IN RE G SMITH MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR PUBLICATION
February 15, 2011
9:15 a.m.
In the Matter of G. SMITH, Minor.
No. 299300
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 09-053614-NA
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and STEPHENS and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from an order terminating his parental rights to the minor
child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j), and (l). We affirm.
Respondent argues that the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights is not
supported by clear and convincing evidence, but he does not directly challenge the trial court’s
determination that grounds for termination were established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j), and
(l). Relying on In re Mason, 486 Mich 142; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), he contends that termination
was improper because he was incarcerated and petitioner did not provide him with services for
reunification. We agree and have found that petitioner failed to meet its statutory duty to
facilitate reunification between respondent and his child. Our Supreme Court has held “the state
is not relieved of its duties to engage an absent parent merely because that parent is
incarcerated.” Id. at 152; 752. Unfortunately for respondent, petitioner, the Department of
Human Services (DHS) misunderstood the extent of its obligation to an incarcerated father and
determined it was under no duty to facilitate reunification.
Petitioner removed Respondent’s son, the minor child, from the care of his mother on
October 13, 2009. The child’s mother identified respondent as the child’s father. Petitioner
learned that respondent was being held at Kent County Jail, awaiting sentencing, but no
employee of the agency visited respondent at any time during proceedings regarding his child’s
care. Petitioner chose to communicate with respondent solely through letters, despite
acknowledging that there were no barriers to face to face contact. Petitioner never believed that
reunification was an option. Petitioner’s initial correspondence with respondent clearly states the
case manager’s belief that respondent’s incarceration renders “working on a treatment plan” with
DHS “not possible.” The case manager testified that she would not provide respondent with
services. As a result, there was never a parent-agency agreement proposed for respondent.
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Petitioner believed termination to be the only option in this case and recommended to
respondent that he voluntarily release his rights before he was even given these rights as the
child’s legal father. Petitioner repeatedly asked respondent to terminate his rights from the time
of their initial communication, even though respondent gave no indication that he wished to do
so. Petitioner refused to make efforts that did not involve termination, and the case manager
focused the majority of her correspondence with respondent on his waiving of his rights. Even
after establishing that Respondent wished to parent his son, little was done to provide services to
facilitate this. Respondent informed petitioner that he had completed a number of substance
abuse goals and that his attorney had proof of his progress, but petitioner chose to ignore this
information rather than use it in forming a plan for respondent. The record clearly shows that
petitioner made no attempt to allow for respondent’s reunification with his child and instead
focused efforts solely on termination.
Nonetheless, petitioner’s apathetic approach to respondent’s right to services does not
require reversal. Pursuant to MCL 712A.19a(2)(c), the prior involuntary termination of parental
rights to a child’s sibling is a circumstance under which reasonable efforts to reunify the child
and family need not be made. It is undisputed that the child’s sister was previously the subject of
a child protective proceeding and that respondent’s parental rights to the child’s sibling were
involuntarily terminated. “‘Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in
all cases’ except those involving aggravated circumstances not present in this case.” Mason, 486
Mich at 152 (emphasis in original). We find it incongruous that having one’s rights to another
child terminated is treated the same as murdering another child, both resulting in a blanket grant
of authority to petitioner to abdicate responsibility for so much as a token effort, irrespective of
whether a parent might someday reform his or her life. However, the Legislature may make
policy choices that seem, from our perspective, unwise. People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 159;
599 NW2d 102 (1999). Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(l)
was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612
NW2d 407 (2000); MCR 3.977(K).
Further, given the absence of any bond between respondent and the child, the trial court
did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s
best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5).
Affirmed.
/s/Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
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