JON STAUDACHER V TWP OF BANGOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JON STAUDACHER AND KATHY
STAUDACHER,
UNPUBLISHED
October 11. 1996
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 181709
LC No. 175774
TOWNSHIP OF BANGOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Fitzgerald and M. J. Matuzak*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a tax tribunal hearing referee’s judgment revising their property
tax assessments for 1993 and 1994. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.1
The property at issue is 11.5 acres of residential, unimproved property located in Bangor
Township, Bay County, Michigan, parcel number 90-010-030-400-030-15. In March 1992, plaintiffs
paid $100,000 for a larger parcel which included this property. Subsequent to their purchase, they
donated a portion of the land to the State of Michigan to be added to the Bay City State Park. Plaintiffs
claim that the 1992 purchase price of the 11.5 acres they retained was $89,000. In 1993, this 11.5
acres was assessed at $115,000 with the true cash value being set at $230,000. Plaintiffs appealed the
assessment, claiming that the true cash value was $89,000 and not $230,000. Plaintiffs also noted that
the Department of Natural Resources offered to purchase 6.9 acres of the retained land for $52,800,
and that if the amount per acre under that calculation was applied to the whole 11.5 acres, the value
would be approximately $89,000. While the case was pending, plaintiffs added a challenge to their
1994 assessment, which was again set at $115,000. Respondent claimed that the assessments were
proper, and that the market value as reflected by the purchase price was not conclusive of the true cash
value, especially since the seller of the property was under duress when he sold the land to plaintiffs.
Respondent estimated that eight buildable lots could be made out of the 11.5 acres and sold for
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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$35,000 each. Respondent argued that the value of the land was therefore $280,000 (8 x $35,000),
minus the $75,000 cost of extending a sewer.
The referee rejected both parties’ proposed valuations, finding the assessed value of the
property for 1993 and 1994 to be $81,000 with a true cash value of $162,000. He compared the
parties’ valuations and determined $162,000 was reasonable, purporting to base the assessment on the
market method, modified to take into consideration that the purchase price resulted from duress.
On appeal, plaintiffs first assert that the referee’s method of valuation was “most likely not
allowed by law.” The method of valuation actually used is not clear from the record.
The decision of the tribunal must include a concise statement of facts and conclusions of law.
MCL 205.751(10); MSA 7.650(51)(1). Granader v Southfield Twp, 145 Mich App 585; 377
NW2d 893 (1985). Since no transcript is prepared for proceedings in the small claims division, MCL
205.762(3); MSA 7.650(62)(3), it is crucial that the evidence relied upon and the reasoning for the
conclusions of law be set out in order to allow for meaningful appellate review of the true cash value at
issue. See Oldenburg v Dryden Twp, 198 Mich App 696; 499 NW2d 416 (1993), and First City
Corp v City of Lansing, 153 Mich App 106; 395 NW2d 26 (1986). Here, the referee claimed that
he utilized a modified market method and compared the values offered by each party, but did not
explain how he arrived at an assessment of $162,000. The referee’s statement that he utilized
“reasoned judgment” is insufficient to permit this Court to determine whether there was competent,
material and substantial evidence to support this conclusion of law. Oldenburg, supra at 698.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the tribunal to clarify the basis for its decision. If the tribunal can
reissue its opinion and judgment setting forth its reasoning, without conducting a new hearing, it may do
so. Kern v Pontiac Twp, 93 Mich App 612; 287 NW2d 603 (1979). Otherwise, a new hearing
should be conducted. Id.
Second, plaintiffs contend that the referee should have utilized the selling price to determine true
cash value. Since selling price is not conclusive evidence of a property’s value, the referee was not
bound to accept it as the true cash value. See First City Corp, supra at 155, and Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp v City of Warren, 193 Mich App 348; 483 NW2d 416 (1992).
Third, plaintiffs claim that some of the tribunal’s factual conclusions are unsupported, including
the determination that the seller was under duress when plaintiffs purchased the property. Although
findings of fact by the tax tribunal will be accepted as final if they are supported by “competent,
material, and substantial evidence,” Jones, supra at 352, the record presented to this Court is sparse,
contains conclusory statements and does not provide sufficient information upon which this Court can
review the challenged factual determinations. Accordingly, we remand for clarification of the facts and
evidence upon which the referee relied in making his findings of fact. First City Corp, supra at 113.
Finally, plaintiffs claim that their 1994 assessment actually set the true cash value at $154,000.
On appeal, they submit their assessment notice to support this contention. The referee, however,
specifically noted that the 1994 assessment set the true cash value at $230,000. The referee revised the
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assessment based on the latter value. On remand, the referee should clarify the 1994 true cash value.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the referee would not be bound by the lower appraisal, but could
increase or decrease the assessment. Clark Equipment Co v Leoni Twp, 113 Mich App 778; 318
NW2d 586 (1979). However, the referee should clarify the basis for his decision.
We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction. No costs to either party.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Matuzak
1
Defendant’s claim that this Court does not have jurisdiction is incorrect. When plaintiffs filed their
claim of appeal, the argument that this Court did not have jurisdiction was made. This Court remanded
the case for a determination as to when the motion for rehearing was filed. A subsequent order of
determination by the tax tribunal held that plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing filed on November 4, 1994,
was timely. Therefore, the claim of appeal, filed after the denial of a rehearing on December 13, 1994,
was also timely. Defendant’s reasserted claim that it was not timely and that, therefore, this Court does
not have jurisdiction must fail.
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