JOHN TER BEEK V CITY OF WYOMING (Authored Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN TER BEEK,
FOR PUBLICATION
July 31, 2012
9:15 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 306240
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 10-011515-CZ
CITY OF WYOMING,
Defendant-Appellee.
Advance Sheets Version
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and WHITBECK, JJ.
HOEKSTRA, J.
In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff, John Ter Beek, appeals as of right the trial
court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, the city of Wyoming. Plaintiff
sought to void defendant’s zoning ordinance on state preemption grounds because the zoning
ordinance was enacted to prohibit conduct permitted by the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act
(MMMA), MCL 333.26421 et seq. Because we conclude that defendant’s zoning ordinance
directly conflicts with the MMMA, and the federal controlled substances act (CSA), 21 USC 801
et seq., does not preempt § 4(a) of the MMMA, MCL 333.26424(a), we reverse and remand.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 1, 2010, defendant amended its city code and enacted a zoning ordinance
that provides: “Uses not expressly permitted under this article are prohibited in all districts. Uses
that are contrary to federal law, state law or local ordinance are prohibited.” Wyoming
Ordinance, § 90-66. Violations of Wyoming’s city code, including zoning violations, are
punishable by “civil sanctions, including, without limitation, fines, damages, expenses and
costs,” Wyoming Ordinance, § 1-27(a), and zoning violations are further subject to injunctive
relief pursuant to Michigan’s zoning enabling act, MCL 125.3407.
Plaintiff, who is a qualified medical-marijuana 1 patient, lives within the city limits of
Wyoming, where he grows and uses marijuana for medical purposes in his home, presumably in
1
While the statute refers to “marihuana,” by convention this Court uses the more common
spelling “marijuana.”
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compliance with the MMMA. He has not been charged with violating the ordinance, nor has he
been subjected to any penalties, fines, or injunctions. 2 After the enactment of defendant’s zoning
ordinance, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief against defendant. Plaintiff’s first
amended complaint alleged that because the federal CSA prohibits the manufacture and use of
marijuana, which the CSA sanctions as a schedule I controlled substance, defendant’s ordinance
prohibits the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes. Plaintiff’s
complaint further alleged that defendant’s ordinance is invalid because the ordinance prohibits
and makes punishable the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes in
direct conflict with the MMMA. On these grounds, plaintiff maintained that the ordinance
conflicts with the MMMA and, therefore, is preempted by the MMMA, and, consequently, is
invalid. Defendant’s answer admits that “the cultivation, possession and distribution of
marihuana are subject to the zoning code of Wyoming,” but denies that its ordinance is
preempted by the MMMA.
The parties filed competing motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff argued that the ordinance directly conflicted with the MMMA and was
accordingly invalid. Plaintiff further maintained that the federal CSA did not preempt the
MMMA. Defendant argued that its ordinance was not preempted by the MMMA because the
ordinance enforced the federal prohibition on the cultivation and distribution of marijuana as set
forth in the CSA and that the CSA preempted the MMMA.
After hearing arguments from both sides, the trial court found that the CSA preempted
the MMMA because the MMMA stood as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress
as specified in the CSA. Consequently, the trial court declined to decide whether the MMMA
preempted defendant’s ordinance and, accordingly, issued an order granting summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendant and denying plaintiff’s request for
declaratory relief.
II. STATE PREEMPTION OF THE WYOMING CITY ORDINANCE
On appeal, plaintiff reiterates his argument that defendant’s ordinance is invalid because
it conflicts with the MMMA. Accordingly, plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the finding
of the trial court and remand with instructions to grant summary disposition in his favor and
enter a declaratory judgment finding defendant’s ordinance void and unenforceable to the extent
that it prohibits the medical use of marijuana in accordance with the MMMA.
2
We note that the issue of plaintiff’s standing to challenge the ordinance was addressed by the
trial court. The trial court relied on Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349,
372; 792 NW2d 686 (2010), and found that plaintiff had standing because he has a right or
interest in using and growing marijuana for medical purposes that would be affected by
defendant’s ordinance in a way that is different from the rights and interests of the public at
large. Defendant does not raise the issue of standing on appeal, and at oral argument agreed that
plaintiff has standing to maintain this action.
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Whether a state statute preempts a local ordinance is a question of statutory interpretation
and, therefore, a question of law that we review de novo. Mich Coalition for Responsible Gun
Owners v City of Ferndale, 256 Mich App 401, 405; 662 NW2d 864 (2003). We also review de
novo a decision to grant or deny a declaratory judgment; however, the trial court’s factual
findings will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. Auto-Owners Ins Co v Harvey,
219 Mich App 466, 469; 556 NW2d 517 (1996).
Further, we review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition.
