PASKA NUCULOVIC V JOHNNY DEAN HILL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PASKA NUCULOVIC,
FOR PUBLICATION
January 5, 2010
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
JOHNNY DEAN HILL and SMART BUS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 280216
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-003647-NI
Advance Sheets Version
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and WILDER and BORRELLO, JJ.
WILDER, J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
defendants. We affirm.
In September 2005, plaintiff was driving a vehicle north on Harper Avenue, at an
intersection with a highway entrance ramp, when defendant Johnny D. Hill, driving a bus owned
by defendant SMART Bus, Inc. (SMART), turned left in front of her vehicle, causing a collision.
Plaintiff sued defendants in 2006, more than 60 days after the accident, alleging injuries resulting
from the negligence of defendants.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), on
the ground that plaintiff failed to provide notice of her claim within 60 days of the accident, as
required by MCL 124.419, a part of the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act, MCL
124.401 et seq. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, and denied plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration. This appeal ensued.
We review summary dispositions de novo. Willett v Waterford Charter Twp, 271 Mich
App 38, 45; 718 NW2d 386 (2006). Questions of law, such as construction of a statute, are also
reviewed de novo. Morden v Grand Traverse Co, 275 Mich App 325, 340; 738 NW2d 278
(2007).
Subrule (C)(7) permits summary disposition where the claim is barred by an applicable
statute of limitations. In reviewing a motion under subrule (C)(7), a court accepts as true the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Hanley v
Mazda Motor Corp, 239 Mich App 596, 600; 609 NW2d 203 (2000). The Court must consider
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and any other documentary evidence submitted by
the parties, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. These materials are
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considered only to the extent that they are admissible in evidence. In re Miltenberger Estate,
275 Mich App 47, 51; 737 NW2d 513 (2007).
A motion for summary disposition under subrule (C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the
pleadings alone. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Johnson-McIntosh v Detroit, 266 Mich App 318, 322; 701
NW2d 179 (2005). Where the parties rely on documentary evidence, appellate courts proceed
under the standards of review applicable to a motion made under MCR 2.116(C)(10), Healing
Place at North Oakland Med Ctr v Allstate Ins Co, 277 Mich App 51, 55; 744 NW2d 174
(2007), or (C)(7).
A motion made under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim, Campbell
v Kovich, 273 Mich App 227, 229; 731 NW2d 112 (2006), and should be granted when there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
Healing Place, 277 Mich App at 56. When the burden of proof at trial would rest on the
nonmoving party, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings,
but must, by documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. Id. But again, such evidence is only considered to the extent that it is admissible.
MCR 2.116(G)(6); Campbell, 273 Mich App at 230. A genuine issue of material fact exists
when the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, leaves open
an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ. Healing Place, 277 Mich App at 56.
Here, the trial court considered defendants’ motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and
(10), but did not indicate under which subrule it granted it. Because the trial court considered
evidence beyond the pleadings, we review the motion as though it were granted under MCR
2.116(C)(7) or (10).
MCL 124.419 provides:
All claims that may arise in connection with the transportation authority
shall be presented as ordinary claims against a common carrier of passengers for
hire: Provided, That written notice of any claim based upon injury to persons or
property shall be served upon the authority no later than 60 days from the
occurrence through which such injury is sustained and the disposition thereof
shall rest in the discretion of the authority and all claims that may be allowed and
final judgment obtained shall be liquidated from funds of the authority: Provided,
further, That only the courts situated in the counties in which the authority
principally carries on its function are the proper counties in which to commence
and try action against the authority. [Emphasis added.]
“Shall” is mandatory. Roberts v Farmers Ins Exch, 275 Mich App 58, 68; 737 NW2d 332
(2007).
The Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act does not define “claim.” However, in
CAM Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass'n, 465 Mich 549, 554; 640 NW2d 256 (2002), relying
on Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed), the term “claim” was defined as the aggregate of operative
facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court. The statute at issue in this case requires that a
claim be “based upon injury to persons or property . . . . ” MCL 124.419. Here, it is undisputed
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that plaintiff did not provide notice of a court-enforceable right based on a personal injury within
60 days of the date of the accident.
Plaintiff contends that defendants should not have been able to rely on MCL 124.419 in
support of their motion for summary disposition, because they did not timely raise reliance on
MCL 124.419 as an affirmative defense. Because plaintiff did not challenge below defendants’
right to assert this statute as an affirmative defense, on the ground that it was not timely raised,
the issue is not preserved. We therefore reject plaintiff’s unpreserved claim. Coates v Bastian
Bros, Inc, 276 Mich App 498, 510; 741 NW2d 539 (2007), quoting Booth Newspapers, Inc v
Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993) (‘“[i]ssues raised
for the first time on appeal are not ordinarily subject to review”’ in a civil case). This Court may
overlook preservation requirements if the failure to consider the issue would result in manifest
injustice, if consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the case, or if the issue
involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented.
