TOMMY JOE BARROW V MAYOR OF DETROIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TOMMY JOE BARROW,
FOR PUBLICATION
November 9, 2010
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
MAYOR OF DETROIT, CITY OF DETROIT,
DETROIT BOARD OF CANVASSERS,
DETROIT ELECTIONS COMMISSION,
DETROIT CITY CLERK, DANIEL BAXTER,
DOROTHY BURRELL, EDWARD
HARTOUNIAN, WALTER KOPPY, EDWIN
UKAGBU, GEORGE AZZUZ, WAYNE
COUNTY BOARD OF CANVASSERS, KRISTA
HARTOUNIAN, CAROL LARKIN, JOSEPH
XUEREB, and JOHN DOE #2,
No. 298128
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 10-003994-AW
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: SERVITTO, P.J. and ZAHRA and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Tommy Joe Barrow, appeals as of right from an opinion and order denying his
emergency application for leave to file a complaint for quo warranto. Plaintiff filed this action
for quo warranto in order to challenge the outcome of the November 2009 election of defendant
Dave Bing as mayor of the city of Detroit. Because the trial court did not err in denying
plaintiff’s application for leave for the reason that plaintiff failed to allege specific facts
warranting further inquiry by quo warranto, we affirm.
I
This action arises out of the November 3, 2009, general election in which both plaintiff
and Dave Bing appeared on the ballot as candidates for mayor of the city of Detroit. On
November 16, 2009, the board of city canvassers declared that plaintiff received 50,785 votes
while Bing received 70,166 votes in the mayoral election, and certified Mayor Bing as the
winner. On November 20, 2009, plaintiff filed a recount petition alleging “fraud, deliberate
mistake and electronic manipulation” of the ballots cast in the election. At a meeting on
November 23, 2009, the Wayne County Board of Canvassers approved plaintiff’s recount
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petition. Thereafter, the Wayne County Board of Canvassers informed plaintiff that the recount
would commence on December 9, 2009.
Prior to the recount date, on November 24, 2009, plaintiff sent a letter to the county clerk
requesting that she secure the ballots pending the recount alleging that the ballots were “under
the sole control of the building janitor.” On the same day, the Wayne County Board of
Canvasser’s, through its attorney, sent plaintiff an email informing him that Michigan election
law contained procedures for ballot security pending a recount and that, “[a]bsent a court order,
the statutory procedures will be followed.” It is undisputed that plaintiff did not seek a court
order.
The recount was held on December 9, 2009 as scheduled. Following the recount, the
Wayne County Board of Canvassers met and addressed plaintiff’s various challenges at a series
of meetings on December 11, 15, 18, 22, and 23, 2009. On December 23, 2009, the Wayne
County Board of Canvassers approved a motion to certify the election, despite plaintiff’s
assertion “that there were 49,386 votes that were not recountable.” The Wayne County Board of
Canvassers certification of the results of the recount as 47,062 votes for plaintiff and 65,946
votes for Mayor Bing was filed on December 24, 2009.
On December 30, 2009, plaintiff wrote letters of complaint to the Wayne County
Prosecutor, the Michigan Attorney General, and the Michigan Secretary of State, elections
department asking each to initiate an investigation. On January 5, 2010, plaintiff again wrote to
the Attorney General asking him to initiate quo warranto proceedings. On January 15, 2010, the
prosecutor declined to proceed. On February 9, 2010, the Attorney General informed plaintiff
via letter that it had routed his letter to the criminal division for review and that review of the
plaintiff’s complaint materials was complete. In the letter, the Attorney General explained that
there was a “lack of evidence of criminal intent to defraud” contrary to plaintiff’s allegations,
and declined to take further action at that time. On February 23, 2010, the Attorney General also
declined to seek a writ of quo warranto. On February 23, 2010, the Secretary of State issued a
letter informing plaintiff that it had conducted an inquiry into plaintiff’s complaint, that the
investigation revealed “no evidence to indicate or suggest that any type of fraudulent vote
manipulation occurred during or after the administration of the election,” and thus, the
investigation was concluded.
