PEOPLE OF MI V JEREMY EUGENE RAILER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
April 20, 2010
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291817
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 08-000903
JEREMY EUGENE RAILER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Advanced Sheets Version
Before: SAAD, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and MURRAY, JJ.
MURRAY, J.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of unlawful imprisonment, MCL
750.349b, for which he was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to 129
months to 30 years’ imprisonment.1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a case about control. It arises out of defendant’s romantic relationship with Amy
Nichols. These individuals, having dated sporadically in their youth, resumed their amorous
affair and began cohabitating in November 2007. Defendant was jobless, without a car, and
completely reliant on Nichols for his transportation. In Nichols’s words, defendant “did what he
wanted to do,” and while defendant left her ignorant about his activities, “[her] business was his
business.”
The relationship had a long history of dysfunction. For example, on one occasion in
April 2008, Nichols was arrested—while in her car with her children—when a police officer
discovered marijuana under her seat. Nichols testified that although the marijuana was
defendant’s, she decided to take the blame because she still loved defendant, who had
nonetheless threatened that if Nichols faced subsequent criminal charges, he would deny his
ownership of the drugs and inculpate Nichols.
1
Defendant was also convicted of possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d), and assault
and battery, MCL 750.81 (the lesser included offense of his original charge of assault with intent
to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84), but appeals neither of these convictions.
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Nichols had little contact with defendant following her arrest until June 16, 2008. On
that date, defendant approached Nichols, who was in her car. Upon Nichols’s attempt to leave,
defendant reached through the open car window, grabbed Nichols by the throat, and threatened
to kill her. Defendant called Nichols later that night, this time threatening to “slit [her] throat.”
The next night, June 17, 2008, Nichols was driving to her aunt’s house when defendant called
her phone and told her to stop the car and back up, whereupon defendant got into the car and
began driving. With Nichols unsure of their destination, defendant took Nichols’s cellular phone
after her sister called. Minutes later, defendant and Nichols arrived at the apartment complex of
defendant’s friend, but defendant refused to return Nichols’s phone or keys and instead twisted
her wrist and told her that she was going to spend time with him. The two went into the
apartment, but returned a short time later when defendant needed to retrieve an item from the car.
Seizing the opportunity, Nichols ran into the apartment ahead of defendant, borrowed the cellular
phone of an unknown man inside, and informed her sister of her whereabouts. Defendant
subsequently located Nichols and took her outside, at which point Nichols sat down in the
middle of the parking lot hoping to buy time until the police arrived.
At that, defendant dragged Nichols by her hair across the parking lot and into the car.
Defendant then drove Nichols to another parking lot, where he punched her in the mouth and
choked her until she lost consciousness because Nichols “wouldn’t shut [her] smart mouth.”
When Nichols resumed consciousness, defendant drove to a store. Nichols, however, refused to
accompany defendant into the store because she had “wet [her] pants.” During this time,
Nichols’s sister had been calling repeatedly. On the fourth call, defendant held the phone to
Nichols’s ear and instructed her not to reveal their location and threatened to hang up the phone
if Nichols did not comply because, as Nichols testified, defendant had told her that “nobody was
going to get in the way of him spending time with [Nichols].” Scared of defendant, Nichols
complied.
After the call, Nichols reassured defendant that she loved him and convinced him to go
into the store by himself, since her pants were wet, to buy her new pants. Once defendant went
into the store with Nichols’s phone, Nichols enlisted the aid of a man in the parking lot to lead
her safely into the store. Inside, the store manager assisted Nichols in reporting the incident to
police and her family. Police arrived, and after a brief chase inside the store, defendant was
arrested as he was attempting to hide an item on a store shelf. A canine officer later discovered
marijuana on a shelf next to the area where defendant was arrested. After a jury trial, defendant
was convicted of unlawful imprisonment, possession of marijuana, and assault and battery. The
instant appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant first argues that insufficient evidence existed to support his conviction of
unlawful imprisonment. Due process requires that, to sustain a conviction, the evidence must
show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73
(1999). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 459; 697 NW2d 494
(2005). We do not consider whether any evidence existed that could support a conviction;
rather, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the evidence proved the
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essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), citing People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 366; 285 NW2d 284
(1979) (opinion by COLEMAN, C.J.). “[C]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising from th[e] evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People
v Lee, 243 Mich App 163, 167-168; 622 NW2d 71 (2000).
As noted, defendant was convicted of unlawful imprisonment under MCL 750.349b,
which provides as follows:
(1) A person commits the crime of unlawful imprisonment if he or she
knowingly restrains another person under any of the following circumstances:
(a) The person is restrained by means of a weapon or dangerous
instrument.
(b) The restrained person was secretly confined.
(c) The person was restrained to facilitate the commission of another
felony or to facilitate flight after commission of another felony.
Thus, to be guilty of unlawful imprisonment under MCL 750.349b(1)(b), (1) a defendant must
knowingly restrain a person, and (2) the restrained person must be “secretly confined.”
