RENEE SHERRY V EAST SUBURBAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RENEE SHERRY, as Next Friend of JESSICCA
SHERRY,
FOR PUBLICATION
March 17, 2011
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
EAST SUBURBAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
MACOMB YOUTH FOOTBALL CLUB, JULIE
LANGE, CAROL BOMMARITO and
STEPHANIE VALLIE,
No. 295792
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-003637-NO
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JANE DOE 1 and JANE DOE 2,
Defendants.
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and JANSEN and SERVITTO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Renee Sherry, as next friend of Jessicca Sherry,1 appeals as of right the trial court’s order
granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, the East Suburban Football League
(“ESFL”), the Macomb Youth Football Club (“MYFC”), Julie Lange, and Stephanie Vallie.2
1
We refer to Jessicca as plaintiff.
2
The trial court entered a consent order dismissing all claims against defendant, Carol
Bommarito, on November 10, 2009. Accordingly, Bommarito is not a party in the instant appeal
notwithstanding the fact that counsel’s appearance includes Bommarito. The order also
dismissed Count III of plaintiff’s complaint alleging violation of Michigan’s consumer
protection act.
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We reverse the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff sustained injuries while performing a stunt, called a full extension cradle,3 at
“Spirit Day,” a camp for cheerleaders of the ESFL. At the time, plaintiff cheered on the Junior
Varsity Team for the Macomb Mustangs, a team organized through the MYFC. The MYFC is a
non-profit organization and franchise member of the ESFL. Stephanie Vallie served as Cheer
Coordinator for the Macomb Mustangs, and Julie Lange served as coach for the Junior Varsity
Cheerleading Team. According to plaintiff, her injuries occurred as a result of defendants’
negligence and gross negligence in, among other things, failing to properly train and supervise
the cheerleaders.
Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10),
contending that there was no evidence that defendants were grossly negligent or engaged in
reckless misconduct, such that they could not be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries. The trial
court, quoting Gibbard v Cursan, 225 Mich 311; 196 NW 398 (1923), overruled by Jennings v
Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 521 NW2d 230 (1994), agreed that plaintiff must demonstrate
reckless misconduct and that, because she failed to do so, summary disposition in defendants’
favor was appropriate. In denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court relied
upon Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 94; 597 NW2d 517 (1999) to find that
plaintiff’s argument lacked merit.
I. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in applying the reckless misconduct standard
of care adopted in Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73. According to plaintiff,
ordinary negligence principles apply, and genuine issues of material fact remain regarding
whether defendants acted negligently in the supervision of plaintiff. We agree.
We review decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Latham v Barton
Malow Co, 480 Mich 105, 111; 746 NW2d 868 (2008). Summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rose v Nat’l Auction Group, Inc, 466 Mich 453, 461;
646 NW2d 455 (2002). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, “we consider the affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Id. The general standard of care is a
question of law for the courts, and thus subject to de novo review. Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich
425, 438; 254 NW2d 759 (1977).
3
In a half extension, two bases each hold one of the flier’s feet at their chest level and a third
base stands in back as a spotter. In a full extension, the bases extend their arms straight, lifting
the flier above their head level. To finish the extension, the bases catch the flier in a cradle.
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In Ritchie-Gamester, the Michigan Supreme Court set out to decide “the proper standard
of care among coparticipants for unintentional conduct in recreational activities.” 461 Mich at
77. The undisputed facts of the case were that the defendant, a 12-year-old girl, while skating
backwards during an open skating period at an ice rink, ran into the plaintiff and knocked her to
the ground, causing serious injury to the plaintiff’s knee. Id. at 75. The Court stated:
[W]e join the majority of jurisdictions and adopt reckless misconduct as
the minimum standard of care for coparticipants in recreational activities. We
believe that this standard most accurately reflects the actual expectations of
participants in recreational activities. … [W]e believe that participants in
recreational activities do not expect to sue or be sued for mere carelessness. A
recklessness standard also encourages vigorous participation in recreational
activities, while still providing protection from egregious conduct. Finally, this
standard lends itself to common-sense application by both judges and juries. [Id.
at 89.]
Unlike the claim in Ritchie-Gamester, plaintiff’s claim in this case is not against a
coparticipant. Therefore, the reckless misconduct standard adopted in Ritchie-Gamester is
inapplicable. The Court in Ritchie-Gamester was careful, in fact, to note the limited reach of its
holding. In addition, the justifications that the Supreme Court cited for adopting the reckless
misconduct standard do not extend to coaches and organizations. Coaches and organizations can
expect to be sued for their carelessness, and holding coaches and organizations to an ordinary
standard of care does not discourage vigorous participation in recreational activities. Had
plaintiff brought her claim against other cheerleaders, who may properly be considered
coparticipants in the recreational activity of cheerleading, then, perhaps, the reckless misconduct
standard announced in Ritchie-Gamester would apply. Nothing in Ritchie-Gamester, however,
precludes ordinary negligence claims against coaches and organizations involved in recreational
sports.