Coblentz v City of Novi, 475 Mich 558, 567; 719 NW2d 73 (2006). Summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim based on the affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties. Id. The
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 567-568. “Where
the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597
NW2d 817 (1999).
A city ordinance that purports to prohibit what a state statute permits is void. Walsh v
City of River Rouge, 385 Mich 623, 636; 189 NW2d 318 (1971). “A state statute preempts
regulation by an inferior government when the local regulation directly conflicts with the statute
or when the statute completely occupies the regulatory field.” USA Cash #1, Inc v City of
Saginaw, 285 Mich App 262, 267; 776 NW2d 346 (2009). A direct conflict exists between a
local regulation and state statute when the local regulation prohibits what the statute permits. Id.
In its brief on appeal, defendant specifically acknowledges that the purpose of the
ordinance “is to regulate the growth, cultivation and distribution of medical marihuana in the
City of Wyoming by reference to the federal prohibitions regarding manufacturing and
distribution of marihuana.” In making this argument, defendant relies on 21 USC 841(a)(1),
which makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance . . . .” Further, under 21 USC 812(c)(10), marijuana is a schedule I controlled
substance; thus, manufacturing or possessing marijuana is generally prohibited under federal
law. Consequently, these provisions of the CSA when read together with defendant’s zoning
ordinance, which makes any violation of federal law an unpermitted use of one’s property, cause
any medical use 3 of marijuana pursuant to the MMMA on any property within the city of
Wyoming to be a violation of defendant’s zoning ordinance. Although plaintiff has not been
punished for violating defendant’s zoning ordinance, defendant’s municipal code permits “civil
sanctions, including, without limitation, fines, damages, expenses and costs” for violations of the
code. Wyoming Ordinance, § 1-27(a). In addition, it cannot be disputed that if found in
3
“‘Medical use’ means the acquisition, possession, cultivation, manufacture, use, internal
possession, delivery, transfer, or transportation of marihuana or paraphernalia relating to the
administration of marihuana to treat or alleviate a registered qualifying patient’s debilitating
medical condition or symptoms associated with the debilitating medical condition.” MCL
333.26423(e).
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violation of Wyoming Ordinance, § 90-66, plaintiff would be subject to injunctive relief that
would restrict the use of his property to purposes that would otherwise be permitted under the
MMMA. See MCL 125.3407.
In contrast, the MMMA permits medical use as defined in MCL 333.26423(e), which
includes use, possession, cultivation, delivery, and transfer. Further, the plain language of MCL
333.26424(a) provides immunity for a qualifying patient—which plaintiff is acknowledged to
be—from being “subject to arrest, prosecution, or penalty in any manner, or denied any right or
privilege.” Under these circumstances, the question presented regarding conflict preemption
between the MMMA and defendant’s ordinance is whether the possibility of plaintiff’s being
subject to the civil sanctions of the Wyoming Ordinance, § 1-27(a) if found in violation of
Wyoming Ordinance, § 90-66, for engaging in activity otherwise permitted by the MMMA
constitutes a “penalty in any manner” prohibited by MCL 333.26424(a).
In addressing the issue of statutory interpretation, we apply the rule of statutory
construction that “[t]he words of an initiative law are given their ordinary and customary
meaning as would have been understood by the voters.” Welch Foods, Inc v Attorney General,
213 Mich App 459, 461; 540 NW2d 693 (1995). Further, we presume that the meaning as
plainly expressed in the statute is what was intended. People v Redden, 290 Mich App 65, 76;
799 NW2d 184 (2010). We may consult dictionaries in order to determine the plain and ordinary
meaning of words not defined by a statute. Sanchez v Eagle Alloy, Inc, 254 Mich App 651, 668;
658 NW2d 510 (2003).
The word “penalty” is undefined by MCL 333.26424(a). “Penalty” is defined as “a
punishment imposed or incurred for a violation of law or rule . . . . [S]omething forfeited . . . .”
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). Further, penalty as used in the statute is
modified by the prepositional phrase “in any manner.” Plainly, this phrase is intended to require
that the immunity from penalties is to be given the broadest application. Thus, any possible
uncertainty about whether immunity under the MMMA is intended to cover both civil
penalties—such as those permitted by defendant’s ordinance—as well as criminal penalties is
removed by the emphasis added by the language “in any manner.” Thus, under MCL
333.26424(a), we conclude that it is clear that registered, qualified medical-marijuana users are
not to be subject to any penalty, whether civil or criminal, if their medical use of marijuana
conforms to the limitations set forth in the MMMA.