Johnson Family Ltd Partnership v White Pine Wireless, LLC, 281 Mich App 364, 377; 761
NW2d 353 (2008). We do not find any of these exceptions to be applicable.
We next address plaintiff’s various arguments that MCL 124.419 does not apply here.
We hold that it does apply.
When construing a statute, we use well-established principles, and begin by consulting
the specific statutory language. Provider Creditors Comm v United American Health Care
Corp, 275 Mich App 90, 95; 738 NW2d 770 (2007). This Court gives effect to the Legislature’s
intent, as expressed in the statute’s terms, giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary
meanings. McManamon v Redford Charter Twp, 273 Mich App 131, 135; 730 NW2d 757
(2006). “When the language poses no ambiguity, this Court need not look beyond the statute or
construe the statute, but need only enforce the statute as written.” Id. at 136. “This Court does
not interpret a statute in a way that renders any statutory language surplusage or nugatory.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that MCL 124.419 is intended to prevent claims by phantom bus
passengers, and, therefore, does not apply to claims by persons involved in a motor vehicle
accident with a bus, while a passenger or driver of another vehicle. Plaintiff also argues that
MCL 124.419 should apply only to claims based on common-carrier liability. We disagree.
Plaintiff’s arguments find no support in the language of the statute. The statute applies,
unambiguously, to “[a]ll claims that may arise in connection with the transportation
authority . . . .” MCL 124.419 (emphasis added). There is no language suggesting that it applies
only to claims involving bus passengers, or does not apply to claims involving injuries to
nonpassengers, or that it only applies to common-carrier liability. To accept plaintiff’s
interpretation, would render nugatory the “[a]ll claims” language, which we lack authority to do.
McManamon, 273 Mich App at 136. We apply the statute as written,1 and reject this claim of
error.
1
Further, in Trent v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transportation, 252 Mich App 247,
(continued…)
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We also reject plaintiff’s argument that MCL 124.419 does not apply because the action
is premised on SMART’s liability as the owner of the vehicle, under the owner liability statute,
MCL 257.401, and not on its status as a common carrier. Contrary to what plaintiff suggests,
MCL 257.401 and MCL 124.419 are not mutually exclusive. MCL 257.401 provides that the
owner of a vehicle may be liable for the negligent operation of that vehicle. MCL 124.419 does
nothing to negate the liability established by MCL 257.401; it only prescribes a notice
requirement for presenting a claim against a transportation authority. And as previously
indicated, MCL 124.419 applies to “[a]ll claims that may arise in connection with the
transportation authority . . . .” Thus, the fact that SMART may be subject to liability as the
owner of a vehicle does not preclude the applicability of MCL 124.419.
Plaintiff also argues that to the extent MCL 124.419 applies, it applies only to claims
against common carriers, and, therefore, would not apply to any claim against Hill, individually.
In light of the statutory language indicating that the statute applies to “[a]ll claims that may arise
in connection with the transportation authority,” we must reject this claim as well. The broad
language of the statute indicates that it encompasses plaintiff’s claim against Hill, because the
claim arises from Hill’s operation of the bus as an employee of SMART.
Plaintiff also argues that MCL 124.419 does not apply because SMART has excess
insurance that provides coverage for claims over $1 million. Plaintiff observes that MCL
124.419 provides that claims “shall be liquidated from funds of the authority,” and that the
disposition of claims is within the discretion of the authority. Plaintiff argues that the availability
of insurance necessarily limits SMART’s authority regarding the disposition of a claim. We find
it unnecessary to consider the merits of this argument, because plaintiff failed to show that there
was an issue of fact concerning whether her claim might exceed $1 million, thereby triggering
the availability of excess insurance. Further, plaintiff failed to show any potential availability of
insurance for defendant Hill that would avoid the applicability of MCL 124.419. For these
reasons, we reject plaintiff’s arguments that MCL 124.419 is not applicable to this action.
Plaintiff also argues that, even if the notice requirement of MCL 124.419 is applicable,
proper notice was given because SMART received a copy of the police report for the incident,
and because both Hill and his supervisor prepared reports regarding the accident. We disagree.
MCL 124.419 requires that “written notice of any claim based upon injury” be served upon the
authority within 60 days of the date of the accident.
