STEPHANIE WARNER V HENRY FORD HOSPITAL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STEPHANIE WARNER, M.D.,
UNPUBLISHED
October 4, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 177995
LC No. 93-333197-CZ
HENRY FORD HOSPITAL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Corrigan and R.A. Benson,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this defamation action, plaintiff appeals by right the order granting summary disposition to
defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
Plaintiff Stephanie Warner participated in defendant Henry Ford Hospital’s residency program
from July 1989 until February 1990, when she resigned. She subsequently completed her residency at
another hospital and eventually obtained a medical license in Michigan. In 1993, plaintiff applied for a
medical license in Florida. As part of the application process, the Florida Board of Medicine sent
defendant a request for information regarding plaintiff. Defendant responded to that request. Plaintiff
subsequently commenced the present action, alleging that defendant defamed her in its response to the
request for information. Defendant moved for summary disposition, which the court granted. Plaintiff
appeals.
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion on appeal, the record does not indicate that the trial court
granted summary disposition because it concluded that the alleged defamatory statements “were merely
opinions” and, therefore, not actionable. Rather, the record indicates that the trial court granted
summary disposition because the submitted documents did not create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding malice. We find no error.
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a claim. Radtke v
Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). In ruling on such a motion, the trial court must
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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consider not only the pleadings but also any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary
evidence submitted by the parties. Id. The court must give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the
opposing party and may grant the motion only if no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
MCL 331.531; MSA 14.57(21) states, in pertinent part:
(1) A person, organization, or entity may provide to a review entity information
or data relating to the physical or psychological condition of a person, the necessity,
appropriateness, or quality of health care rendered to a person, or the qualifications,
competence, or performance of a health care provider.
***
(3) A person, organization, or entity is not civilly or criminally liable:
(a) For providing information or data pursuant to subsection (1).
***
(4) The immunity from liability provided under subsection (3) does not apply to
a person, organization, or entity that acts with malice. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, a person, organization or entity that provides information to a review entity pursuant to subsection
(1) is immune from civil liability unless the person, organization or entity acts with malice. Regualos v
Community Hospital, 140 Mich App 455, 462; 364 NW2d 723 (1985).
In this case, defendant furnished the information to the Florida Board of Medicine because
plaintiff applied for a medical license. The statute defines “review entity” to include “[a] state
department or agency whose jurisdiction encompasses the information described in subsection (1).”
MCL 331.531(2)(d); MSA 14.57(21). This definition encompasses the Florida Board of Medicine
with respect to information pertaining to an application for a medical license. Accordingly, unless
defendant acted with malice, it is immune from liability regarding information it provided pursuant to
subsection (1) of the statute.
We reject plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in finding that no genuine issue of material fact
existed regarding malice. In Veldhuis v Allan, 164 Mich App 131, 136; 416 NW2d 347 (1987), this
Court stated:
[T]he definition of malice applicable in defamation actions also seems appropriate in the
context of MCL 331.531; MSA 14.57(21). . . . Applying that definition, the statutory
immunity does not apply only if the person supplying information or data does so with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. [Citations
omitted.]
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In the present case, defendant submitted numerous memoranda, letters, departmental
communications, correspondence, and other documents from plaintiff’s file that support the various
statements contained in defendant’s response to the Florida Board of Medicine’s request for
information. A review of the submitted documents reveals that reasonable minds would not be justified
in concluding that defendant acted with malice.
We reject plaintiff’s contention that additional documents in her file create a genuine issue of fact
regarding the existence of malice. Specifically, the Florida Board of Medicine’s letter of inquiry and
defendant’s response both reference plaintiff’s participation in defendant’s psychiatry residency
program. Neither the February 14, 1990, nor the May 31, 1990, letters of reference relied upon by
plaintiff relate to her performance in the psychiatry rotation. Rather, the letters address plaintiff’s
performance in the general internal medicine and neurology rotations. Accordingly, the letters do not
provide factual support for plaintiff’s claim that the statements concerning her participation in the
psychiatry rotation were false or were made with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.
Additionally, plaintiff’s reliance on the February 23, 1990, letter from Dr. Selbst is misplaced. That
letter does not discuss the plaintiff’s employment status when she resigned from the residency program.
Thus, it fails to establish an issue of fact regarding the existence of malice with respect to defendant’s
statement that plaintiff “did not leave in good standing.” Likewise, the February 13, 1990, departmental
communication from Dr. Davis merely addresses plaintiff’s then-existing suspension and the steps
necessary for that suspension to be lifted. Contrary to plaintiff’s representation, the document does not
indicate that defendant would have offered plaintiff a position in the residency program the following
year. Nor do any of the other documents that plaintiff submitted support a finding that defendant acted
with malice when responding to the Florida Board of Medicine’s request for information.
Apart from the issue of malice, plaintiff argues that summary disposition was improper because
a question of fact exists whether defendant, in responding to the request for information, exceeded the
scope of any personal consent that plaintiff provided for the release of information, thereby defeating
defendant’s claim of privilege. Plaintiff’s argument, however, assumes that “defendant relies on a
general release of information to conclude they have a privilege.” As the prior discussion indicates,
defendant’s claim of privilege is not grounded solely on the existence of a general release; it is also
grounded in MCL 331.531; MSA 14.57(21), which does not require consent. Rather, the privilege
applies if the information relates to “the physical or psychological condition of a person, the necessity,
appropriateness, or quality of health care rendered to a person, or the qualifications, competence, or
performance of a health care provider.” MCL 331.531(1); MSA 14.57(21)(1). Here, each of the
statements relate to plaintiff’s qualifications, competence or performance as a health care provider. The
statements are subject to the statutory privilege, notwithstanding the alleged absence of consent
regarding the release of the information. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary disposition
correctly in favor of defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Robert A. Benson
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