PEOPLE OF MI V JASON SCOTT ROOF
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 27, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 180763
LC No. 93-2856-FC
JASON SCOTT ROOF,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markman, P.J., and McDonald and M. J. Matuzak,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury conviction for first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA
28.548.
Defendant confessed to the stabbing homicide of the 2½ year old son of an acquaintance
and was charged with open murder. He was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment.
We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction, claiming that the jury improperly ignored his own testimony that his actions at the time of the
killing were spontaneous and that he had no intent to kill. We disagree. Premeditation and deliberation
may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a killing, including the prior relationship between the
parties and the defendant’s actions leading up to, during, and after the killing. People v Morris, 202
Mich App 620, 622-623; 509 NW2d 865 (1993), vacated on other grounds 445 Mich 860 (1994).
Evidence presented at trial revealed that defendant had a particular dislike of the victim and h
ad
repeatedly threatened to harm him; that defendant first tried to suffocate the victim with a pillow and,
when suffocation did not work, retrieved a knife from across the room and stabbed the victim through
the heart; that defendant put the victim in the back of his pickup truck even while the victim gasped for
breath; and that defendant went to great lengths to methodically conceal what he had done, showing a
decided lack of remorse upon confessing. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the evidence sufficient to prove the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Medlyn, 215 Mich App 338,
340; ___ NW2d ___ (1996).
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence
an edited version of his video taped interview with police, claiming that failure to present the entire tape
was prejudicial. Since defendant failed to object to this admission below, we need not review this issue
absent manifest injustice. People v King, 210 Mich App 425, 432; 534 NW2d 534 (1995). We find
no manifest injustice because the prosecutor apprised the jury that the tape had been edited and the trial
court admitted into evidence the omitted portions of the interview as well as the entire unedited tape.
Defendant next contends that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on a controlling
issue of the case when it did not give an instruction regarding the evidentiary weight to be given to his
video taped statement, claiming that this instruction pertained to his state of mind at the time of the
killing. Since defendant failed to object to this omission below, we need not review this issue absent
manifest injustice. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 230; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). We find no
manifest injustice because the trial court gave instructions on, and explicitly directed the jury’s attention
to, the issue of defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing.
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to
call a pharmacological expert witness. We disagree. The proposed witness would have given
testimony regarding side effects of defendant’s drug regimen, facts that had already been introduced by
a previous defense witness. Furthermore, these facts were never directly disputed by the prosecution.
We find no abuse of discretion in disallowing the presentation of cumulative and undisputed evidence.
People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 18; 507 NW2d 763 (1993); MRE 403.
Defendant next contends that the trial court improperly required defense counsel to declare his
own witness hostile, claiming that his counsel instead should have been able to ask leading questions
pursuant to MRE 611(c)(3). We disagree. We note that defendant failed to object to the trial court’s
limitation on the manner of questioning and therefore, we need not review this issue absent manifest
injustice. People v Adamski, 198 Mich App 133, 143; 497 NW2d 546 (1993). Furthermore, at no
time did the trial court require defense counsel to declare his witness hostile. Rather, the trial court
merely admonished defense counsel, quite inconspicuously, that he would not be permitted to continue
to lead his own witness. Moreover, we note that MRE 611(c)(3) requires that the witness be identified
as hostile when called in order for leading questions to be appropriate, which was not the case here.
We find no manifest injustice here.
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a defense witness
to give expert testimony on cross-examination without prior qualification as an expert. We agree.
Defendant called a mental health clinician as part of his case-in-chief; however, the witness was not
offered as an expert. On cross-examination, the trial court permitted the witness to testify that
defendant was not mentally ill. Such a specialized opinion by a lay witness cannot be rationally based
on the witness’ perception, MRE 701, and the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the
witness to so testify. People v McMillan, 213 Mich App 134, 137; 539 NW2d 553 (1995).
However, we also find that the trial court’s error was harmless, precluding reversal, since there was no
miscarriage of justice. Substantial evidence had already been introduced establishing an absence of
mental illness on defendant’s part.
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Finally, defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial,
claiming that his counsel erred by calling certain witnesses part of whose testimony undermined his own
case. We disagree. We note that defendant offers no concrete evidence to support his assertions that
his trial counsel was ineffective. Furthermore, it is to be expected, in the normal course, that the cross
examination of defense witnesses will often elicit some testimony that is unhelpful to the defense’s theory
of the case. Defendant has not overcome the presumption that his counsel’s actions constituted
reasonable trial strategy, nor has he shown in some other way that his counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness so as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v LaVearn, 448
Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797
(1994).
Because we find only one error and conclude that it was harmless, we need not address
defendant’s contention that cumulative error denied him a fair trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Michael J. Matuzak
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