IN RE CONSERVATORSHIP FOR KATHRYN M TOWNSEND
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Conservatorship for KATHRYN M.
TOWNSEND.
LARRY D. TOWNSEND and DEAN JENSEN,
Conservator,
FOR PUBLICATION
June 23, 2011
9:05 a.m.
Appellees,
v
KATHRYN M. TOWNSEND, a Protected Person,
No. 296358
Montcalm Probate Court
LC No. 2009-030504-CA
Appellant.
Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and MURRAY and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Kathryn Townsend (Townsend) appeals as of right the probate court’s order
appointing a conservator over her estate. At issue in this case is whether a conservator may be
appointed for a reason not listed in MCL 700.5401, specifically whether a conservator may be
appointed for a “vulnerable adult,” and, if so, whether the evidence supported the probate court’s
finding that Townsend is a vulnerable adult. We conclude that a probate court may appoint a
conservator for a vulnerable adult, but that under a proper definition of vulnerable adult, the facts
do not support the probate court’s finding that Townsend is a vulnerable adult. Accordingly, we
reverse.
In October 2009, Townsend’s son, appellee Larry Townsend (appellee), petitioned the
probate court for the appointment of a conservator for Townsend’s estate. In his petition,
appellee asserted that Townsend suffered from a diminished mental capacity and that without
proper management her property will be wasted or dissipated. Appellee alleged that after the
death of Townsend’s husband in 2003 and the sale of real property, Townsend had assets totaling
between $700,000 and $750,000, but that the subsequent “gratuitous spending” of Townsend’s
money by some of his siblings, Townsend’s excessive debt accumulation, and the downturn in
mutual fund share prices had left Townsend with less than $200,000. Appellee further alleged
that he was concerned that the “considerable drain” on Townsend’s finances would leave
Townsend destitute.
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At the hearing on the petition, Townsend admitted that she financially helped her children
and grandchildren. When she loaned them money, she did not charge interest and allowed them
to repay the loan as they were able, and she often accepted work in exchange for repayment of
money. The testimony established that Townsend had provided financial assistance for the
purchase of vehicles, wedding dresses, gas and tires, groceries, and trips, as well as in the
payment of mortgage payments, property taxes, education expenses, attorney fees, and medical
and dental fees. Townsend also acknowledged that she had accumulated a large amount of credit
card debt and that she had been late on bill payments.
Townsend’s personal physician, Dr. Danielsky, testified that Townsend scored “a
perfect” 30 out of 30 on a mini mental status examination. According to Danielsky, Townsend’s
score meant that “she’s not demented and that she’s a normal human being as far as her thought
goes.” He believed that Townsend’s mental capabilities were above average. Danielsky had no
doubt that Townsend was able to manage her property and business affairs.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the probate court first addressed the “easier issue,”
whether Townsend had property that would be wasted or dissipated unless proper management
was provided. According to the probate court, the answer was “clearly yes.” It explained that
Townsend only had $59,000, as she had burned through $440,000 in the past six years.1 The
probate court then addressed the “hard question,” whether Townsend was in need of a
conservator. Referring to the statutory criteria for appointment of a conservator, MCL
700.5401(3)(a), it noted that Townsend had not disappeared and was not confined or detained by
a foreign power. It further noted that there was no evidence that Townsend suffered from a
mental illness or deficiency, a physical illness or disability, or a chronic use of drugs or alcohol.
Nonetheless, it held that the phrase “such as” in MCL 700.5401(3)(a) did not limit the reasons
for the appointment of a conservator to those listed in the statute. The probate court then
proceeded to hold that Townsend was a “vulnerable adult” because Townsend could not manage
her own financial affairs; it was concerned with Townsend’s inability to say “no.” It explained
that Townsend “will give money to any child who asks for it whether it is in her best interests or
not.”2 Consequently, the probate court granted appellee’s petition to appoint a conservator. This
appeal ensued.
