PEOPLE OF MI V STEPHEN T NICHOLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 26, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 174392
LC No. 93-11202-FH
STEPHEN T. NICHOLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Saad and W. J. Giovan,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520d(1)(b); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(b), and was sentenced to serve three to fifteen years in prison.
He appeals as of right, and we reverse.
The prosecutor violated defendant’s right to remain silent and right to counsel by cross
examining him regarding his request for an attorney when police questioned him about handcuffs he
possessed. When a defendant speaks after receiving Miranda1 warnings, a momentary pause or even a
failure to answer a question is not to be construed as an affirmative invocation of the right to remain
silent. People v McReavy, 436 Mich 196, 222; 462 NW2d 1 (1990). However, where the record
indicates that the defendant’s silence is attributable to invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination or reliance on Miranda warnings, use of that silence against the defendant is
error. Id., 201. The prosecutor’s questions effectively attempted to force defendant to explain his
assertion of his Miranda and Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent. However, the
Miranda rights contain an implicit assurance that silence in reliance on those rights will not be penalized.
See People v Cetlinski, 435 Mich 742, 746; 460 NW2d 534 (1990). A prosecutor may not use a
defendant’s exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent against the defendant at trial. People
v Gilbert, 183 Mich App 741, 747; 455 NW2d 731 (1990). The jury could have inappropriately
inferred that defendant sought the assistance of counsel because the police were pressing him about
strong evidence of guilt. Inasmuch as the only direct testimony regarding the incident was from
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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defendant and the complainant, any corroborating evidence could have tipped the scale in the credibility
contest. People v Gee, 406 Mich 279, 283; 278 NW2d 304 (1979); People v Scobey, 153 Mich
App 82, 86; 395 NW2d 247 (1986). Accordingly, we conclude that this impropriety was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 404-406; 521
NW2d 538 (1994), and reverse defendant’s conviction. We note that we do not find improper the
prosecutor’s cross-examination regarding defendant’s failure to assert during police questioning that his
sexual activity with the complainant was consensual. From the record, it appears that before the
handcuffs were mentioned, defendant was answering questions and had not affirmatively invoked his
right to remain silent. People v Davis, 191 Mich App 29, 36; 477 NW2d 438 (1991).
Given our decision above, we need only address the merits of two of defendant’s remaining
issues, given the likelihood that they may arise on retrial. First, the trial court did not err by failing to
instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser misdemeanor of assault and battery. Even if this instruction had
been requested, it would have been improper because criminal sexual conduct offenses protect a
distinct societal interest from other types of assaultive offenses. People v Payne, 90 Mich App 713,
720-721; 282 NW2d 456 (1979). Instructions on a lesser misdemeanor should not be given unless
there is an “inherent relationship” between the greater and lesser offenses. People v Hendricks, 446
Mich 435, 444-445; 521 NW2d 546 (1994).
Second, we find no merit to defendant’s argument that the trial court’s instructions failed to
apprise the jury adequately that it could convict him of third-degree criminal sexual conduct only if it
found that he committed the oral penetration testified to by the complainant. There was evidence of
only one oral penetration. The court clearly and unambiguously instructed the jury that conviction
required, in part, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s penis entered the complainant’s
mouth, thereby confining the possibility of conviction to the act charged, although the prosecution had
also presented evidence of other (hand-genital) sexual contact. People v Howell, 396 Mich 16, 28;
238 NW2d 148 (1976); People v Yarger, 193 Mich App 532, 536-537; 485 NW2d 119 (1992).
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Henry W. Saad
/s/ William J. Giovan
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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