TIMOTHY WOOLRIDGE V GRACE HOSPITAL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TIMOTHY WOOLRIDGE, next Friend of
ADARRIUS WOOLRIDGE,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 1996
Plaintiffs,
and
VERONICA WOOLRIDGE and TIMOTHY
WOOLRIDGE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 187678
LC No. 94-423836-NH
GRACE HOSPITAL and YOUL CHOI, M.D.,
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Murphy and C.W. Simon, Jr.,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order of the circuit court granting partial summary disposition to
defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) on this medical malpractice action.
This Court reviews de novo a lower court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition.
Borman v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 198 Mich App 675,678; 449 NW2d 419 (1993), aff’d
444 Mich 935 (1994).
The undisputed facts of this case reveal that plaintiffs’ claim of medical malpractice accrued on
June 9, 1992, the date that plaintiff Veronica Woolridge gave birth to her son, Adarrius. The two-year
statute of limitations, as provided in MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4), expired on June 9, 1994.
Plaintiffs sent out their mandatory letter of intent to file a medical malpractice claim, per MCL
600.2912b; MSA 27A.2912(2), on November 30, 1993. Therefore, when the 182-day period under
§2912b expired on May 31, 1994, plaintiffs still had nine days in which to file their complaint under the
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
general two-year statutory period. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that although the two-year statute of
limitations for a medical malpractice action under MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.58505(4) had
expired, the doctrine of equitable tolling should allow their claim to be heard. We disagree.
This Court has recently held that “as a general rule, a limitation period is tolled only by a
substantive restriction on the plaintiff’s ability to bring an action in a timely manner, not by mere
procedural or technical irregularities whose correction is within the control of the plaintiff. Turner v
Mercy Hosps & Health Servs of Detroit, 210 Mich App 345, 349-350; 533 NW2d 365 (1995).
Further, when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, no judicial interpretation is warranted.
Witherspoon v Guilford, 203 Mich App 240, 247; 511 NW2d 720 (1994). We find here that a
straightforward reading of the language of both MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.58505(4) and MCL
600.2912b; MSA 27A.2912(2) reveals that the Michigan Legislature provided a precise formula for
computing when the §5805(4) general statute of limitations period should be tolled, in language upon
which reasonable minds could not differ. Plaintiffs failed to comply with the statutory provisions.1
Plaintiffs’ further reliance on federal law to establish equitable tolling also fails, as federal courts
use the doctrine only sparingly, and rarely in cases where, as here, the claimant has failed to exercise
due diligence in preserving his legal rights. Irwin v Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 US 89; 111 S Ct
453; 112 L Ed 2d 435 (1990).
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Charles W. Simon, Jr.
1
This case is completely distinguishable from Morrison v Dickinson, 217 Mich App 308; ___ NW2d
___ (1996).
-2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