On appeal, Townsend argues that while the appointment of a conservator for a vulnerable
adult may be appropriate in certain circumstances, the probate court erred in appointing a
conservator for her on the basis that she was a vulnerable adult. We agree.
1
At the hearing, Townsend testified that after the death of her husband she had approximately
$400,000 to $500,000. The probate court stated that at a minimum and by Townsend’s own
admission, Townsend had spent $440,000 in six years.
2
The record shows that the parties themselves did not raise the issue whether a conservator may
be appointed for a reason not listed in MCL 700.5401(3)(a), nor did appellee argue that
Townsend was a vulnerable adult.
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We review a probate court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. In re
Bennett Estate, 255 Mich App 545, 549; 662 NW2d 772 (2003). “A finding is clearly erroneous
when a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,
even if there is evidence to support the finding.” Id. We review de novo issues of statutory
interpretation. Apsey v Mem Hosp, 477 Mich 120, 127; 730 NW2d 695 (2007).
Resolution of the issue requires us to interpret MCL 700.5401, which provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Upon petition and after notice and hearing in accordance with this
part, the court may appoint a conservator or make another protective order for
cause as provided in this section.
***
(3) The court may appoint a conservator or make another protective order
in relation to an individual’s estate and affairs if the court determines both of the
following:
(a) The individual is unable to manage property and business affairs
effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness
or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, confinement, detention by
a foreign power, or disappearance.
(b) The individual has property that will be wasted or dissipated unless
proper management is provided, or money is needed for the individual’s support,
care, and welfare or for those entitled to the individual’s support, and that
protection is necessary to obtain or provide money.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. Tevis v Amex Assurance Co, 283 Mich App 76, 81; 770 NW2d 16 (2009). If the
statutory language is unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning
clearly expressed, and a court must enforce the statute as written. Ameritech Publishing, Inc v
Dep’t of Treasury, 281 Mich App 132, 136; 761 NW2d 470 (2008). Words and phrases in a
statute shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the
language. Henry Ford Health Sys v Esurance Ins Co, 288 Mich App 593, 600; ___ NW2d ___
(2010), quoting MCL 8.3a.
Pursuant to MCL 700.5401(3)(a), a court may appoint a conservator if “[t]he individual is
unable to manage property and business affairs effectively.” The statute further requires that the
petitioning party establish that the individual’s inability to manage his or her property and
business affairs effectively is caused by a condition that the individual exhibits. In this regard,
MCL 700.5401(3)(a) specifically identifies eight conditions that may affect an individual’s
ability to manage his or her property and business affairs effectively: “mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, confinement,
detention by a foreign power, or disappearance.”
-3-
However, as noted by the probate court, the phrase “for reasons such as” precedes the
listing of these eight conditions. The phrase “for reasons such as” appears in only two statutes,
MCL 700.5401(3)(a) and MCL 722.5401(1), and has never been construed by this Court.
Applying the common usage and understanding of the phrase, Henry Ford Health Sys, 288 Mich
App at 600, we hold that the phrase “for reasons such as” is one of enlargement, rather than
limitation. In other words, the use of the phrase “for reasons such as” in MCL 700.5401(3)(a)
does not limit the appointment of conservators to individuals who have disappeared, been
detained by a foreign power or confined, or suffer from mental illness or deficiency, a physical
illness or disability, or chronic use of drugs or alcohol. Consequently, in light of the statutory
language, we agree with the probate court that the appointment of a conservator for an individual
may be appropriate even if the individual does not suffer from one of the conditions listed in
MCL 700.5401(3)(a).
But not any condition suffered by an individual will justify the appointment of a
conservator. “It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list
should be given related meaning.” Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637, 650; 753 NW2d 48 (2008)
(quotations marks and citations omitted). Based on this well-established rule of statutory
construction, we also hold that any circumstance, which is not listed in MCL 700.5401(3)(a), that
prohibits an individual from effectively managing his or her property and business affairs must
be of a similar nature and quality to the eight conditions listed in the statute to justify the
appointment of a conservator.
