HELEN JORDAN V DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Dissenting Opinion)
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If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS HELEN JORDAN, FOR PUBLICATION December 10, 2020 Plaintiff-Appellee, V DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, formerly known as DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, No. 349641 Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission LC No. 17-000029 Defendant-Appellant. Before: MARKEY, P.J., and METER and GADOLA, JJ. METER, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion to reverse the MCAC’s determination that plaintiff’s opioid prescriptions were reasonable and necessary treatments. I write separately to highlight the highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the MCAC. “[J]udicial review of a decision by the MCAC is limited . . . .” Arbuckle v Gen Motors LLC, 499 Mich 521, 531; 885 NW2d 232 (2016). This Court’s “review begins with the [commission’s] decision, not the magistrate’s.” Omian v Chrysler Group LLC, 309 Mich App 297, 306; 869 NW2d 625 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). “Findings of fact made or adopted by the [commission] are conclusive on appeal, absent fraud, if there is any competent evidence in the record to support them.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original). Here, there was competent evidence to support the MCAC’s determination that plaintiff’s opioid prescriptions were reasonable and necessary: plaintiff and her treating doctors testified that she was prescribed opioids on the basis of her 1995 work-related injury, and that at the time of the prescriptions, opioids were a reasonable and necessary treatment for pain. Thus, the MCAC’s findings are conclusive on appeal. Further, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the MCAC did not misconstrue or misapply Staggs. I agree with the majority’s statement that “[t]he principle or proposition that emanated from Staggs is that treatment provided in response to a work-related injury, if reasonable or -1- necessary under the circumstances, can create or give rise to a disability causing loss of wageearning capacity that entitles the employee to workers’ compensation benefits, even if the physical injury alone would not have supported an award of benefits.” However, I disagree that Staggs is inapplicable to this case. Plaintiff’s doctors originally prescribed the opioids in direct response to plaintiff’s work-related injuries. Despite the factual distinction between this case and Staggs regarding the on-going nature of the relevant treatments, plaintiff’s doctors continued to prescribe opioids as a reasonable and necessary treatment for plaintiff’s work-related injuries. Because plaintiff’s treatment was provided in response to her work-related injury, and that treatment caused the loss of her wage-earning capacity, this case falls squarely within Staggs. Therefore, I would affirm the MCAC’s decision to reverse the magistrate’s determination. /s/ Patrick M. Meter -2-
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