The Thompsons argue on cross-appeal that the easement was too indefinite to be enforced.
Although this particular question was not presented to the trial court, it is obvious that the trial court did
not believe that the easement was too indefinite to be enforced because it ordered the parties to observe
the easement for purposes of ingress and egress. We agree with the trial court's implicit finding that the
easement was definite enough to be enforced. This Court found an easement too indefinite to be
enforced in Kahn-Reiss v Detroit & Northern Savings & Loan, 59 Mich App 1; 228 NW2d 816
(1975), overruled in part by Schmidt v Eger, 94 Mich App 728; 289 NW2d 851 (1980). There, the
easement was described as "a means of ingress and egress" that would be located on parcels known as
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lots 6 and 7. Id., at 4, 9. That description, however, was erroneous. The easement was supposed to
have been located on lots 8 and 9, it was not clear whether the "means" was for pedestrian or vehicular
traffic, and there was no recital of the specific shape or dimension of the claimed easement, nor
reference to lot lines or specific structures. The lack of specificity in Kahn-Reiss of the easement's
location is not analogous to the lack in this case of a recital of the easement's scope and purpose. We
find no error.
III
Next, the Thompsons argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their breach of contract and
negligence claims against Guaranty Title and Security Union Title Insurance Companies. We disagree.
The existence of a duty is a question of law for the court. Schneider v Nectarine Ballroom (On
Remand), 204 Mich App 1, 4; 514 NW2d 486 (1994). This Court reviews questions of law de novo.
Westchester Fire Ins Co v Safeco Ins Co, 203 Mich App 663, 667; 513 NW2d 212 (1994). The
trial court properly noted that the Thompsons had no cause of action against Security Union Title
Insurance Company, which issued the Campbells’ title insurance policy. It had no duty, contractual or
otherwise, to the Thompsons. We affirm dismissal of the complaints against Security Union Title
Insurance Company.
The Thompsons contend that Guaranty Title breached its contract with them by failing to list the
easement in each title commitment issued. Guaranty Title was Security Union Title Insurance
Company's agent. Guaranty Title issued at least two title commitments on the Thompsons’ parcel. The
first title commitment failed to list the Campbells' easement. No title insurance policy was ordered from
that commitment. The last title commitment, from which the title insurance policy was ordered, and
which was issued by Guaranty prior to the closing on the purchase of the Thompsons’ parcel, listed the
easement. Guaranty Title had no contractual duty to list all recorded easements. Nowhere in the title
commitment did the issuer undertake to list all encumbrances on the property. The issuer undertook to
insure the property against all unlisted encumbrances except those not shown by the public record. The
Thompsons’ breach of contract claim was properly dismissed.
IV
Finally, the Thompsons assert negligence on the part of Guaranty Title and Security Union Title
Insurance with regard to the failure to list the easement in the first title commitment and with regard to
informing the Thompsons that no easement existed. We disagree. Here, the trial court stated that
"[s]ince . . . the plaintiffs were on notice of the easement, the Court does not believe they are entitled to
damages." A negligence action requires that the plaintiff establish four elements: (1) that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) that the defendant breached that duty; (3) that the asserted breach of duty
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages, and (4) that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.
Baker v Arbor Drugs, 215 Mich App 198, 203; 544 NW2d 727 (1996). Although the court
discussed the issue as if it were a matter of damages, implicit in its finding that notice obviated the
Thompsons’ damages was the finding that such notice relieved the title companies of any duty they might
allegedly have had to inform the Thompsons of the existence of a recorded easement. The trial court
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did not err. Having had notice that an easement existed, the Thompsons cannot claim that they were
damaged by any alleged failure on the part of the title companies to warn them via a title commitment of
the existence of an easement. Defendant title companies had no duty to tell the Thompsons that which
the Thompsons already knew. The Thompsons’ negligence claim was properly dismissed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael H. Cherry
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