Applying the plain meaning of the words used in the immunity provision of the MMMA
to defendant’s ordinance, there can be no doubt that enforcement of the ordinance could result in
the imposition of sanctions that the MMMA does not permit. The provisions directly conflict
because the ordinance expressly prohibits uses contrary to federal law and, therefore, provides
for punishment of qualified and registered medical-marijuana users in the form of fines and
injunctive relief, which constitute penalties that the MMMA expressly prohibits. See Shelby
Charter Twp v Papesh, 267 Mich App 92, 105-106; 704 NW2d 92 (2005) (“A direct conflict
exists when the ordinance permits what the statute prohibits or the ordinance prohibits what the
statute permits.”).
Further, we find defendant’s arguments to the contrary unavailing. To the extent that
defendant argues that its ordinance does not conflict with the MMMA because it does not
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require criminal or civil penalties, we note that civil penalties in response to zoning violations
are expressly provided for in defendant’s city code. Wyoming Ordinance, § 1-27(a). The fact
that civil penalties are not required does not save the ordinance from being in direct conflict with
the MMMA because the mere possibility of such a penalty directly conflicts with the plain
language of MCL 333.26424(a). Moreover, defendant’s ordinance does not attempt to regulate
lawful conduct, but attempts to completely ban the medical use of marijuana on the basis of the
authority of the CSA, a federal criminal statute. 4 Thus, any sanction imposed pursuant to the
ordinance rests on the premise that the statutorily allowed medical use of marijuana constitutes
criminal activity, a proposition that is in direct conflict with the MMMA. In addition, we reject
the notion implied in defendant’s brief on appeal that enforcing the ordinance through the
remedy of civil injunctive relief is not a penalty. We conclude that the civil injunctive relief that
could be used to prohibit any medical use of marijuana within the city would constitute a
“penalty in any manner” as proscribed by MCL 333.26424(a).
Accordingly, we hold that defendant’s ordinance, Wyoming Ordinance, § 90-66, is void
and unenforceable to the extent that it prohibits the medical use of marijuana in accordance with
the MMMA because it is preempted by MCL 333.26424(a). Id.
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF THE MMMA
Defendant alternatively argues that its ordinance is valid and enforceable even if it is
preempted by the MMMA because the federal CSA preempts the state MMMA. Defendant
argues that because the MMMA is preempted by federal law, it does not stand as an obstacle to
the enforcement of its ordinance. Plaintiff argues that federal law does not preempt the MMMA.
Whether a federal statute preempts state law is a question of law that we review de novo.
Packowski v United Food & Commercial Workers Local 951, 289 Mich App 132, 138; 796
NW2d 94 (2010).
In every federal preemption case, we must first determine the intent of Congress in
enacting the federal statute at issue. Wyeth v Levine, 555 US 555, 565; 129 S Ct 1187; 173 L Ed
2d 51 (2009). In all preemption cases, courts should assume that “the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). The areas of public health
and drug regulation are traditionally left to the police powers of the states. See, e.g., Gonzales v
Oregon, 546 US 243, 270; 126 S Ct 904; 163 L Ed 2d 748 (2006). Accordingly, we begin with
the presumption that the MMMA is not preempted by the CSA. Id. at 270-271; see also Wyeth,
555 US at 565. Moreover, we note the United States Supreme Court’s recent caution against a
“freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives”
because “such an endeavor would undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts
that preempts state law.” Chamber of Commerce of the United States v Whiting, 563 US ___,
___; 131 S Ct 1968, 1985; 179 L Ed 2d 1031 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
4
We note that this is not a case in which zoning laws are enacted to regulate in which areas of
the city the medical use of marijuana as permitted by the MMMA may be carried out.