The case of Behar v Fox, 249 Mich App 314, 316-318; 642 NW2d 426 (2001), in which a
panel of this Court applied the reckless misconduct standard from Ritchie-Gamester to a soccer
coach, is distinguishable from the case at hand. In Behar, the plaintiffs sued the defendant, their
son’s soccer coach, after he collided with or kicked their son in the knee during a soccer
scrimmage, resulting in a torn anterior cruciate ligament. Id. at 315. The plaintiffs contended
that the ordinary negligence standard should apply, but this Court disagreed. Id. at 316. This
Court stated, “the mere fact that [the] plaintiffs’ minor son was injured in a collision with an
adult coach rather than with a larger child coparticipant is of insufficient distinction to take this
case out of the realm of the Ritchie-Gamester standard.” Id. at 318. It further noted that the
defendant “was as much a ‘coparticipant’ in the scrimmage as he was a coach.” Id. Thus,
although the reckless misconduct standard applies in cases where a coach is acting as a
coparticipant, the ordinary negligence standard remains applicable in typical failure to supervise
cases.
Further, in several cases involving recreational activities, this Court has held
nonparticipating parties to an ordinary negligence standard absent an applicable immunity
statute. See Woodman v Kera, LLC, 280 Mich App 125, 127-130; 760 NW2d 641 (2008), aff’d
486 Mich 228 (2010); In re Tarlea, 263 Mich App 80; 687 NW2d 333 (2004). The gross
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negligence standard applies in cases involving coaches of publicly sponsored athletic teams who
are entitled to government immunity, In re Tarlea, 263 Mich App at 83-89, and the reckless
misconduct standard applies in cases alleging negligence on the part of coparticipants in
recreational activities, Ritchie-Gamester, 461 Mich at 89. Defendants, however, cite to no
authority to support their position that the reckless misconduct standard announced in RitchieGamester, or any other heightened standard, applies in cases alleging negligence on the part of
nonparticipating coaches and organizations involved in privately sponsored recreational
activities.
A prima facie case of negligence requires the establishment of four elements: (1) a duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.
Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 71-72; 701 NW2d 684 (2005). Having determined that
ordinary negligence is the appropriate standard of care in this case, the next question is whether
genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether defendants’ conduct fell below that
standard. In ordinary negligence cases, whether the defendant has breached his or her duty of
care owed to the plaintiff turns on foreseeability. Laier v Kitchen, 266 Mich App 482, 494; 702
NW2d 199 (2005). The question is whether the defendant’s action or inaction created a risk of
harm to the plaintiff, and whether the resulting harm was foreseeable. Schuster v Sallay, 181
Mich App 558, 563; 450 NW2d 81 (1989).
Here, there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding whether defendants
exercised ordinary care under the circumstances. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, it cannot be said as a matter of law that defendants provided proper
supervision of the stunting station or that plaintiff’s injuries were unforeseeable. Although a
coach was supposed to be positioned at the stunting station, no coach was present when plaintiff
incurred her injury. Without proper supervision, the high school girls in plaintiff’s group became
inattentive and horsed around. Although a coach was notified, she simply threatened the high
school girls with running laps if they dropped plaintiff. Despite this threat, the high school girls
continued horsing around and were not counting properly. The girls then attempted to execute
an advanced cheerleading stunt with plaintiff, who had never before performed the maneuver.
On the whole, we find that reasonable minds could differ regarding whether an individual
exercising ordinary care would foresee that a young girl without proper supervision or training
would become injured in an attempt to execute an advanced cheerleading stunt with a group of
high school girls on a grass football field.
Defendants argue that, applying any standard of care, plaintiff cannot establish the
requisite element of causation. We disagree. Reasonable minds could differ regarding whether
it is foreseeable that unsupervised, high school girls assisting in the execution of difficult
cheerleading stunts will become inattentive to the point of creating a risk of harm. Exercising
due care, perhaps defendants would have maintained supervision at the stunting station, removed
the girls who were incapable of focusing, or introduced only those stunts that were appropriate
given the cheerleaders’ ages and skill levels. Thus, we are unable to conclude as a matter of law
that defendants did not cause plaintiff’s damages. At the very least, questions of fact remain, and
summary disposition in defendants’ favor was improper.
II. FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT
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Plaintiff next challenges the trial court’s refusal to consider the affidavit of plaintiff’s
expert witness. “[T]he decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion.” Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408, 419; 697 NW2d 851 (2005). A trial
court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Tinman v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 264 Mich App 546, 556-557; 692 NW2d 58 (2004). “An
abuse of discretion occurs when the decision results in an outcome falling outside the range of
principled outcomes.” Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151, 158; 732 NW2d 472 (2007). We hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to consider the affidavit for the
reason that it lacked notarization.
To be valid, an affidavit must be: (1) a written or printed declaration or statement of
facts; (2) voluntarily made; and (3) confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it,
taken before a person having authority to administer such oath or affirmation. Detroit Leasing
Co v City of Detroit, 269 Mich App 233, 236; 713 NW2d 269 (2005). Because an affidavit
lacking notarization is invalid, a trial court need not consider it. Id. Although plaintiff points out
that defendants never contested the affidavit’s validity, plaintiff cites no legal authority that
would preclude a trial court from refusing to consider an invalid affidavit sua sponte.
