PEOPLE OF MI V LARRY FARMER
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 19, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 178842
LC No. 93-36388-FC
LARRY FARMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, C.J., and Wahls and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury conviction of guilty but mentally ill of first-degree
murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant first agues that insufficient evidence was presented to find defendant guilty of first
degree murder because the prosecutor failed to show that defendant was legally sane. Defendant
contends that because he was legally insane at the time he committed the instant offense, the prosecutor
failed to establish that defendant had the requisite specific intent to commit murder. A person is legally
insane if as a result of mental illness that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. MCL
768.21a(1); MSA 28.1044(1). A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed sane. People v
Savoie, 419 Mich 118, 126; 349 NW2d 139 (1984). However, once there is any evidence
introduced of insanity, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish defendant’s sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. The testimony of lay witnesses may be competent evidence of sanity and may be
used to rebut expert testimony of the issue. People v Murphy, 416 Mich 453, 465; 331 NW2d 152
(1982).
Conflicting evidence on the issue of defendant’s mental capacity was presented at trial. While
defendant presented expert testimony opining that defendant was legally insane at the time he committed
the instant crime, the prosecutor presented evidence that defendant was not criminally insane when he
committed the crime. Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
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rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). Because we will not second
guess the jury’s determination of witness credibility and reweigh the evidence, we affirm the jury’s
verdict. Id. at 514.
Defendant next claims that he was denied a fair trial through numerous alleged instances of
prosecutorial misconduct. Having reviewed defendant’s claims, we find that he was not deprived of a
fair trial. Defendant first contends that the prosecutor improperly referred to the penalty that defendant
would receive if the jury found defendant not guilty. Our review of the record shows that the prosecutor
never mentioned the possible penalty defendant could receive if acquitted of the charged crime. Thus,
we find this contention of error to be without merit.
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor improperly disparaged defendant by comparing
defendant to Adolph Hitler. The record does not support defendant’s contention that the prosecutor
specifically compared defendant to Hitler. However, even if the prosecutor’s comments could be
construed as such, any prejudice to defendant was cured by the trial court’s instruction to the
prosecutor to retract the remark. People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 104-105; 505 NW2d 869
(1993).
Defendant failed to object to the remaining instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore,
our review of the remaining alleged instances of misconduct is limited to whether our failure to review
would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557
(1994). We find no miscarriage of justice here because either any possible prejudice could have been
cured by a timely instruction from the court, id., or, in some instances, the conduct at issue did not
amount to misconduct.
Defendant further claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel due to trial
counsel’s failure to object to the above instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. To show
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant first must show that counsel’s performance was below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel’s assistance constituted sound trial strategy. Id. Second, defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Id.
We find that defendant failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
alleged error, the result of his trial would have been different. As noted above, most of the complained
of comments were proper; therefore, any objection by counsel would have been overruled.
Furthermore, even if the remarks were improper, they did not rise to a level warranting reversal because
sufficient evidence of defendant’s sanity was presented. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to a new
trial because even if counsel would have objected to the complained-of remarks, the outcome of the
trial would not have been different. Id.
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Defendant claims that the trial court improperly excluded a diagram made by defendant which
supported defendant’s theory that he was legally insane when he committed the instant crime. The
decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is within the trial court’s discretion. People v McAlister,
203 Mich App 495, 505; 513 NW2d 431 (1994). Finding that the diagram was irrelevant, the trial
court excluded the evidence. Defendant committed the instant crime in February 1993. The evidence
sought to be admitted was a diagram drawn by defendant in August 1994; therefore, the diagram had
no relevancy to the issue of whether defendant was insane at the time he committed the crime in 1993.
Because the evidence was irrelevant, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the evidence. Id.
Defendant next contends that he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury when the
prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to exclude a black person from the jury. We review de novo
the issue of whether a prosecutor improperly used a peremptory challenge to exclude a black person
from the jury; however, we will give great deference to a trial court’s factual determination that the
explanation given by the prosecutor was racially neutral. People v Barker, 179 Mich App 702, 707;
446 NW2d 549 (1989). We find that the prosecutor’s explanation was racially neutral and shows that
he did not exercise his peremptory challenge with respect to this juror merely because the juror was
black. Thus, defendant is not entitled to a new trial. Id. at 706.
Defendant’s final contention of error is that he was deprived of a fair trial when a witness
improperly remarked that defendant should be shackled. Defendant did not object to the witness’
statement at trial; therefore, the issue is unpreserved for appellate review. A plain unpreserved error
may not be considered by this Court for the first time on appeal unless the error could have been
decisive of the outcome or unless it falls under the category of cases where prejudice is presumed.
People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). We find that the witness made an
unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question, which is not a ground for granting a mistrial.
People v Gonzales, 193 Mich App 263, 266; 483 NW2d 458 (1992). We also find that defendant
was not prejudiced by the remark; therefore, defendant is not entitled to a new trial. Grant, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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