On April 2, 2010, plaintiff filed an “Emergency Application for Leave to File a Quo
Warranto Action” in the circuit court, alleging that various election law errors, mistakes, and
violations were committed that undermined any confidence in the outcome of the election. The
Wayne County defendants1 filed an answer on April 7, 2010, denying plaintiff’s allegations that
Mayor Bing usurped the office of mayor and was not entitled to the office of mayor based on the
election of November 3, 2009. On April 8, 2010, the Wayne County defendants filed a brief in
support of their answer, arguing that plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case of fraud
1
The Wayne County defendants consist of the Wayne County Board of Canvassers and its
members Krista Hartounian, Carol Larkin, Joseph Xuereb, and John Doe #2.
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or error, or to show that he was entitled to the mayor’s position. They also argued that plaintiff’s
application was time-barred or barred by laches.
Mayor Bing filed an answer to the application, denying plaintiff’s allegations on April 9,
2010. On May 3, 2010, Mayor Bing filed a brief in support, arguing that plaintiff failed to show
factual support for his allegations. The city of Detroit defendants2 filed an appearance on May 4,
2010, but did not file an answer or a brief in opposition to plaintiff’s application. On May 7,
2010, plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of his application arguing that a “monumental
number of irregularities which may have indeed derived from fraud or gross errors” justified
inquiry by quo warranto. Plaintiff also denied that his application was time-barred or barred by
laches, or would cause harm or undue expense to the public.
At a hearing on May 10, 2010, plaintiff argued that the trial court should grant his request
for leave to proceed in quo warranto due to defendants’ failure to comply with mandatory
provisions concerning ballot container seals and calibration of clocks in the voting machines,
resulting in 59,135 ballots not being recounted, which was more than enough to change the
outcome of the election. Plaintiff maintained that he was not asserting material fraud or error,
which would be subject to a 30-day limitations period.
The county defendants countered that, because propositions B and S were on the same
ballot as the mayor’s race, the statutory subsection dealing with material fraud or error applied,
and plaintiff’s application was time-barred. The county defendants argued that if the election
was declared invalid, a new election would be required, including a new primary, at substantial
public cost. The county defendants argued that plaintiff had failed to plead specific facts
necessary for the court to conclude that fraud or irregularities existed and, instead, had simply
promised to develop supporting evidence at a later date. Further, the county defendants argued
that plaintiff’s allegations were unsupported because the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State had both investigated the matter and neither had found evidence of fraud or vote
manipulation.
Mayor Bing adopted the county defendants’ arguments. He also noted that plaintiff
stated in his reply brief that he observed numerous irregularities that “may have indeed derived
from fraud or gross errors,” and that such speculation was insufficient to meet the required
specificity standard. Mayor Bing then summarized the substantive allegations of plaintiff’s
petition and argued the plaintiff had failed to make allegations that were factually specific
enough to justify further inquiry by quo warranto. Mayor Bing noted that approximately 80 out
of 100 absentee precincts were counted before those ballots were deemed unrecountable and that
the results of that recount (before it was halted) agreed with the original results. Further, there
was no evidence that polls were open less hours than required by law, so those 9,649 ballots
2
The city of Detroit defendants consist of (1) the city of Detroit; (2) the Detroit Board of
Canvassers and its members Dorothy Burrell, Edward Hartounian, and Walter Kroppy; and (3)
the Detroit Elections Commission and its members Daniel Baxter, Edwin Ukagbu, and George
Azzuz.
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(while unrecountable) were unremarkable. Moreover, Michigan election law requires that,
where precincts are deemed unrecountable due to seal issues, the original results stand.
The city defendants adopted the arguments made by the other attorneys, adding that
holding a new election would cost approximately $2 million and would cause “extreme”
financial hardship. In reply, plaintiff’s counsel admitted that “we don’t know how they [the
irregularities] happened. Could have been inadvertence, incompetence, could have been any
number of reasons,” so “We didn’t plead that.” The trial court took the matter under advisement.