-5-
While there are three types of federal preemption, the only type of preemption at issue in
this case is conflict preemption. 5 Packowski, 289 Mich App at 140. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized two different ways that conflict preemption can occur. Hillsborough Co,
Fla v Automated Med Laboratories, Inc, 471 US 707, 713; 105 S Ct 2371; 85 L Ed 2d 714
(1985). Impossibility conflict preemption occurs when “compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Obstacle conflict preemption occurs “when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Impossibility conflict preemption requires a finding that “compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .” Boggs v Boggs, 520 US 833, 844; 117 S
Ct 1754; 138 L Ed 2d 45 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The United States
Supreme Court has held that it is not physically impossible to comply with logically inconsistent
statutes when a person can simply refrain from doing the activity that one statute purports to
permit and the other statute purports to proscribe. See, e.g., Barnett Bank v Nelson, 517 US 25,
31; 116 S Ct 1103; 134 L Ed 2d 237 (1996) (finding that preemption on the basis of impossibility
inapplicable when a federal statute authorized national banks to do something that state law
prohibited). 6
As noted previously, the CSA proscribes marijuana in all forms, medicinal or otherwise.
The MMMA, however, permits, but does not mandate, medical use of marijuana in limited
circumstances and grants immunity from penalties or prosecutions to qualified and registered
patients. Because the medical use permitted by the MMMA is not mandatory, it is not physically
impossible to comply with both statutes simultaneously. Thus, we conclude that because it is not
physically impossible to comply with both the MMMA and the CSA at the same time, the
MMMA is not preempted by the CSA on the basis of impossibility conflict preemption. 7
5
Field preemption and express preemption are the two other types of federal preemption.
Packowski, 289 Mich App at 140. Field preemption is not applicable because 21 USC 903
expressly declares that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of controlled substance
regulation “unless there is a positive conflict” between the CSA and state law. Moreover,
express preemption is inapplicable because there is no clearly stated intent to preempt state law
in the CSA. Accordingly, on the basis of the plain language of the CSA, conflict preemption,
which considers whether there is a direct conflict between the state and federal law, is the only
type of preemption at issue.
6
The doctrine of impossibility preemption is rarely applied. Indeed, the impossibility
preemption test has been described as “vanishingly narrow.” Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va L R
225, 228 (2000).
7
Our conclusion is consistent with the conclusions reached by the California and Oregon courts,
both of which addressed whether their state medical-marijuana laws were preempted by the CSA
on grounds of impossibility preemption. Both state courts have concluded that their state laws
were not preempted by federal law on the basis of impossibility preemption. See Emerald Steel
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The second type of conflict preemption—obstacle preemption—occurs “when state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” Hillsborough Co, 471 US at 713. Accordingly, the purposes and objectives of
Congress must be identified. See id. (noting that in the absence of express preemption language,
Congress’s intent to preempt state law may be inferred in certain circumstances). Moreover, to
determine whether a state statute stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress, the purposes and objectives of the state statute at issue must also be
identified. See Willis v Winters, 350 Or 299, 312; 253 P3d 1058 (2011), citing Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc v Paul, 373 US 132, 144-146; 83 S Ct 1210; 10 L Ed 2d 248 (1963).
In Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 12-13; 125 S Ct 2195; 162 L Ed 2d 1 (2005), the United
States Supreme Court explained:
The main objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and to control
the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances. Congress was
particularly concerned with the need to prevent the diversion of drugs from
legitimate to illicit channels.
To effectuate these goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system
making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled
substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA.
With regard to marijuana, Congress classified the drug as a schedule I controlled substance,
meaning that Congress did not recognize an accepted medical use for the drug. Id. at 14; 21
USC 812(b)(1) and (c). Thus, in enacting the CSA, Congress expressed a clear intention to
comprehensively regulate all uses of marijuana. See Gonzales, 545 US at 14-15 (noting that
because Congress classified marijuana as schedule I controlled substance, the manufacture,
distribution or possession of it became a criminal; offense).
“The purpose of the MMMA is to allow a limited class of individuals the medical use of
marijuana, and the act declares this purpose to be an ‘effort for the health and welfare of
[Michigan] citizens.’” People v Kolanek, 491 Mich 382; 817 NW2d 528 (2012), quoting MCL
333.26422(c). The ordinance at issue in this case conflicts with § 4(a) of the MMMA, which
grants immunity to medical-marijuana users and provides in pertinent part that a “qualifying
patient who has been issued and possesses a registry identification card shall not be subject to
arrest, prosecution, or penalty in any manner, or denied any right or privilege . . . .” MCL
333.26424(a). While the grant of immunity set forth in § 4(a) does not specifically limit its
prohibition on arrest, prosecution, or penalty to state law, it cannot be disputed that state
medical-marijuana laws do not and cannot supersede federal laws criminalizing the possession of
marijuana. United States v Hicks, 722 F Supp 2d 829, 833 (ED Mich, 2010).
