PEOPLE OF MI V JERRY DALE HARRIS SR
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
_____________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 25, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 161477
LC No. 92-001794
JERRY DALE HARRIS, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Markey, and J.M. Batzer,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
On May 28, 1992, defendant and Wildean Holbrook (hereinafter "the victim") had been
drinking heavily. After an argument, defendant fatally stabbed the victim once in the chest. Defendant
was charged with open murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548. At trial, defendant presented the
defenses of intoxication, self-defense, and accident. The jury found defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553. The trial judge sentenced defendant to seven to fifteen
years of imprisonment for the conviction. Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction and
sentence. We affirm.
I
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied, on the ground that the
evidence in question was hearsay, defendant's request to introduce evidence pertaining to a restraining
order issued against the victim. Defendant asserts that this evidence was non-hearsay that could have
bolstered his self-defense claim. Although defendant's claim has some merit, the trial court's error was
harmless.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Specific instances of violence may be admitted "if directly connected with and involved in the
homicide or if known by the defendant." People v Nichols, 125 Mich App 216, 220-221; 335 NW2d
665 (1983). In contrast, hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." MRE 801(c). The
evidence was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Nevertheless, we believe that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant an opportunity to introduce the
restraining order into evidence because the restraining order can be likened to specific instances of
violence that are inadmissible because they are too remote to show that the deceased was the
aggressor. Nichols, supra (“[i]f there are many such instances of violent behavior, presumably the
deceased will have acquired a reputation for such behavior, which would be admissible by laying the
proper foundation.”); see People v McAlister, 203 Mich App 495, 505; 513 NW2d 431 (1994).
Even assuming, arguendo, the erroneous exclusion of this evidence, we will not reverse a
defendant's conviction unless the error was prejudicial. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. Thus, the
inquiry becomes was "the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?" People v Minor, 213 Mich
App 682, 685; 541 NW2d 576 (1995). An error will be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt when it had no effect on the verdict. Id. Our review of the record shows that the trial court's
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's action of stabbing an unarmed man
negated his claim to self-defense. See People v Kemp, 202 Mich App 318, 322-323; 508 NW2d
184 (1993). Consequently, we find no error requiring reversal.
II
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a
directed verdict on the first-degree murder component of the open murder charge. Defendant asserts
that the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence that he acted with premeditation when he
stabbed the victim. We disagree. When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict,
this Court tests the validity of the motion by the same standard as the trial court. People v Daniels,
192 Mich App 658, 665; 482 NW2d 176 (1992). When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the
trial court must consider the evidence presented by the prosecutor up to the time the motion was made
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that
the essential elements of the charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jolly,
442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993).
To establish a charge of first-degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the defendant
killed the victim with deliberation and premeditation. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 229;
530 NW2d 497 (1995). By taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, our review
of the record shows that sufficient evidence was introduced for the jury to find the elements of
deliberation and premeditation. Because the evidence supported the element of premeditation and
deliberation, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
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III
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly scored OV 4 when it calculated his
sentence. We disagree. The guidelines provide that OV 4 in homicide situations will be scored at
twenty-five points when an aggravated physical injury is present. Michigan Sentencing Guidelines (2d
ed), p 77. Our review of the case law leads us to conclude that a single fatal stab wound may constitute
“aggravated physical injury.” We believe that “aggravated physical injury” should be evaluated on the
basis of not only the number of stab wounds inflicted, People v Hoffman, 205 Mich App 1, 24; 518
NW2d 817 (1994), but also the location or situs of the wound. Here, defendant stabbed the victim
directly in the heart. Indeed, stabbing someone in the heart is much “more serious or more severe” than
stabbing that person in the arm or the leg and is likely to have immediate, fatal consequences, as it did in
this case. See Daniels, supra at 674. Further, the emergency room physician testified that the victim
was dead on arrival and that while attempting to perform heart massage, he and a thoracic surgeon
found the victim’s heart to be heavily damaged by the single knife wound. Because the trial court
properly scored OV 4 at twenty-five points, we find no abuse of discretion. See People v Derbeck,
202 Mich App 443, 449; 509 NW2d 534 (1993).
IV
We also reject defendant’s assertion that he was denied due process or is entitled to
resentencing because the trial court failed to properly resolve his challenges to the accuracy of the
presentence report. The trial court has a duty to resolve any challenge to the presentence report and
must strike any challenged information that is inaccurate or irrelevant. People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App
531, 533-534; 462 NW2d 793 (1990); People v Swartz, 171 Mich App 364, 381; 429 NW2d 905
(1988). The failure to strike disregarded information can be harmless error, however. People v
Fisher, 442 Mich 560, 567 n 4; 503 NW2d 50 (1993).
Here, after reviewing the sentencing record, we find that the judge did not specifically refer to
any particular comment from anyone in reaching his conclusion that defendant had a general propensity
to be “a pretty aggressive person.” Defendant does not challenge any factual background matters
contained in the presentence report. Instead, defendant disagrees with comments he supposedly made
to his wife, family and jail inmates as well as their opinions regarding his temperament. The judge duly
noted defendant’s disagreement and permitted him to append a denial to the report. A remand is,
therefore, of no value because neither these opinions regarding defendant nor such statements can be
proven or disproven.
Affirmed.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ James M. Batzer
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