PEOPLE OF MI V JERRY MACK WOODY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 19, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 174451
LC No. 93-003056-FC
JERRY MACK WOODY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Sawyer and R.M. Pajtas,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83;
MSA 28.278, armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, breaking and entering an occupied
dwelling with intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, and three counts of possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to
life imprisonment for the assault with intent to murder conviction, twenty-five to fifty years for the armed
robbery conviction, six to fifteen years for the breaking and entering conviction and two years for each
of the felony-firearm convictions. Defendant now appeals and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor violated his due process rights by eliciting testimony
on direct examination that the owner of the marijuana allegedly taken during the armed robbery had
agreed to testify “truthfully” in exchange for leniency. Defendant does concede that counsel failed to
object to these alleged improper remarks. Therefore, appellate review of these allegedly improper
remarks is precluded absent manifest injustice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 446 NW2d
643 (1994). Given the nature of the witness’ testimony and the overwhelming evidence against
defendant, we conclude that failure to review this issue further will not result in manifest injustice.
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to show that he had
an intent to kill the victim. We disagree. The intent to kill may be proven by inference from any fact in
evidence. People v Taylor, 422 Mich 554, 568; 375 NW2d 1 (1985). The testimony showed that
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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defendant and an accomplice were involved in an armed robbery, and that when they noticed that the
police arrived, they ran out the back door towards Officer Madsen in an attempt to escape. There was
evidence that defendant first shot from a distance of only ten feet, and was aiming directly at the officer
and that if the officer had not moved, he would have been hit. There was also testimony that after the
first shot, defendant positioned himself to get a better aim at the officer and that his aim followed the
officer as he moved and that defendant then fired a second shot from a distance of only twelve feet.
When the above-mentioned evidence and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom are looked at in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have been convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant in this case intended to kill the officer when he was trying to make his
escape from the scene of the crime. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508; 489 NW2d 748 (1992),
amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court violated his due process rights by requiring him
to appear in shackles in the presence of the jury. In this case, defendant was brought into the
courtroom, prior to the jury’s returning from its deliberations, in leg irons. Prior to this, defendant was
at no time shackled in the presence of the jury. When the jury did return from deliberations, the
following exchange took place:
The Defendant: Your Honor, they put leg irons on me.
The Court: Mr. Woody, please have a seat back there. Mrs. Plushnik. Have
a seat Mr. Woody. Mrs. Plushnik.
The Clerk: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if you have arrived at a verdict
would your foreman please rise and state your verdict as to Count I? As to Count I.
Jury Foreperson: Guilty.
The Clerk: As to—
The Defendant: You[r] Honor, they put leg irons—
The Court: Mr. Woody, please have a seat.
The Defendant: They put leg irons on me before I’m even found guilty of
anything.
The Court: Mr. Woody, that was only brought to the attention of the jury at
your direction, sir. It never would have been known had you—
The Defendant: I walked in her with leg chains on.
The Court: They were not present, Mr. Woody.
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Defendant further argues that he was prejudiced in that because a juror could have changed his
vote during the polling of the jury, the jury may have reached its verdict on the presence of shackles,
rather than on the evidence presented at trial. A juror, upon polling, may exercise disagreement with the
verdict which would require further deliberations. People v Booker (After Remand), 208 Mich App
163; 527 NW2d 42 (1994). However, in this case, the jury had already reached a verdict and voted
to convict defendant prior to seeing defendant in leg irons; there is simply no evidence that shows that
any of the jurors were going to change their vote or express disagreement with the verdict because of
what defendant had brought to their attention. We, therefore, conclude that defendant was not
prejudiced as a result of having been shackled. People v Robinson, 172 Mich App 650, 654; 432
NW2d 390 (1988). Furthermore, we note that the only reason the jury was aware of the shackling was
because of defendant’s own actions. If defendant was concerned that the shackling might have
prejudiced the jury at that late stage of the proceedings, he should not have drawn their attention to it.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard M. Pajtas
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