PEOPLE OF MI V TRENTON MILLENDER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 11. 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 186524
LC No. 94-008610
TRENTON MILLENDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Young, P.J., and Taylor and R. C. Livo,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial involving one of the most horrific and sadistic crimes we have ever
reviewed, defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b(1)(e); MSA 28.288(2)(1)(e), three counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797,
three counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, one count of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of
twenty-five to sixty years for the criminal sexual conduct convictions, twenty to forty years for the
robbery convictions, five to ten years for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction, two
to four years for the felonious assault convictions, and to a consecutive term of two years for the felony
firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. This Court
previously denied defendant’s motion to remand for a Ginther1 hearing. Our review, therefore, is
limited to the record. People v Armendarez, 188 Mich App 61, 74; 468 NW2d 893 (1991). In
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), the Supreme Court adopted the
federal test for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Michigan Constitution. To
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must first show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as an attorney as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Also, defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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were so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, i.e., a trial whose result is reliable. The Pickens
Court stated that to find prejudice a court must conclude that there is a reasonable probability that,
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id. at 312. The
Court then stated as follows in a footnote:
Furthermore, an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination,
without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or
unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the
outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors may grant the defendant a
windfall to which the law does not entitle him. [Lockhart v Fretwell, 506 US __, __;
113 S Ct 838; 122 L Ed 2d 180, 189 (1993).]
People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 401, n 21; 535 NW2d 496 (1995), similarly stated:
The proper inquiry is not whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
supra at 694. An analysis that focuses “solely on outcome determination, with attention
to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is
defective.” Lockhart v Fretwell, supra at 369.
Thus, in order to establish that counsel was ineffective, defendant must show that but for counsel’s
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different and
that the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.2 Further, defendant must
overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. People
v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995).
Defense counsel’s excellent brief and arguments notwithstanding, we find defendant is not
entitled to any relief regarding this issue. After reviewing the alleged instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel, individually and in the aggregate, we are unable to conclude that the result of the proceeding
(the guilty verdicts) was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.
We do not believe that trial counsel’s failure to move for a Wade3 hearing was ineffective
assistance of counsel. People v Johnson, 202 Mich App 281, 285-286; 508 NW2d 509 (1993).
The fact that only three of the six victims picked defendant out of the lineup belies the claim that the
lineup was unduly suggestive. Also, the fact that two of the victims that identified defendant at trial said
they had seen defendant before the night of the crime diminishes the chance that a false identification
was made. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument was not ineffective assistance
of counsel. Bahoda, supra at 287, n 54 (there are times when it is better not to object and draw
attention to an improper argument). Trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction that defendant was
merely present was not ineffective assistance of counsel because such an instruction was not warranted
by the evidence. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 81-82; 537 NW2d 909 (1995) amended 450 Mich
1212.
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Defendant next argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court failed to give
jury instructions regarding identification and impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement. Once again,
we find defendant is not entitled to any relief. Defendant did not request either of these instructions and
he stated his satisfaction with the instructions that were given. MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1082 states that
the failure of a court to instruct on a point of law shall not be grounds for setting aside the verdict unless
such instruction was requested by the accused. Similarly, MCR 2.516(C) states that a party may assign
error to the court’s failure to give an instruction only if the party objected on the record. Absent an
objection, reversal is only required in cases of manifest injustice. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669,
676-677; __ NW2d ___(1996). Even if the jury instructions are somewhat imperfect, reversal is not
required if the instructions that were given presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the
rights of the defendant. Id. While we believe it would have been better if the court had given the
identification and impeachment by prior inconsistent statement instructions, we do not find the failure to
give these instructions resulted in manifest injustice and we are further satisfied that the instructions that
were given adequately presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. Cf.
People v Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 512-513; 456 NW2d 10 (1990). For example, we believe the giving
of CJI2d 2.6 sufficiently protected defendant’s misidentification defense.
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial as a result of improper prosecutorial
argument. Appellate review of improper prosecutorial remarks is generally precluded absent an
objection because it deprives the court of an opportunity to cure the error. People v Stanaway, 446
Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Nevertheless, we still will reverse if a curative instruction
could not have eliminated the prejudice or if failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of
justice. Ullah, supra at 679. We are satisfied that an objection could have cured any prejudice
relating to the challenged remarks. We agree that a small part of the prosecutor’s closing argument
bordered on an appeal to sympathize with the victims. However, any prejudice was dispelled when the
court subsequently instructed the jury not to let sympathy influence the verdict. See People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 281; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). Failure to review this issue further will not result in a
finding of a miscarriage of justice.
Defendant further argues that the court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to bring
out certain information during redirect examination of a prosecution witness. We find no abuse of
discretion because we agree with the trial court that defendant opened the door to this questioning
during his cross-examination of the witness. Bahoda, supra at 280-281. Assuming error, we find it
was harmless because it had negligible if any influence on the verdicts. See People v Mateo, 453 Mich
203, 221; __ NW2d __ (1996).
Finally, defendant claims that even if the individual errors, standing alone, were harmless, the
cumulative effect of the errors necessitates reversal. We disagree. See People v Duff, 165 Mich App
530, 539; 419 NW2d 600 (1987) (test is not whether there were some irregularities, but whether
defendant had a fair trial), and Reed, supra at 379 (in both federal and state systems, the constitution
guarantees only a fair trial, not a perfect one).
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Affirmed.
/s/ Robert P. Young
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
/s/ Robert C. Livo
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
2
Accord Jones v Page, 76 F 3d 831, 841 (CA 7, 1996) (court may not focus solely on outcome
determination but “must make an additional determination”); Jenner v Class, 79 F3d 736, 739 (CA 8,
1996) (Lockhart “refined” the prejudice inquiry).
3
United States v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L E2d 1149 (1967).
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