Fabricators, Inc v Bureau of Labor & Indus, 348 Or 159, 176; 230 P3d 518 (2010); San Diego
Co v San Diego NORML, 165 Cal App 4th 798, 824-825; 81 Cal Rptr 3d 461 (2008); Qualified
Patients Ass’n v City of Anaheim, 187 Cal App 4th 734, 758-759; 115 Cal Rptr 3d 89 (2010).
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Moreover, MCL 333.26422(c) acknowledges that “[a]lthough federal law currently
prohibits any use of marihuana except under very limited circumstances, states are not required
to enforce federal law or prosecute people for engaging in activities prohibited by federal law.”
Additionally, MCL 333.26422(b) recognizes that 99 out of every 100 marijuana-based arrests in
the United States are made under state law. Accordingly, the statute declares that “changing
state law will have the practical effect of protecting from arrest the vast majority of seriously ill
people who have a medical need to use marihuana.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the
MMMA itself recognizes the federal policy regarding marijuana and acknowledges that state law
will not affect the federal law.
It is well established that different provisions of a statute that relate to the same subject
matter are in pari materia and must be read together as one law. McNeil v Charlevoix Co, 275
Mich App 686, 701; 741 NW2d 27 (2007). Moreover, “[p]roper application of the in pari
materia rule gives the fullest possible effect to the legislative purpose underlying harmonious
statutes without overreaching, unreasonableness, or absurdity. If multiple statutes can be
construed in a way that avoids conflict, that construction should control.” Ryan v Dep’t of
Corrections, 259 Mich App 26, 30; 672 NW2d 535 (2003) (citations omitted).
Therefore, when the immunity granted in MCL 333.26424(a) is read in context with
MCL 333.26422(b) and (c), it is plain that the immunity was not intended to exempt qualified
medical-marijuana users from federal prosecutions. Specifically the language in MCL
333.26422(b) and (c) refers to changing state law and acknowledges that federal law prohibits
the medical use of marijuana. Moreover, the proclamation in MCL 333.26422(b) that changing
state law will protect “the vast majority of seriously ill people who have a medical need to use
marihuana” from arrest, instead of stating that the change in the law will protect all qualified
medical-marijuana users from arrest, acknowledges that users of marijuana for medical purposes
are still subject to federal prosecution. Further, construing MCL 333.26424(a) to grant immunity
only from state prosecution and other penalties avoids the absurd result that the MMMA
purportedly preempts federal prosecutions, and avoids conflict with the CSA. See Ryan, 259
Mich App at 30 (when construing multiple statutes together, this Court should arrive at a
construction that avoids absurd results or conflicts, if possible). The court in Hicks, 722 F Supp
2d at 833, followed this approach when it cited MCL 333.26422(c) and noted that “the MMMA
specifically acknowledges that it does not supercede [sic] or alter federal law.” Therefore, we
conclude that the immunity granted under the statute was not intended to include protection from
federal prosecutions. See Hicks, 722 F Supp 2d at 833.
Moreover, the MMMA’s decriminalization of the medical use of marijuana is not
contrary to the CSA’s provisions punishing all medical uses of marijuana. The CSA provisions
do not preempt the MMMA’s grant of immunity as found in MCL 333.26424(a) because it is
well established that Congress cannot require the states to enforce federal law. See, e.g., Printz v
United States, 521 US 898, 924; 117 S Ct 2365; 138 L Ed 2d 914 (1997) (“[E]ven where
Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain
acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts . . . .”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted); New York v United States, 505 US 144, 166; 112 S Ct
2408; 120 L Ed 2d 120 (1992) (“We have always understood that even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”). Thus, while Congress
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can criminalize all uses of medical marijuana, it cannot require the states to do the same. Printz,
521 US at 924; New York, 505 US at 166. Accordingly, Michigan is not required to criminalize
all medical uses of marijuana, and the immunity afforded to qualified patients for the medical use
of marijuana by MCL 333.26424(a) is permissible. Accordingly, we conclude that the immunity
provision of MCL 333.26424(a) is not preempted by the CSA because it only grants immunity
from state prosecution and, therefore, does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s ordinance is void and unenforceable to the extent that it purports to sanction
the medical use of marijuana in conformity with the MMMA because the ordinance directly
conflicts with MCL 333.26424(a). Walsh, 385 Mich at 636. Moreover, MCL 333.26424(a) is
not preempted by the CSA because the limited grant of immunity from a “penalty in any
manner” pertains only to state action and does not purport to interfere with federal enforcement
of the CSA. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
defendant and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs pursuant to
MCR 7.219, a public question being involved.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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