“‘Restrain’ means to forcibly restrict a person’s movements or to forcibly confine the person so
as to interfere with that person’s liberty without that person’s consent or without lawful
authority.” MCL 750.349b(3)(a). To “secretly confine” means either “[t]o keep the confinement
of the restrained person a secret” or “[t]o keep the location of the restrained person a secret.”
MCL 750.349b(3)(b)(i) and (ii).
Ample evidence was presented to support this conviction. First, it is clear that Nichols
was forcibly confined against her will when defendant dragged her by her hair across the parking
lot to force her into the car. Twice after leaving the apartment—once at the store and once
before arriving—the car was parked. However, Nichols dared not leave while in defendant’s
presence given that, before arriving at the store, defendant had struck her face and choked her
until she lost consciousness when she voiced her displeasure with the situation. Once at the
store, defendant—who was in possession of Nichols’s phone and answered the fourth call of
Nichols’s sister—precluded Nichols from communicating freely with her family and took the car
keys and Nichols’s phone when he went into the store. These same acts provided sufficient
evidence that defendant knowingly committed this misconduct, so a jury could have reasonably
inferred that defendant knowingly restrained Nichols. Furthermore, the phone call from
Nichols’s sister revealed that defendant intended to keep both the actual confinement and
location of the confinement a secret. Indeed, frightened of defendant, Nichols complied with
defendant’s demand that she not reveal their location. See People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 309;
519 NW2d 108 (1994) (“[T]he essence of ‘secret confinement’ . . . is deprivation of the
assistance of others by virtue of the victim’s inability to communicate his predicament.”).
Defendant counters that his conviction is unsustainable where (1) he left Nichols alone in
the car before she freely walked into the store and reported defendant to police and (2) Nichols’s
credibility was suspect given her letters to defendant before trial in which she admitted she was
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lying. Neither argument has merit. First, MCL 750.349b(3)(a) expressly provides that “[t]he
restraint does not have to exist for any particular length of time . . . .” The period from when
defendant dragged Nichols into the car until he left Nichols to go inside the store was sufficient
to sustain defendant’s conviction under the statute. Second, issues of witness credibility are
matters for the jury and not this Court. People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 561; 679 NW2d
127 (2004). Hence, defendant’s arguments on both scores do not alter our conclusion that this
conviction must stand.
B. OTHER ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Defendant’s final argument is that MRE 404(b) precluded the admission of the testimony
of two former girlfriends who revealed his prior threats and acts of violence against them. A trial
court’s evidentiary ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490,
494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). However, preliminary questions of law pertaining to this issue are
reviewed de novo. People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003).2
Evidence is generally admissible if it is relevant and its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 402; MRE 403; People v
Taylor, 252 Mich App 519, 521; 652 NW2d 526 (2002). Under MRE 404(b), the prosecution
may not present evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts in order to show a
defendant’s propensity to commit a crime. People v Magyar, 250 Mich App 408, 413-414; 648
NW2d 215 (2002). Notwithstanding this prohibition, however, in cases of domestic violence,
MCL 768.27b permits evidence of prior domestic violence in order to show a defendant’s
character or propensity to commit the same act. People v Schultz, 278 Mich App 776, 778; 754
NW2d 925 (2008). That statute provides in relevant part:
Except as provided in [MCL 768.27b(4)], in a criminal action in which the
defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the
defendant’s commission of other acts of domestic violence is admissible for any
purpose for which it is relevant, if it is not otherwise excluded under Michigan
rule of evidence 403. [MCL 768.27b(1).]
Here, defendant was accused of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than
murder. Such conduct constitutes “domestic violence,” which is defined to include occurrences
causing physical or mental harm to a family or household member or placing a family or
household member in fear of harm.3 MCL 768.27b(5)(a)(i) and (ii). At trial, the prosecution
called defendant’s former girlfriends from four and five years earlier. Both testified about
defendant’s physical abuse and threats to kill them. One testified that defendant forced her into
his van and drove off with her against her will, and the other explained that defendant would
grab and yell at her to listen to him. Such behavior clearly meets the definition of “domestic
2
Contrary to the prosecution’s claim, this issue is preserved because defendant challenged the
admission of this evidence at trial and in his pretrial motion.
3
A “family or household member” includes individuals with whom a defendant had a dating
relationship. MCL 768.27b(5)(b)(iv).
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violence” under the statute, occurred within 10 years of the charged offense as required by MCL
768.27b(4), and would be highly relevant to show defendant’s tendency to assault Nichols as
charged. Furthermore, MRE 403 did not preclude admission of this evidence where the
testimony of the former girlfriends was brief and not nearly as graphic or violent as defendant’s
transgressions recounted in Nichols’s testimony. While this evidence was certainly damaging
and prejudicial—as is most evidence presented against a criminal defendant—it was by no
means inflammatory, nor did it interfere with the jury’s ability to logically weigh the evidence.
People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75-76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). Its admission was, therefore,
proper.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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