On May 11, 2010, the trial court issued an opinion and order denying plaintiff’s
application. The trial court stated that, in determining whether to grant leave, it was required to
determine “whether the application discloses sufficient apparent merit to justify further inquiry
by quo warranto proceedings.” The trial court found that plaintiff’s essential claim was that
“Detroit election officials had made such numerous errors, and mistakes, and had engaged in
such numerous violations of Michigan election law that the number of ballots deemed not
recountable or tainted was more than six (6) times the number necessary to alter the outcome of
the city’s general election for mayor.” The trial court observed that plaintiff claimed in
particular that: 41,485 absentee ballots and 8,001 other ballots were deemed unrecountable;
another 9,649 ballots had dates and times calling into question whether the precincts were open
during the hours required by law; a total of 59,135 ballots (47.4 percent of the total vote) were
found to be unrecountable; “an additional unknown number of countable ballots have likely been
tampered with and manipulated, further eliminating any reasonable certainty as to the true
outcome of the election”; and thus, “there exists no reasonable certainty that any winner could be
determined accurately and with the required legal certainty.”
The trial court specifically found:
As the aforementioned portions of Plaintiff’s application illustrate,
Plaintiff has failed to allege any specific facts establishing that ballots were
tampered with and/or manipulated, or that Defendants engaged in unlawful acts.
Even assuming that Plaintiff’s action is premised on irregularities as opposed to
actual ballot tampering or other illegal acts, he has failed to state facts sufficient
to support an inquiry into whether Bing usurped the office of mayor on the basis
of those irregularities. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts in support
of his conclusion that any ballots which were not recounted were not valid as cast.
He has also failed to provide factual support for his allegations that the Detroit
Board of Canvassers “repeatedly violated statute election law and procedures.”
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The trial court concluded that plaintiff had failed to show that his application had “sufficient
apparent merit to justify further inquiry by quo warranto” proceedings into Mayor Bing’s title as
mayor of the city of Detroit and denied plaintiff’s application for leave. This appeal followed.3
II
Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his petition for
leave to file for quo warranto because the application disclosed sufficient merit to justify further
inquiry by quo warranto proceedings. Plaintiff asserts that he proceeded under MCL 600.4505
and alleged usurpation due to the massive number of irregularities (i.e., errors, mistakes, and
violations of Michigan election laws). Plaintiff maintains that his petition is based on the 59,135
irregular ballots resulting from numerous election law violations that were disclosed by the
December 2009 recount and that he did not allege election fraud, and did not seek to set aside the
entire November 2009 election.
The county defendants, the city defendants, and Mayor Bing all respond that the trial
court correctly held that plaintiff failed to allege specific facts warranting further inquiry by quo
warranto and, for that reason, properly denied plaintiff’s petition. The county defendants argue
that case law requires plaintiff to offer “critical facts” in support of his application for leave to
file for quo warranto, showing a prima facie case of usurpation and that he did not do so. The
county defendants contend that the trial court could not determine from the face of plaintiff’s
application that fraud or errors were committed. Additionally, the county defendants assert that
plaintiff failed to include allegations showing his entitlement to the office of mayor, not mere
uncertainty concerning the true outcome.
The city defendants argue that plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed by quo
warranto alleged no facts to support his claims that ballots were tainted, that the winner of the
election could not be ascertained, that errors and mistakes were made, or that Detroit election
officials engaged in numerous election law violations. Similarly, Mayor Bing asserts that
plaintiff failed to allege, much less offer proof of, any actual facts that would warrant further
investigation by quo warranto. Mayor Bing contends that plaintiff has offered speculation rather
than any facts tending to show that the election was improper and simply complains that various
authorities failed to take the steps he requested concerning his various concerns.
III
A court’s decision whether to grant or deny an application for leave to proceed by quo
warranto is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Shoemaker v City of Southgate, 24 Mich App
3
On June 16, 2010, this Court denied plaintiff’s motion for peremptory reversal. Barrow v
Mayor of Detroit, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 16, 2010 (Docket No.
298128). On June 18, 2010, this Court granted in part the city of Detroit’s motion to expedite
this appeal. Barrow v Mayor of Detroit, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June
18, 2010 (Docket No. 298128).
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676, 680-681; 180 NW2d 815 (1970); McDonald v Jackson, 3 Mich App 287, 288-290; 142
NW2d 42 (1966). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision falls outside
the range of “reasonable and principled outcome[s].” Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich
372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).
