PEOPLE OF MI V MARVIN MILLER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
April 15, 2010
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 294566
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 09-001837-FH
MARVIN MILLER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Advanced Sheets Version
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and TALBOT and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution appeals by leave granted an order granting
defendant’s motion to quash a charge of larceny from a motor vehicle, MCL 750.356a(1). We
reverse.
I
On June 24, 2009, William Buchheister drove his truck to a softball field in St. Clair
County, parked it in a lot about 50 feet away from the field, and left it unlocked. At
approximately 9:30 p.m., Buchheister was watching a softball game, and a friend alerted him that
someone was in his truck. Buchheister alleged that he saw defendant get out of the truck and
flee, so Buchheister and his friends pursued. Buchheister further alleged that his friends
apprehended defendant about 15 minutes later. Buchheister’s cellular telephone, keys, and
wallet had been removed from his truck. His cellular telephone and keys were found on a street
corner, and his wallet was found in a factory near the area where defendant allegedly ran.
Defendant was charged with larceny from a motor vehicle under MCL 750.356a(1), on
the basis of the allegation that he took Buchheister’s cellular telephone, and also with larceny of
less than $200, MCL 750.356(1) and (5). Defendant moved to quash the charge of larceny from
a motor vehicle, arguing that MCL 750.356a(1) does not apply to cellular telephones because
they are not permanently attached to the vehicle and would not reduce the value of the vehicle if
taken. In granting defendant’s motion, the trial court concluded that cellular telephones do not
fall within the parameters of the statute. After the prosecution unsuccessfully sought
reconsideration from the trial court, this Court granted leave to appeal. People v Miller,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 17, 2009 (Docket No. 294566).
II
-1-
On appeal, the prosecution argues that the trial court improperly interpreted MCL
750.356a(1) as being limited to the larceny of electronic devices that are permanently attached to
the vehicle. We agree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to quash the
information for an abuse of discretion. See People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 561; 621 NW2d 702
(2001). To the extent that a lower court’s decision on a motion to quash the information is based
on an interpretation of the law, appellate review of the interpretation is de novo. Id.
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the Legislature. People v Droog, 282 Mich App 68, 70; 761 NW2d 822 (2009). To
determine the intent of the Legislature, this Court must first examine the language of the statute.
Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 166-167; 772 NW2d 272 (2009). The language must be read
and understood in its grammatical context and in relation to the statute as a whole. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich 1, 13; ___
NW2d ___ (2009); Bush, 484 Mich at 167. “‘[T]his Court must enforce clear and unambiguous
statutory provisions as written.’ ‘If the language of [a] statute is unambiguous, the Legislature
must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written.’”
United States Fidelity, 484 Mich at 12-13 (citations omitted). Nothing will be read into a clear
and unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from
the language of the statute itself. Bay Co Prosecutor v Nugent, 276 Mich App 183, 189; 740
NW2d 678 (2007). If a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction is appropriate. People v
Warren, 462 Mich 415, 427; 615 NW2d 691 (2000). “A provision is not ambiguous just because
‘reasonable minds can differ regarding’ the meaning of the provision.” People v Gardner, 482
Mich 41, 50 n 12; 753 NW2d 78 (2008), quoting Lansing Mayor v Pub Serv Comm, 470 Mich
154, 165; 680 NW2d 840 (2004). On the contrary, a statutory provision is ambiguous only if it
irreconcilably conflicts with another statutory provision or it is equally susceptible to more than
one meaning. Gardner, 482 Mich at 50 n 12.
MCL 750.356a(1) provides, in relevant part:
A person who commits larceny by stealing or unlawfully removing or
taking any wheel, tire, air bag, catalytic converter, radio, stereo, clock, telephone,
computer, or other electronic device in or on any motor vehicle, house trailer,
trailer, or semitrailer is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not
more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both.
The language of MCL 750.356a(1) is clear and unambiguous. It criminalizes stealing,
unlawfully removing, or taking a specific and limited list of items of property (wheels, tires, air
bags, catalytic converters, radios, stereos, clocks, telephones, computers, or other electronic
devices) from a specific and limited list of vehicles (motor vehicles, house trailers, trailers, or
semitrailers). The broad term “telephone” that the Legislature adopted, which is defined as “an
apparatus, system, or process, for transmission of sound or speech to a distant point, [especially]
by an electric device,” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2000), includes the cellular
or “mobile” telephone that defendant allegedly took from Buchheister’s truck.
Nothing in the language of MCL 750.356a(1) expresses the legislative intent to limit the
statute’s application to items that are permanently attached to the vehicle. See Nugent, 276 Mich
App at 189. Rather, the property listed in MCL 750.356a(1) includes items “in or on” the
vehicles listed. “In” is “used to indicate inclusion within space, a place, or limits,” whereas “on”
-2-
means “so as to be attached to or unified with . . . .” Random House Webster’s College
Dictionary (2000). The fact that wheels, tires, air bags, and catalytic converters are generally on
or attached to a vehicle does not by itself prevent the application of MCL 750.365a(1) to other
enumerated items that are not generally attached to but are merely included within the space of
the vehicle.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the application of subsection (1) of MCL 750.356a to
all enumerated items “in or on” the listed vehicles does not result in a scheme of punishment in
subsection (1) that irreconcilably conflicts with the statute as a whole. See Gardner, 482 Mich at
50 n 12. A person who violates subsection (1) is guilty of a felony with a specific punishment,
regardless of the value of the property stolen, unlawfully removed, or taken. In contrast, a
person who violates subsection (2) of the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor or felony, with a
range of possible punishments, depending on the value of the stolen or unlawfully removed
property and the person’s prior convictions. MCL 750.356a(2). “[T]he ultimate authority to
provide for penalties for criminal offenses is constitutionally vested in the Legislature.” People v
Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 436; 636 NW2d 127 (2001). As the Supreme Court explained in
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), the distinctions between “sentence
ranges for different offenses across the spectrum of criminal behavior” reflect the Legislature’s
“value judgments concerning the relative seriousness and severity of individual criminal
offenses.” It is reasonable to conclude from the distinctions in subsections (1) and (2) that the
Legislature intended to penalize the stealing, unlawful removal, or taking of specific items
commonly associated with vehicles in subsection (1) differently than the stealing or unlawful
removal of other unspecified property in subsection (2).
Reversed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.