KENNETH ZEEFF V GENERAL MOTORS CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KENNETH ZEEFF,
UNPUBLISHED
October 18, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 188360
LC No. 94-001266-NZ
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Hoekstra and G. D. Lostracco,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court order that granted summary disposition to
defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). We affirm.
I
This case arises from defendant’s termination of plaintiff’s employment on June 30, 1992.
Plaintiff was an electrical engineer with defendant at its AC Rochester Products plant in Grand Rapids.
Plaintiff began his career with defendant in 1968. Prior to his termination, defendant had twice been
placed on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”), once in 1979 and again in 1983. Plaintiff’s last
performance review prior to his termination classified plaintiff’s performance as satisfactory. However,
the review also noted that plaintiff had to improve his time management.
As a salaried employee with defendant, plaintiff was on a formal month to month employment
basis with defendant. He acknowledged that he read and possessed the pamphlet “Working with
General Motors.” Plaintiff also acknowledged that he signed the “Compensation Statement,” which,
when signed and accepted, becomes part of the employee’s employment agreement with defendant and
reaffirms the employee’s status as month to month. Defendant provided testimony that it had to
downsize and reduce its head count by about ten percent, and that eight employees, including plaintiff,
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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were discussed. Roger Dunkle testified that plaintiff was selected for performance review because he
was the poorest performer in his area.
On May 6, 1992, plaintiff met with four of defendant’s supervisors to discuss plaintiff’s
performance. Defendant provided testimony that plaintiff was simply put on notice that his performance
had to improve and that no decision had been made to terminate plaintiff. Plaintiff, on the other hand,
testified that he was told he would be terminated as of June 1, 1992, and that he was forced to seek the
external opportunities procedure. Plaintiff’s performance did not improve in the month of May. On
May 29, 1992, plaintiff was called in to another meeting, instructed on specific areas in which he needed
to improve, and given additional time to improve. Plaintiff’s performance failed to improve and he was
terminated on June 30, 1992. The lower court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant based
on MCR 2.116(C)(8) for the contractual claims, and MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the age discrimination
claim.
II
Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of defendant as
to the wrongful discharge claim. Plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to consider the pleadings,
affidavits, deposition testimony, and documentary evidence in considering defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. We disagree.
A
In other cases involving similar facts and employment documents, this Court has evaluated the
employment status of salaried employees of General Motors. Plaintiff’s employment was terminable at
will and plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of a just-cause termination, except for a one-month notice
period. Ferrett v General Motors Corp, 438 Mich 235, 236-244; 475 NW2d 243 (1991); Singal v
General Motors Corp, 179 Mich App 497, 504-505; 447 NW2d 152 (1989); Taylor v General
Motors Corp, 826 F2d 452, 458 (CA 6, 1987). None of the sections of the employee handbook
created a legitimate expectation of termination only for just cause.
B
Plaintiff also claims that defendant failed to follow its own policies and procedures relating to the
unsatisfactory performance of an employee, and therefore breached its express/implied agreement to do
so. An employer can promulgate disciplinary procedures without altering the at-will status of its
employees. Biggs v Hilton Hotel Corp, 194 Mich App 239, 241-242; 486 NW2d 61 (1992). See
also Stopczynski v Ford Motor Co, 200 Mich App 190, 195; 503 NW2d 912 (1993). Therefore,
because plaintiff’s employment was at-will, the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition in
favor of defendant on the claims of wrongful discharge and breach of employment agreement. Plaintiff
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. MCR 2.116(C)(8).
III
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Plaintiff next argues that the trial court committed error mandating reversal in granting
defendant’s motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s age discrimination claim under MCR
2.116(C)(10) because he was discharged and replaced by a younger engineer. Plaintiff contends that
there was a factual question raised as to the age discrimination claim. We disagree.
A
A prima facie case of age discrimination can be made by proving either disparate impact or
disparate treatment. Lytle v Malady, 209 Mich App 179, 184-185; 530 NW2d 135 (1995). In this
case, plaintiff relied on an intentional discrimination theory, which is one method of proving disparate
treatment.
Where, as here, the employer argues that the discharge was economically motivated, plaintiff
must show that (1) he was a member of the protected class, (2) he was discharged, and (3) age was a
determining factor in defendant’s decision to discharge him. Id at 185-186. For plaintiff to survive a
summary disposition motion, he need only tender specific factual evidence that could lead a reasonable
jury to conclude that defendant’s proffered reasons are a pretext for age discrimination. Id. at 188. In
other words, plaintiff must establish, either directly or indirectly, the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact that defendant’s proffered reasons are unworthy of credence, and that illegal age
discrimination was more likely defendant’s true motivation in discharging or demoting him. Id.
B
Plaintiff did not provide any evidence that age was a determining factor in his discharge.
Testimony was given by many of defendant’s supervisors that plaintiff needed to improve his work
performance and that defendant needed to downsize the number of employees. An employer reserves
the right to set its own standards of performance. Touissant v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, 408 Mich 579, 623; 292 NW2d 880 (1980). As mentioned above, defendant had
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decision to terminate plaintiff from employment. Plaintiff
failed to present any evidence that his age was a determining factor for his discharge. Plaintiff’s
replacement by a younger employee, without more, is insufficient to support a claim of age
discrimination. Barnell v Taubman Co, Inc, 203 Mich App 110, 121-122; 512 NW2d 13 (1993).
Therefore, the trial court correctly granted summary disposition on the age discrimination claim in favor
of defendant because there was no issue of a material fact. MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Gerald D. Lostracco
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