IN RE A ELLIS MINOR (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR PUBLICATION
August 25, 2011
9:05 a.m.
In the Matter of A. Ellis, Minor.
Nos. 301884 and 301887
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 10-495589
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and DONOFRIO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from an order terminating
their parental rights to A. Ellis. We affirm.
Respondents are the child’s parents. When A. Ellis was less than two months of age,
Children’s Protective Services (CPS) received a complaint that the child had been brought to the
hospital with, to understate the situation, injuries from physical abuse. In fact, skull x-rays and
skeletal surveys revealed that A. Ellis had swelling and multiple skull fractures on the upper rear
right side of his head. He had internal bleeding inside the skull, over the coating of the brain, in
the area of the fractures as well as on the left side of his head. In the area of the fracture, he had
reduced blood supply to his brain. A. Ellis had thirteen broken bones, including seven partiallyhealed fractures to his posterior ribs, with three breaks on his right and four on his left. He also
had fractures to bones in an arm and in his legs.
Neither respondent was able to provide an explanation for these severe injuries, and they
agreed that they were A. Ellis’s only caretakers. They explained that A. Ellis had been
particularly fussy and crying more than usual. A physician qualified as an expert in child abuse
and neglect, however, was able to explain the injuries. The rib fractures resulted from physical
abuse and very forceful squeezing of his rib cage, especially the posterior injuries. The fractures
to A. Ellis’s arm and leg bones were in the metaphysis portion of the bones1, which is significant
because fractures in that area are very highly specific for child abuse and typically occur when
babies are shaken very forcefully. Finally, none of the child’s injuries appeared to be accidental,
1
The metaphysis is a transitional section of long bones between the long tubular shaft (the
diaphysis) and the expanded ends (the epiphyses).
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related to any genetic problems, or the result of a difficult childbirth. Injuries caused by, say,
being dropped or hitting his head against a faucet would look different. The physician’s expert
opinion is that A. Ellis suffered “abuse head trauma and physical abuse.”
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Only one statutory ground need be
established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights, even if
the court erred in finding sufficient evidence under other statutory grounds. In re Huisman, 230
Mich App 372, 384-385; 584 NW2d 349 (1998). If a statutory ground for termination is
established, and the trial court finds “that termination of parental rights is in the child's best
interests the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for
reunification of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5).
This Court reviews the trial court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR
3.977(K); Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357. A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is
evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 455 NW2d 161 (1989). To be clearly erroneous, a
decision must be more than maybe or probably wrong. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593
NW2d 520 (1999). Further, regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. MCR 2.613(C); MCR 3.902(A);
Miller, 433 Mich at 337.
Respondents’ parental rights were terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent
abused child), (b)(ii) (parent failed to prevent abuse), (j) (child would likely be harmed if
returned to the parent), and (k)(iii) (abuse included battery or torture). Respondents argue that
the trial court erred in terminating their rights. We disagree.
The most significant and interesting argument respondents raise is that it is impossible to
determine which of them committed this heinous abuse of the minor child. That would be an
extremely relevant, and possibly dispositive, concern in a criminal proceeding against either or
both of them. However, it is irrelevant here. When there is severe injury to an infant, it does not
matter whether respondents committed the abuse at all, because under these circumstances there
is clear and convincing evidence that they did not provide proper care. In re Edwards,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued Feb 21, 2006 (Docket No
264477) (slip op at p 2). While Edwards is unpublished and therefore not binding, MCR
7.215(C)(1), we find its reasoning sound and persuasive. See People v Jamison, ___ Mich App
___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2011) (Docket No. 297154, slip op at p 4).
Other cases from this Court have reached similar conclusions from similar facts. We find
those cases to be persuasive, as well.
In In re Armstrong, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued Oct
15, 2006 (Docket No 266856), a three-month-old child was treated for multiple non-accidental
fractures; they were determined to be the result of abuse, but because the child had several
caregivers, it was not possible to determine the actual perpetrator. This Court nevertheless found
termination of the parents’ parental rights appropriate, reasoning that the multitude of injuries
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over an extended period of time showed that the parents could have prevented the abuse but
failed to do so, and so the child would likely be injured again if returned to either of their care.
In In re Rangel, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued Oct 10, 2006
(Docket No 268172), the parents were the sole caretakers of a 20-month-old child who suffered
severe non-accidental wounds, so at least one of them must have caused the injuries, and their
joint denial of knowledge of the source of injury showed a reasonable likelihood that the child
would suffer further injury in their care. In In re Turner, unpublished opinion per curiam of the
Court of Appeals, issued Jan 20, 2009 (Docket No 286133), this Court reasoned that because the
respondents were the sole caregivers of a non-accidentally injured child, the trial court had “little
choice but to conclude that one or both parents abused [the child] and that the other parent failed
to protect him.”
Again, we find the reasoning in the above cases persuasive and applicable here. The trial
court’s decision to terminate respondents’ parental rights is supported by the law and by the facts
apparent from the record. Respondents lived together in a small apartment. They both testified
that they were the only two individuals that cared for the child. The child suffered numerous
non-accidental injuries and the explanations provided were inconsistent with the extent of the
child’s injuries. The injuries were numerous, highly specific to child abuse, and indicative of
very high impact; they were inconsistent with any sort of accident. The fact that many of them
were in various stages of healing showed that A. Ellis had suffered multiple instances of abuse
over a prolonged time. The physician testified that, while the child may not have been crying
constantly, he would have shown signs of distress at least periodically through lack of appetite,
sleeping more, and increased fussiness. Respondents could not offer any plausible alternative
explanation for A. Ellis’s injuries. We find that the trial court properly concluded that at least
one of them had perpetrated the abuse and at least one of them had failed to prevent it;
consequently, it did not matter which was which.
We hold that termination of parental rights under subsections 19b(3)(b) and (k) is
permissible even in the absence of definitive evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrator,
where the evidence does show that the respondent or respondents must have either caused or
failed to prevent the child’s injuries. The evidence so shows here, where A. Ellis suffered
numerous non-accidental injuries that likely occurred on more than one occasion, the parents live
together, the parents share child care responsibilities, and the parents are the child’s sole
caregivers. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
of respondents’ parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. In addition,
termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen Fort Hood
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
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