IV
“Quo warranto” literally means “by what authority.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed), p
1285. It is “[a] common-law writ used to inquire into the authority by which a public office is
held or a franchise is claimed.” Id. MCR 3.306 governs actions for quo warranto. The rule
provides, in pertinent part:
(A) Jurisdiction.
(1) An action for quo warranto against a person who usurps, intrudes into,
or unlawfully holds or exercises a state office, or against a state officer who does
or suffers an act that by law works a forfeiture of the office, must be brought in
the Court of Appeals.
(2) All other actions for quo warranto must be brought in the circuit court.
(B) Parties.
(1) Actions by Attorney General. An action for quo warranto is to be
brought by the Attorney General when the action is against:
(a) a person specified in subrule (A)(1);
(b) a person who usurps, intrudes into, or wrongfully holds or exercises an
office in a public corporation created by this statute’s authority;
***
(3) Application to Attorney General.
(a) A person may apply to the Attorney General to have the Attorney
General bring an action specified in subrule (B)(1). The Attorney General may
require the person to give security to indemnify the state against all costs and
expenses of the action. The person making the application, and any other person
having the proper interest, may be joined as parties plaintiff.
(b) If, on proper application and offer of security, the Attorney General
refuses to bring the action, the person may apply to the appropriate court for
leave to bring the action himself or herself.
(C) Person Alleged to be Entitled to Office. If the action is brought
against the defendant for usurping an office, the complaint may name the person
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rightfully entitled to the office, with an allegation of his or her right to it, and that
person may be made a party. [Emphasis added.]
MCL 600.4501 echoes the court rule’s provision allowing a private party to bring an
action for quo warranto by leave of court, if the Attorney General refuses to act. A quo warranto
action may be brought under MCL 600.4505, which provides:
(1) Determination. In actions brought against persons for usurpation of
office, the judgment may determine the right of the defendant to hold the office.
If a party plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to the office, the court may decide
which of the parties is entitled to hold the office.
(2) Judgment for relator [private plaintiff]; proceedings. If judgment is
rendered in favor of a party who is averred to be entitled to the office, he is
entitled, after taking the oath of office, and executing any official bond which is
required by law, to take the office. Such party shall be given all the books and
papers in the custody of the defendant, or within his power, belonging to the
office. [Emphasis added.]
An action under MCL 600.4505 is appropriate where the plaintiff seeks to challenge the
defendant’s right to hold office, but fraud or error is not alleged. See People ex rel Wexford
Prosecuting Attorney v Kearney, 345 Mich 680, 692; 77 NW2d 115 (1956). A plaintiff can
prevail under MCL 600.4505 only by showing “his own good title” to the office. Ebright v
Buck, 326 Mich 208, 212; 40 NW2d 122 (1949); see also Marian v Beard, 259 Mich 183, 185187; 242 NW 880 (1932).
“[A]ny damages sustained because of the usurpation” can be recovered under MCL
600.4511, and such a claim may be asserted independently, or as part of the plaintiff’s action for
quo warranto. Additionally, under MCL 600.4515, a court may award costs and may fine a
defendant “found or adjudged guilty of usurping or intruding into or unlawfully holding or
exercising any office . . . .”
An action in the nature of quo warranto may be brought under MCL 600.4545, which
provides:
(1) Jurisdiction. An action may be brought in the circuit court of any
county of this state whenever it appears that material fraud or error has been
committed at any election in such county at which there has been submitted any
constitutional amendment, question, or proposition to the electors of the state or
any county, township, or municipality thereof.
(2) Time for filing action, plaintiffs, defendant. Such action shall be
brought within 30 days after such election by the attorney general or the
prosecuting attorney of the proper county on his own relation, or on the relation of
any citizen of said county without leave of the court, or by any citizen of the
county by special leave of the court or a judge thereof. Such action shall be
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brought against the municipality wherein such fraud or error is alleged to have
been committed.
(3) Procedure. After such action is brought the procedure shall conform
as near as may be to that provided by law for actions for quo warranto.
[Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, the 30-day limit applies only where the plaintiff alleges material fraud or error
under MCL 600.4545. Kearney, 345 Mich at 692. Under MCL 600.4545, “material fraud or
error” means fraud or error “which might have affected the outcome of the election.” St Joseph
Twp v City of St Joseph, 373 Mich 1, 6; 127 NW2d 858 (1964). While a “but for” showing is not
necessary, the plaintiff’s “proofs must be sufficient to support a fact finding that enough votes
were tainted by the alleged fraud to affect the outcome.” Id.
A traditional quo warranto action under MCL 600.4545 seeks to “try title” to the disputed
office. Risk v Lincoln Twp Bd of Trustees, 279 Mich App 389, 390 n 1; 760 NW2d 510 (2008).
An action in the nature of quo warranto is brought to challenge the validity of the election itself.
Id. MCL 600.4545 “does not apply to quo warranto actions to try title to a particular office, but
only to test the validity of an election with regard to a constitutional amendment, question or
proposition.” Stokes v Clerk of the Bd of Canvassers of Monroe Co, 29 Mich App 80, 84; 184
NW2d 746 (1971). “[H]owever, . . . actions in the nature of quo warranto . . . are functionally
equivalent to traditional quo warranto actions and are consequently reviewable in the same
manner.” Risk, 279 Mich App at 390 n 1.
MCR 3.301(A)(1)(d) and (2) “govern the procedure for seeking the writs or relief
formerly obtained by the writs,” including a writ of quo warranto. In that regard, MCR
3.301(A)(3) provides that “[t]he general rules of procedure apply except as otherwise provided in
this subchapter.” MCR 2.111(A)(1) requires that allegations made in a pleading be clear,
concise, and direct. MCR 2.112(B)(1) requires that fraud and mistake be pleaded with
particularity. Other matters, including malice, intent, and knowledge, can be pleaded generally
under MCR 2.112(B)(2). MCR 3.300 does not otherwise contain pleading requirements for a
petition for leave to proceed by quo warranto. Nonetheless, our Supreme Court has held that a
petition for leave to seek a writ of quo warranto “should be so clear and positive in its statement
of facts, as to make out a clear case of right; and should be so framed as to sustain a charge of
perjury if any material allegation is false.” Boucha v Alger Circuit Judge, 159 Mich 610, 611;
124 NW 532 (1910), citing Cain v Brown, 111 Mich 657, 660; 70 NW 337 (1897); see also
Vrooman v Michie, 69 Mich 42, 46; 36 NW 749 (1888).
Vrooman was “the first instance of [quo warranto] proceedings by a private relator.”
Vrooman, 69 Mich at 43-46. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly
dismissed the action because, as supervisor, the plaintiff was disqualified from holding the
appointed office in question. Id. at 45-46. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found it “proper to
remark on some peculiarities of the present record.” Id. at 46. In dicta, the Vrooman Court
stated that leave had been improperly granted by the trial court because the statute “does not
contemplate that leave shall be granted without some showing, as it was in this case.” Id. at 46.
The Court stated that where leave of the court is required for a given action, “[c]ourts can never
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act unless upon some responsible showing, and, as it is contrary to public policy to allow persons
to be needlessly annoyed by vexatious claims, the statute . . . does not, as construed, permit a
relator to proceed without exacting a very precise and positive showing.” Id. The Court
observed that “a chief object in requiring leave is to prevent vexatious prosecutions; and the rule
is inflexible that there must be affidavits so full and positive from persons knowing the facts as
to make out a clear case of right in such a way that perjury may be brought if any material
allegation is false.” Id. The Court stated that “the relator is not allowed to proceed without
showing, not merely a good case in law against respondent, but also that public policy will be
subserved by the proceeding.” Id. at 46-47. The Court stated that “[a]s no showing was made to
obtain leave to file the information in the present case, leave should not have been granted.”4 Id.
at 47.
In Boucha, 159 Mich at 610-611, the petition stated that the election board failed to count
11 votes in the plaintiff’s favor, allegedly because the ballots contained distinguishing marks
when in fact they did not, that the real reason the election board refused to count those votes was
that a majority of the board opposed the plaintiff’s election as township supervisor, and that the
board illegally counted “between one and ten ballots” for the plaintiff’s rival even though those
ballots contained distinguishing marks and were therefore illegal. The Boucha Court stated that
“[t]he law requires a precise and positive showing before the court will interfere” in the results of
an election. Id. at 611. It also stated that an application for leave to file a complaint for quo
warranto must “make a showing sufficiently clear and definite as to facts, to make out a prima
facie case.” Id. The Court also observed that leave should not be granted where the applicant
“swears to a conclusion only.” Id.
