BARBARA J HILL V AGENCY RENT-A-CAR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA J. HILL,
UNPUBLISHED
August 9, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 176184
LC No. 92-213875
AGENCY RENT-A-CAR,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
PATRICK WILSON,
Defendant.
Before: Young, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and J. Richard Ernst,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a Wayne Circuit Court order vacating the arbitration award
rendered in plaintiff’s favor in this automobile negligence case. We reverse and reinstate the arbitration
award.
Where a court finds that an arbitration panel exceeded its powers, the court may vacate the
arbitration award. MCR 3.602(J)(1)(c). An arbitration panel exceeds its powers whenever it acts
beyond the material terms of the contract from which it primarily draws its authority, or in contravention
of controlling principles of law. Gordon Sel-Way Inc v Spence Brothers Inc, 438 Mich 488, 496
497; 475 NW2d 704 (1991), citing Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v Gavin, 416
Mich 407; 331 NW2d 418 (1982). Any legal error in this respect by the arbitration panel must be
clear from the face of the award and must be so material or substantial as to have governed the award.
Gordon Sel-Way Inc, supra.
The arbitration agreement between the parties provided, in pertinent part:
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
The arbitration will be held in accordance with the usual rules governing
procedure and admission of evidence in Courts of law and under the laws of the State
of Michigan.
The arbitrators shall hear and determine the issues of tort liability and allowable
damages under MCLA 500.3135. The arbitrators shall have no power to decide any
issue of coverage pertaining to this cause of action.
Plaintiff relies on League General Ins Co v Budget Rent-A-Car of Detroit, 172 Mich App 802; 432
NW2d 751 (1988), which dealt with the issue of coverage under a no-fault insurance policy. Given that
the parties’ arbitration agreement limited the arbitrators’ decision in this case to tort liability and
allowable damages, and specifically precluded the arbitration panel from deciding any issue regarding
insurance coverage, we find plaintiff’s reliance on League General to be misplaced.
In Michigan, the owner of a negligently driven motor vehicle is liable for any resulting injury,
unless the vehicle was driven without the owner’s express or implied consent or knowledge. MCL
257.401; MSA 9.2101. The term “consent” must be construed to effectuate the underlying policy of
the owner’s civil liability statute, which is to place the risk of damage or injury upon the person who has
ultimate control of the vehicle, the owner. Cowan v Strecker, 394 Mich 110, 115; 229 NW2d 302
(1975), citing Roberts v Posey, 386 Mich 656; 194 NW2d 310 (1972). To effectuate this public
policy, a car driven upon a public highway in this state gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the car
is being driven with the owner’s consent. Delaney v Burnett, 63 Mich App 639; 234 NW2d 741
(1975). Contrary to defendant Agency Rent-A-Car’s claim, the presumption of consent arises from the
mere fact that the car was being driven on the highway, and it is the owner’s burden to rebut that
presumption. See Roberts, supra at 663.
Defendant Agency Rent-A-Car argues, and the circuit court agreed, that the express provision
of the rental agreement, which prohibited use of the vehicle by anyone under twenty-one years of age,
was sufficient to rebut any presumption that it had consented to defendant Wilson’s operation of the
vehicle. We disagree.
[W]hen an owner willingly surrenders control of his vehicle to others he ‘consents’ to
assumption of the risks attendant upon his surrender of control regardless of
admonitions which would purport to delimit his consent. It must be so, or the
statutory purpose would be frustrated. [Cowan, supra at 115. Emphasis added.]
Here, Agency Rent-A-Car, as owner of the vehicle, failed to rebut the presumption of consent. No
facts have been established that defendant Wilson was denied permission to drive the vehicle by Agency
Rent-A-Car’s permittee. Cf. Caradonna v Arpino, 177 Mich App 486; 442 NW2d 702 (1989);
Fout v Dietz, 75 Mich App 128; 254 NW2d 813 (1977), aff’d 401 Mich 403; 258 NW2d 53
(1977). Accordingly, because the arbitration panel’s decision was consistent with the
-2
controlling precedent of Delaney, Cowan, and Roberts, the circuit court erred in vacating the
arbitrators’ decision to hold defendant Agency Rent-A-Car liable for plaintiff’s injury.
Reversed. The arbitration award is reinstated.
/s/ Robert P. Young
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ J. Richard Ernst
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.