PEOPLE OF MI V RONALD LEE GATEWOOD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 12, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 180300
LC No. 94-050226
RONALD LEE GATEWOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Jansen and T.R. Thomas*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA
28.797. He subsequently pleaded guilty to a charge of habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11;
MSA 28.1083. Defendant was sentenced to twelve to twenty-five years’ imprisonment and now
appeals as of right. We affirm.
On March 23, 1994, Stacey Sorensen was working at a convenience store when she was
robbed at knife point by two individuals. While one individual held a knife to her throat, Sorensen had a
clear view of the other man, whom she later identified as defendant. The day after the robbery, the
police showed Sorensen photographs which had been taken by a surveillance camera during a previous
robbery of a different establishment. Sorensen was told that the individuals in the photographs were
suspects in a different robbery. Sorensen immediately identified the individuals in the photographs as the
men who robbed her. At a police lineup shortly thereafter, Sorensen identified defendant as one of the
men who robbed the store. At trial, Sorensen again identified defendant as the one of the robbers.
Defendant now contends that Sorensen’s identifications of defendant were irrevocably tainted
when she was shown pictures of defendant and was told that he was suspected of a previous robbery.
We disagree. Before the start of trial, the court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury,
pursuant to People v Kachar, 400 Mich 78, 96-97; 252 NW2d 807 (1977), to determine whether
Sorensen’s lineup identification of defendant was tainted by the allegedly improper photographic lineup..
A ruling of a trial court regarding whether identification procedures constituted a denial of due process is
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
reviewed by this Court under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the pretrial identification.
People v James, 184 Mich App 457, 464-465; 458 NW2d 911 (1990), vacated on other grounds
437 Mich 988; 469 NW2d 294 (1991). For subsequent identifications to be valid, a prosecutor needs
to show by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony had a basis independent of the pretrial
identification. Id.
At the hearing held to determine whether Sorensen’s identification of defendant was
independent, evidence was presented that Sorensen was able to observe defendant during the robbery
for a five- to ten- minute period. She was able to identify defendant at a police lineup based on her
memory of the robbery, not based on the police photographs. Similarly, at a preliminary examination
and again at the hearing, Sorensen identified defendant, stating that the identification was not based on
the photographs she had seen of defendant but on what she witnessed during the robbery. Based on
this evidence, the trial judge ruled that the prosecution met its burden of showing that Sorensen’s
identification of defendant was independent of the allegedly tainted photographic identification. We
agree. The evidence was clear and convincing that Sorensen’s lineup identification of defendant had a
basis independent of the photographs she was shown by police. Thus, no error occurred. Kachar,
supra.
Additionally, defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to caution the jury regarding
potential problems with eyewitness identification. We disagree. Defendant failed to request a
cautionary instruction and presented no evidence that he was prejudiced by the out-of-court
identification procedures. Thus, this claim must fail. City of Westland v Okopski, 208 Mich App 66,
73; 527 NW2d 780 (1994).
Defendant next claims that individuals in his age group were systematically excluded from the
jury, thus denying him a right to a jury consisting of a representative cross-section of the community.
This claim is also without merit. In order for defendant’s claim to be successful, it must be shown (1)
that the allegedly excluded group is a “distinctive” group in the community, (2) that the group is unfairly
and unreasonably underrepresented in venires from which juries are drawn, and (3) the
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. People v
Guy, 121 Mich App 592, 599; 329 NW2d 435 (1982), citing Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357; 99 S
Ct 664; 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979). This Court has refused to recognize an age group as a congnizable
class against which discrimination in jury selection can be practiced. People v Redwine, 50 Mich App
593, 596; 213 NW2d 841 (1973). Several other jurisdictions have similarly refused to recognize age
as a “distinctive” group in determining if a venire group constitutes a representative cross section of a
community. See, e.g., Aultman v State, 621 So2d 353, 363 (Ala Crim App, 1992), cert den ___ US
___; 114 S Ct 407; 126 L Ed 2d 354 (1993); State v Jacobs, 813 SW2d 318, 321 (Mo App, 1991).
See also Anno: Age Group Underrepresentation in Grand Jury or Petit Jury, 62 ALR 4th 859.
Because age is not a cognizable class against which discrimination in jury selection could be committed,
defendant’s claim must fail. In addition, defendant provided no evidence that people in defendant’s age
group were “unfairly or unreasonably underrepresented” on defendant’s jury. Guy, supra, 599.
-2
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor committed error requiring reversal in questioning him
about his attempted escape from the courtroom during trial. Defendant initially injected evidence
regarding his attempted escape, however. He therefore “opened the door” to further exploration of the
issue by the prosecutor and waived any claim of error. People v Lipps, 167 Mich App 99, 108; 421
NW2d 586 (1988). Furthermore, defendant failed to request a cautionary instruction regarding the
evidence, and he showed no evidence of prejudice from the trial court’s failure to sua sponte give such
instruction. Thus, defendant’s claim of error is without merit. Okopski, supra, 73.
Defendant next contends that the trial court’s jury instructions created manifest injustice.
Specifically, defendant challenges the court’s instruction that the jury could convict defendant based on
his previous statement, although defendant never made such a statement. We find no error on this
record. Jury instructions must be reviewed in their entirety to determine whether an error requiring
reversal occurred. People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 515; 503 NW2d 457 (1993). Even if the
instructions were imperfect, there is no error if they fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently
protected the defendant’s rights. Id. Although defendant never made an out-of-court statement, the
context of the jury instruction when read as a whole makes it clear that the trial court was referring to a
statement made by defendant’s accomplice. Although the trial court misspoke, the instructions, when
viewed as a whole, fairly presented the issues and sufficiently protected the rights of defendant. The trial
court did not err so as to create manifest injustice. Id.; People v Cross, 202 Mich App 138, 148; 508
NW2d 144 (1993).
Finally, defendant contends that he had previously been convicted of habitual offender, third
offense, and thus, his conviction of habitual offender, third offense in this case violated his protection
against double jeopardy. The argument is without merit. People v Anderson, 210 Mich App 295,
298; 532 NW2d 918 (1995).
Affirmed.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Terrence R. Thomas
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.