In Penn Sch Dist No 7 v Bd of Ed of Lewis-Cass Intermediate Sch Dist, 14 Mich App
109, 117; 165 NW2d 464 (1969), this Court stated that Vrooman and Boucha, among others, did
not apply to actions brought under MCL 600.4545. In that case, however, the Court was
discussing standing, not pleading requirements, and accordingly concluded that, unlike in a MCL
600.4545 action, a plaintiff in a MCL 600.4545 action need not show a special interest in, or
entitlement to, the position in question. Id. at 117-118. However, the Court agreed with
Vrooman and Boucha that the controlling considerations in determining whether to grant leave
are whether the plaintiff made the appropriate request to the Attorney General, and “whether the
application discloses sufficient apparent merit to justify further inquiry by quo warranto
proceedings.” Id. at 118.
In sum, leave to file an action for quo warranto is properly denied (as futile) when the
application fails to disclose sufficient facts and grounds, and sufficient apparent merit, to justify
further inquiry by quo warranto proceedings. 4 Longhofer & McKenna, Michigan Court Rules
4
The Court also observed that in the “information” filed after being granted leave of court, the
plaintiff did “not point out the defect supposed to exist in respondent’s title, but simply denies its
validity.” Id. at 43. The plaintiff also “does not claim to hold title himself to the office, except
as asserting a right to hold over under an old appointment . . . .” Id.
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Practice (5th ed), pp 444-445; City of Grand Rapids v Harper, 32 Mich App 324, 329; 188
NW2d 668 (1971).
V
In the present case, plaintiff’s application alleges that Mayor Bing usurped the office of
mayor. Plaintiff requested leave to file an action for quo warranto under MCL 600.4505, based
on the Attorney General’s refusal to proceed. As far as his own entitlement to the office,
plaintiff alleged that “[t]here is a likelihood that Plaintiff was in fact elected and Defendant
David Bing has usurped the office.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff alleged that prior to the
primary election he “suspected” that ballot tampering would occur at the primary, and that
authorities refused to act on those concerns before or after the primary. Plaintiff also alleged in
his application that before the general election he was “concern[ed]” that “computer
manipulation and ballot tampering” would occur at the general election, but authorities again
refused to act before the election. After the general election, plaintiff sought a recount “based on
computer manipulation and absentee ballot tampering,” and his request for a recount was
approved.
Plaintiff further alleged in his application, in particular:
8.
The facts of this case and the evidence to be developed will show
that:
***
e.
Upon being granted the recount, Plaintiff immediately requested,
in writing, that the county impound and secure the ballots as he believed that
absentee and other voter ballot tampering would occur before the recount could
begin. The county refused to act upon his request.
f.
During the recount conducted by the Wayne County Board of
Canvassers it was revealed that Detroit election officials had made such numerous
errors, and mistakes, and had engaged in such numerous violations of Michigan
election law that the number of ballots deemed not to be recountable and or
tainted was more than six (6) times than [sic] the number necessary to alter the
outcome of the city’s General election for mayor.
g.
The recount also revealed that Detroit election officials had failed
to perform and enforce numerous procedures and requirements set forth by the
State of Michigan designed to ensure the integrity of elections.
h.
As a direct and proximate result, the Wayne County Board of
Canvassers determined:
i. that 100% of the city’s 41,485 absentee voter ballots were not
recountable.
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ii. that an additional 8,001 of the city’s polling precincts’ voter
ballots were not recountable.
iii. that no less than an additional 9,649 precinct polling voter
ballots had dates and times for which it could not be determined with
certainty that they had been cast in compliance with the state law requiring
polls to remain open from 7am until 8pm.
iv. [t]hat the total number of ballots tainted and or deemed not
recountable by the Board of Canvassers was 59,135. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff also alleged that the official results of the election were 71,166 votes for Mayor
Bing and 50,785 votes for plaintiff, a difference of 19,381 votes. Plaintiff further specifically
alleged:
11.