Here, the probate court found that, although there was no evidence to suggest that
Townsend suffered from any of the eight conditions listed in MCL 700.5401(3)(a), Townsend
was unable to manage her property and business affairs because she was a “vulnerable adult.” It
concluded that Townsend was a vulnerable adult because of her inability to say no, she would
give money to any child who asked for it regardless of her best interests. Having construed MCL
700.5401 to allow additional conditions, the question before us in this case is whether
Townsend’s condition of being a vulnerable adult, as found by the probate court, is a condition
of a similar nature or quality to the eight conditions listed in MCL 700.5401(3)(a).
Having conceded that MCL 700.5401’s list of conditions can be enlarged to include
similar conditions, Townsend argues that when considered under a proper definition, the probate
court erred in finding that she is a vulnerable adult. In making this argument, she urges us to
adopt the definition of vulnerable adult found in the Social Welfare Act (SWA), MCL 400.1 et
seq., and claims that under the SWA definition, she is not a vulnerable adult because the
evidence did not establish that she has a mental, physical, or age-related condition that causes her
to be unable to manage her property and business affairs effectively.3
3
At oral argument, appellee urged us to adopt a dictionary definition of “vulnerable” and argued
that the facts supported the probate court’s decision if such a definition was controlling. Random
House Webster’s College Dictionary (1992) defines vulnerable, in part, as “capable of or
susceptible to being wounded . . . .” Even if we assume that Townsend was vulnerable under this
definition, we conclude that the definition does not provide a proper basis for the appointment of
-4-
The SWA uses the term “vulnerable adult”4 and it defines those words. “Vulnerable” is
defined as “a condition in which an adult is unable to protect himself or herself from abuse,
neglect, or exploitation because of a mental or physical impairment or because of advanced age.”
MCL 400.11(f). “Adult” is defined as “a vulnerable person not less than 18 years of age who is
suspected of being or believed to be abused, neglected, or exploited.” MCL 400.11(b). And
exploitation is defined as “an action that involves the misuse of an adult’s funds, property, or
personal dignity by another person.” MCL 400.11(c). We conclude that the condition of being a
vulnerable adult under the SWA is a condition that is of a similar nature and quality to those
listed in MCL 700.5401(3)(a). In particular, to establish vulnerability under the SWA, the
individual must have a mental, physical, or advanced age-related impairment. These
components of vulnerability are sufficiently similar to the mental and physical conditions listed
in MCL 700.5401(3)(a) to allow the SWA definition of vulnerable adult to be categorized as
being of a similar nature or quality. Consequently, we will use the SWA definition to determine
whether the probate court properly found that Townsend was a vulnerable adult in need of a
conservator.
Appellee argues that under the SWA definition Townsend was a vulnerable adult
because, as found by the probate court, other family members exploited her inability to say no.
But even assuming that the evidence supported a finding of exploitation, the evidence does not
show that Townsend was vulnerable because, as found by the probate court, she did not have a
mental or physical impairment and there was no evidence from which to conclude that her
inability to say no was related to her age. Consequently, for the same reasons the probate court
did not find grounds for appointment of a conservator under the conditions listed in MCL
700.5401(3), there are no grounds to find that Townsend is a “vulnerable adult” as defined by the
SWA.5 Accordingly, we reverse the probate court’s order appointing a conservator over
Townsend’s estate.
Reversed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
a conservator because it does not require a condition that is of a similar nature or quality to the
conditions listed in MCL 700.5401(3)(a).
4
The SWA permits a county family independence agency to petition for the appointment of a
conservator for a vulnerable adult. MCL 400.11b(6).
5
Because of this conclusion, we need not address Townsend’s argument that the probate court
clearly erred in finding that she has property that will be wasted or dissipated.
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