Plaintiff also argues that, although lacking notarization, plaintiff’s expert signed the
affidavit and swore to its validity. That the affidavit comported with some elements required for
validity, however, is not a basis to ignore that the affidavit failed to comport with all elements
required for validity.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court should have admitted the affidavit because she
was prejudiced by its exclusion. To support this argument, plaintiff cites to the harmless error
rule—where a trial court considers a defective affidavit on a motion for summary disposition, a
challenging party must show prejudice resulting from the defect or any error is harmless. Hubka
v Pennfield Twp, 197 Mich App 117, 119-120; 494 NW2d 800 (1992), rev’d on other grounds
443 Mich 864 (1993). Plaintiff distorts the harmless error rule. In Hubka, the trial court
committed an error when it considered defective affidavits in ruling on a motion for summary
disposition. In such case, reversal is appropriate only if the error resulted in prejudice. Here,
however, the trial court properly refused to consider the defective affidavit—i.e., the trial court
did not err. Any prejudice plaintiff may have suffered is a result of her own failure to see that
the affidavit comported with the requirements for admission. Because the trial court did not err
in refusing to consider the affidavit, plaintiff cannot claim prejudice resulting from that decision.
III. FAILURE TO RULE ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to hear her motion in limine to
preclude any undisclosed witnesses and evidence from use or admission at trial. We agree.
We review a trial court's evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v
Martzke, 251 Mich App 282, 286; 651 NW2d 490 (2002). However, because the trial court
never ruled on plaintiff’s motion in limine, there is no decision for us to review. Hickory Pointe
Homeowners Ass’n v Smyk, 262 Mich App 512, 516-517; 686 NW2d 506 (2004). We can,
however, consider the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on plaintiff’s motion in limine.
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The trial court never heard plaintiff’s motion in limine, scheduled for the same day as
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Likely the trial court found it unnecessary to rule
on the motion in limine considering that it decided to grant defendants’ motion for summary
disposition—there would be no trial. After the trial court granted defendants’ motion for
summary disposition, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, in part, requesting an inference
that defendants’ witnesses would be adverse, since defendants had failed to produce the names of
any coach or other personnel who witnessed plaintiff’s fall. In denying plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration, the trial court indicated that plaintiff waived her right to assert any ongoing
discovery issues.
Plaintiff argues that she did not waive her right to assert any ongoing discovery issues
because she filed a motion in limine, which was pending for hearing when the trial court granted
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. She raised the issue regarding defendants’ abusive
discovery tactics again in her motion for reconsideration. We agree with plaintiff. Waiver is
defined as the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Quality Products and
Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 374; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). There is
simply no indication that plaintiff intentionally or voluntarily waived her right regarding a claim
of discovery abuse. Quite the opposite, her course of conduct evidences her strong desire to
exercise such a right. Accordingly, waiver is not a valid ground for the trial court’s refusal to
rule on plaintiff’s motion in limine.
Defendants argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hear
plaintiff’s motion in limine because, given that the trial court granted defendants’ motion for
summary disposition, there would be no trial. Because we find that the trial court erred in
granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition, however, defendants’ argument lacks
merit.
There now being no valid ground for refusing to rule on the motion in limine, the trial
court is instructed to consider the same. Accordingly, we remand the case for consideration of
plaintiff’s motion.
IV. JUDGMENT UNDER MCR 2.116(I)(2)
In her last argument on appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in refusing to
enter judgment as a matter of law in her favor as an opposing party under MCR 2.116(I)(2). We
review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary disposition de novo. Rossow v
Brentwood Farms Dev, 251 Mich App 652, 657; 651 NW2d 458 (2002). “The trial court
appropriately grants summary disposition to the opposing party under MCR 2.116(I)(2) when it
appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts the following undisputed facts, which she contends entitled her to
judgment as a matter of law under MCR 2.116(I)(2): (1) no coach was present at the stunting
station; (2) the girls stunting with plaintiff were reprimanded by a coach for engaging in
horseplay; (3) despite being on notice of the risks, the coach walked away; (4) the MYFC
supervisors were not supervising plaintiff at the time of the incident; and, (5) defendants did not
make it known that stunting would be incorporated into Spirit Day’s curriculum. Plaintiff further
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argues that an expert opined that defendants were negligent and even grossly negligent.
According to plaintiff, an adult could have prevented plaintiff’s injuries. Therefore, she argues,
the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, and should have
granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of plaintiff under MCR 2.116(I)(2). We disagree.
Even assuming that the facts set forth above are undisputed, genuine issues of material
fact remain regarding whether defendants failed to exercise the appropriate level of care to
ensure plaintiff’s safety. Given that ordinary negligence rather than reckless misconduct is the
appropriate standard of care in this case, certainly plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence to
survive defendant’s motion for summary disposition. It remains the case, however, that plaintiff
must prove (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages before judgment may enter in her
favor. The bare conclusions regarding negligence or gross negligence made by plaintiff’s expert,
who was not present on the day in question and whose affidavit was ruled invalid by the trial
court, are insufficient to unequivocally establish breach and causation. Rather, questions of fact
remain.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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