While the Board of Canvassers determined that 59,135 ballots
were deemed not recountable and or tainted (47.4% of the total cast for mayor),
Plaintiff believed and continues to believe that an additional unknown number of
the countable ballots have likely been tampered with and manipulated, further
eliminating any reasonable certainty as to the true outcome of the election.
12.
The actual number of ballots necessary to change and alter the
outcome of the election was only 9,692 (19,381 divided by 2 plus 1).
13.
Had a full County canvass resulted in a deduction of 9,692 ballots
from Defendant and, of necessity, an addition of 9,692 ballots to Plaintiff, it
would have altered the outcome of the election.
14.
Insofar as 59,135 ballots were deemed not recountable or tainted,
there exists no reasonable certainty that any winner could be determined
accurately and with the required legal certainty.
15. Defendant Wayne County Board of Canvassers erred, breached its
duty and abused its authority and discretion when despite having 59,135 out of a
total of 124,802 (Defendant’s 70,166, Plaintiff’s 50,785, all others 3,851) ballots
cast being tainted at [sic] which only 9,692 ballots separated Defendant from
Plaintiff, it issued a certificate of election to the Defendant.
16.
Defendant Detroit Board of canvassers similarly erred, breached its
duty and abused its authority and discretion when it repeatedly violated state
election law and procedures in furtherance of the errors and irregularities.
17.
As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, there exists no
reasonable certainty as to which candidate received the greatest number of
legitimate, valid, and legal votes and thus remediation is required.
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Finally, plaintiff alleged that the trial court had the authority to “see that this challenge to title is
heard and resolved.”
Our review of the record reveals that the only specific facts alleged by plaintiff were the
number of ballots deemed unrecountable, the number of votes in the original election, and the
number of votes it would take to change the outcome. Plaintiff “suspected” that ballot tampering
occurred in the general election, but did not allege that it did. Plaintiff alleged that Detroit
election officials committed “numerous errors and mistakes,” and engaged in such “numerous
violations of Michigan election law,” but did not state what those errors, mistakes, or violations
were, or whether they were committed before, during, or after the election. Plaintiff further
alleged that, after the election, Detroit election officials “failed to perform and enforce numerous
procedures and requirements” to ensure the integrity of the ballots, but did not specify what
protocols were violated or how. Plaintiff alleged that 59,135 ballots were found to be “tainted
and or deemed not recountable,” but did not state how or why. Plaintiff expressed his belief that
“an additional unknown number of the countable ballots have likely been tampered with and
manipulated,” but again failed to state how or when.
Plaintiff alleged that, given the number of unrecountable ballots, there was no certainty
concerning the outcome. He alleged that, given such uncertainty, the county board of canvassers
erred, breached its duty, and abused its authority and discretion in certifying Mayor Bing as the
winner. Plaintiff alleged that the Detroit board of canvassers similarly erred, breached its duty,
and abused its authority and discretion when it repeatedly violated state election laws and
procedures in furtherance of the errors and irregularities, but again failed to state what those
errors or violations were, or when and how they occurred.
Since filing his application, plaintiff has made some effort to specify the particular errors
and violations of law of which he complains and discusses them at length on appeal. However,
plaintiff never attempted to amend his application to add any specific, precise, definite, or clear
and positive factual allegations. Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly found that
plaintiff’s application failed to disclose sufficient facts and grounds, and sufficient apparent
merit, to justify further inquiry by quo warranto proceedings. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations
that mistakes, errors, and election law violations occurred are simply insufficient to justify
granting leave to file an action for quo warranto.
VI
We conclude that the trial court correctly held that plaintiff failed to allege specific facts
warranting further inquiry by quo warranto and properly denied plaintiff’s petition. For this
reason, we need not reach any of the remaining issues raised by plaintiff—none of which the trial
court decided. Nonetheless, the irregularities plaintiff alleges do not tend to show that any
unrecountable ballots were not valid as originally cast or that Mayor Bing usurped the office of
-12-
mayor.
Affirmed. Defendants, being the prevailing parties, may tax costs pursuant to MCR
7.219.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
-13-
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