FREDERICK P CALDERONE V LEE ABAJAY
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
FREDERICK P. CALDERONE and MARY LINDA
CALDERONE,
UNPUBLISHED
July 9, 1996
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants/Appellees,
v
No. 183211
LC No. 92-429860
LEE ABAJAY and GAIL ABAJAY,
Defendants,
and
RICHARD ADAMS, NANCY ADAMS, WILLIAM
BIZER, PATRICIA BIZER, JACK CAPPOCCIA,
ROSE CAPPOCCIA, RONALD COLE, CAROLYN
COLE, LEE COX, DEBORAH COX, and GERALD
DUNN,
Defendants/Cross-Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Murphy and C.D. Corwin,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action for a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction tried before the bench,
defendants appeal by right the circuit court’s order declaring that Lot 20 consists of two distinct parcels,
and that plaintiffs could build a single-family home on each parcel. We affirm.
This appeal concerns the interpretation of a restrictive covenant attached to Lot 20 of the West
Franklin Estates subdivision, in Farmington Hills, Michigan. The deed restriction at issue stated that:
“There shall be not more than one house built on each parcel of land.” The developer attached this
deed restriction to all 55 lots in the subdivision. Plaintiffs wanted to build a house on the western
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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portion of Lot 20, even though a house was already erected on the eastern portion of Lot 20. They
argued that this would not violate the restrictive covenant since “parcel,” as used in the restrictive
covenant, did not mean the same thing as “lot.” Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ building plans would
violate the restrictive covenant since “parcel” was equivalent to “lot.” In the alternative, defendants
argued that plaintiffs’ building plans would violate the subdivision’s common scheme or plan.
I
Defendants first argue that the trial court clearly erred in finding that plaintiffs’ building plans
would not violate the restrictive covenant. We disagree.
When reviewing equitable actions, this Court employs de novo review on the decision and
review for clear error of the findings of fact in support of the equitable decision rendered. Webb v
Smith (After Remand), 204 Mich App 564, 568; 516 NW2d 124 (1994). A trial court’s findings are
considered clearly erroneous when this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court
made a mistake. Id. When interpreting a restrictive covenant, courts must give effect to the instrument
as a whole. Rofe v Robinson (On Second Remand), 126 Mich App 151, 157; 336 NW2d 778
(1983). If there is any doubt as to the exact meaning of the restrictions, the court must consider the
subdivider’s intention and purpose. Id. Restrictions must be construed in light of the general plan under
which the area subject to those restrictions was platted and developed. Id. However, restrictive
covenants are to be construed strictly against those seeking enforcement and all doubts are to be
resolved in favor of the free use of property. Id., p 158.
We hold that the trial court’s finding that the deed restriction did not prohibit building a house on
the western portion of Lot 20 was not clearly erroneous. Since it was unclear from the face of the
restriction whether plaintiffs’ proposed building plans violated its terms, the trial court correctly looked
to the developer’s intent in order to determine the restriction’s scope. See Rofe, supra, p 157. The
trial court’s finding that the developer did not intend to prohibit more than one house on Lot 20 was not
clearly erroneous. The evidence established that the developer did not intend to prohibit lot splits. The
developer, himself, attempted to split some of the subdivision’s lots. Therefore, since the developer did
not intend to prohibit lot splits, it is highly unlikely that he intended to restrict Lot 20 to only one house.
II
Defendants next argue that the trial court clearly erred in finding that plaintiffs’ building plans
would not violate the subdivision’s general scheme or plan. We disagree.
If the owner of two or more lots sells one lot with restrictions that benefit the land retained, the
restriction becomes mutual, and, during the period of restraint, the owner of the lot or lots retained can
do nothing forbidden to the owner of the lot sold. Sanborn v McLean, 233 Mich 227, 229-230; 206
NW 496 (1925). This is known as a reciprocal negative easement. Id. A reciprocal negative
easement cannot be created retroactively by mutual agreement among common land owners to act in a
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certain way. Id. A reciprocal negative easement restricts a parcel of land only to the extent that a
common grantor previously restricted some related parcel of land for the grantor’s own benefit. Id.
The only express restriction alleged to have created a reciprocal negative easement was the
deed restriction discussed under Issue I. This restriction could not have created a reciprocal negative
easement prohibiting plaintiffs from building a house on the western portion of Lot 20 since, as
discussed under Issue I, the developer did not intend the deed restriction to prohibit such activity.
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that a reciprocal negative easement prohibiting
more than one house on each lot was not established.
Affirmed.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Charles D. Corwin
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