PEOPLE OF MI V ANGELO JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
June 14, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 295664
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-011104-01
ANGELO JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and O’CONNELL and WILDER, JJ.
WILDER, J. (concurring).
I concur in the lead opinion’s reasoning and result with respect to defendant’s sufficiency
of the evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. However, I respectfully disagree
with the lead opinion’s conclusion that defendant was not “on bond” for purposes of MCL
777.56(1)(d) when he committed the sentencing offense.
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is “‘to discern and give effect to the
Legislature’s intent.”’ People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006), quoting
People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). “‘We begin by examining the plain
language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature
intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is required or
permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written.’” Id. If a statute is ambiguous, judicial
construction is appropriate. People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 50; 753 NW2d 78 (2008).
MCL 777.56 provides, in relevant part:
(1) Prior record variable 6 is relationship to the criminal justice system. Score
prior record variable 6 by determining which of the following apply and by
assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number
of points:
***
(d) The offender is on probation or delayed sentence status or on bond awaiting
adjudication or sentencing for a misdemeanor
5 points
-1-
“On” is defined as “so as to be or remain supported by or suspended from” and “subject
to.” “Bond” is defined as “An obligation; a promise.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed).
Therefore, the phrase “on bond” in MCL 777.56(1)(d) can be interpreted to mean “subject to an
obligation.”
The Manual for District Court Magistrates provides, “The posting of the bail requires the
creation of a contract between the defendant, the bail poster (a third party or a surety), and the
court. This contract is known as a bond.” The manual further provides, “There are three types
of bail for which a bond is required: [1] cash bail (which includes the posting of 10 percent), [2]
secured bail, or [3] unsecured bail (personal recognizance).” While bail is the security required
by the court for release, bond is the obligation or contract between the defendant, the bail poster,
and the court.
A pretrial release on an unsecured bail is subject to the following conditions: “that the
defendant will appear as required, will not leave the state without permission of the court, and
will not commit any crime while released.” See MCR 6.106(C) and MCR 6.106(D) (the court
may designate other conditions as well) (emphasis added). MCR 6.106(E) provides, in relevant
part:
(E) Money Bail. If the court determines for reasons it states on the record that the
defendant’s appearance or the protection of the public cannot otherwise be
assured, money bail, with or without conditions described in subrule (D), may be
required.
Even if the trial court opts to only require money bail under subrule (E), and not other conditions
described in subrule (D), appearance remains a condition of the release based on the language,
“defendant’s appearance . . . cannot otherwise be assured.” With each type of bail, therefore, the
defendant is subject to the minimum obligation to appear as required, which I conclude is the
defendant’s bond, obligation, or contract with the court.
MCR 6.106(I)(2) provides, in relevant part, instructions regarding a defendant’s failure to
comply with conditions of a release:
(2) If the defendant has failed to comply with the conditions of release, the court
may issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant and enter an order revoking the
release order and declaring the bail money deposited or the surety bond, if any,
forfeited.
Although this rule references the forfeiture of “bail money deposited or the surety bond,” the
language does not discharge the defendant’s obligation to appear. Instead, the language gives the
trial court discretion to further compel the obligation to appear with an order revoking the release
and an arrest warrant. Since forfeiture of bail money or a surety bond does not discharge the
defendant’s underlying bond, obligation, or contract with the court to appear as required, I
therefore conclude that defendant’s obligation to appear was not discharged at the time of the
sentencing offense, and that he was “on bond” for purposes of MCL 777.56(1)(d).
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
-2-
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