RACHEL NAWROCKI V MACOMB CNTY ROAD COMM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RACHEL NAWROCKI and LAWRENCE
NAWROCKI,
UNPUBLISHED
November 12, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellants,
v
No. 181350
LC No. 93-5021
MACOMB COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: White, P.J. and Smolenski and R.R. Lamb,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant on governmental
immunity grounds, MCR 2.116(C)(7), in this negligence action alleging liability under the public highway
exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). We affirm.
In a supplemental appellate brief, defendant argues that Suttles v Department of
Transportation, 216 Mich App 166; 548 NW2d 671 (1996) is controlling. Plaintiff has not attempted
to distinguish Suttles. Suttles involved a nonmotorist who was injured on a public street directly next to
the curb, after getting out of a parked car and stepping onto the street, where she slipped on an
unnatural accumulation of ice and snow. 216 Mich App at 167. This Court, relying on Mason v
Wayne Cty Bd of Comm’rs, 447 Mich 130; 523 NW2d 791 (1994), held that “the part of the
highway adjacent to a parked car onto which an occupant of the car, especially the driver, might exit the
car” is included within the scope of the phrase “any other installation outside of the improved portion of
the highway designed for vehicular travel,” MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.9969(102)(1), and thus held
that the defendant was immune. The Suttles Court analyzed the “any other installation” exclusion and
concluded that:
. . . the trial court correctly interpreted the scope of the exclusions to the highway
exception and that such exclusions, specifically the “any other installation” exclusion,
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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fairly encompass the part of a highway adjacent to a parked car onto which an
occupant of the car, especially the driver, might step when getting out of the car.
Suttles is binding authority under Administrative Order 1996-4.
The description of the location of plaintiff’s injury before us is the same as presented to the
circuit court, i.e., she got out of a truck on the passenger side, stepped onto the curb, and then stepped
off the curb onto the street and fell because the street was cracked and broken. Given the similarity in
the locations of the accidents in the instant case and Suttles, both having occurred in the area of a public
street directly next to the curb, plaintiffs’ claim must be dismissed as a matter of law because that area
of the street was held in Suttles to fall under the “any other installation” exclusion of the highway
exception.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Richard R. Lamb
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