The term “service” is not defined in MCL 124.419, but the concept of service of process
is well clarified in our court rules. Service of process is addressed in MCR 2.102, 2.103, and
2.104. Where service is to be made on a public corporation, MCR 2.105(G) provides that
“[s]ervice of process . . . may be made by serving a summons and a copy of the complaint on”
various officials, officers, or members. When process is served on an individual, it may be done
by “delivering a summons and a copy of the complaint . . . .” MCR 2.105(A)(1) (emphasis
(…continued)
251-252; 651 NW2d 171 (2002), this Court held that the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.,
supersedes the prescribed time period in MCL 124.419, with respect to first-party, no-fault
personal protection insurance benefits, but not for third-party claims of personal injury. The case
at bar is a third-party action.
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added). The requirements for proof of service include a description of the facts of service,
including the time, place, and manner of service. MCR 2.104(A)(3). Thus, under our court
rules, where service is not done by mail, service means delivery at a particular time and place.
MCR 2.105(A)(1); MCR 2.104(A)(3). And such service is usually done by a process server.
MCR 2.103. Plaintiff has no evidence of any delivery of her claim, much less formal delivery
such as by a process server. And plaintiff has no “proof of service” as that term is used in the
law.
Under MCR 2.105(H)(1), “[s]ervice of process on a defendant may be made by serving a
summons and a copy of the complaint on an agent authorized by written appointment or by law
to receive service of process.” Under subrule (H)(2), “[w]henever, pursuant to statute or court
rule, service of process is to be made on a nongovernmental defendant by service on a public
officer, service on the public officer may be made by registered mail addressed to his or her
office.” MCR 2.105(H)(2). Here, there is no evidence that SMART received any notice by
registered mail.
Furthermore, while the process in which service is made is well-specified in the court
rules, the word “service” is not defined in either our court rules or in the statute at issue here.
Therefore, we may consult a legal dictionary to define an undefined term that has a specific legal
meaning. Snyder v Advantage Health Physicians, 281 Mich App 493, 502; 760 NW2d 834, 839
(2008). In Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “service” is defined as “[t]he formal delivery of a
writ, summons, or other legal process . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed, 2008), p 1399
(emphasis added).
As the trial court observed, while SMART had in its possession the police report and the
reports prepared by Hill and his supervisor, plaintiff did not “serve” (formally deliver to)
SMART notice of plaintiff’s claim for injury as service is defined in our court rules. Therefore,
the trial court properly determined that the statutory notice requirement was not satisfied, and
properly granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition on this basis.
We disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that our analysis in this case should be affected
by the Supreme Court’s order in Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth, 483 Mich 1081 (2009),
which denied leave to appeal this Court’s opinion in Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2008 (Docket No.
277900). The Supreme Court had originally reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, 482
Mich 1136 (2008), but granted reconsideration, vacated its earlier order, and denied leave to
appeal. 483 Mich 1081 (2009).
First, this Court’s opinion in Chambers was unpublished, and as such, it has no
precedential force. MCR 7.215(C)(1); Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield
Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264, 282-283; 769 NW2d 234 (2009). The Supreme Court’s
denial of leave to appeal, effectively affirming the result reached in that case, also has no
precedential value. MCR 7.302(H)(3); Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 363 n 2; 343 NW2d 181
(1984).
Second and more substantively, Chambers is distinguishable from the present case. In
Chambers, the plaintiff alleged that he fell in a puddle of water at the LC Smith Terminal of the
Wayne County Airport. An officer employed by defendant Wayne County Airport Authority
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was flagged down by passersby, and this officer wrote up an incident report. Defendant Wayne
County Airport Authority moved for summary disposition, arguing, in part, that the plaintiff
failed to provide notice of the occurrence within 120 days as required by MCL 691.1406. The
trial court denied the motion, and this Court affirmed.
MCL 691.1406 provides, in pertinent part:
As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any
dangerous or defective public building, the injured person, within 120 days from
the time the injury occurred, shall serve a notice on the responsible governmental
agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the
exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the
witnesses known at the time by the claimant.
The notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, or by
certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served with civil
process directed against the responsible governmental agency, anything to the
contrary in the charter of any municipal corporation notwithstanding. [Emphasis
added.]
This Court concluded that the incident report prepared by the airport authority’s
employee was sufficient notice of the occurrence to satisfy the notice requirements of MCL
691.1406.
In the instant case, rather than requiring notice of an occurrence, MCL 124.419
specifically requires that notice of a claim be served on the SMART authority within 60 days of
the accident. Therefore, even if the police reports in defendant SMART’s possession constituted
notice of some kind of an occurrence, they did not constitute notice of a claim to defendants.
Plaintiff has failed to show that, from the police reports, the defendant authority had any way of
knowing that plaintiff intended to file a claim for injury to her person or her property because of
the 2005 collision, much less what the claim would actually be. Thus, factually and as a matter
of law, plaintiff has failed to satisfy the notice requirements of MCL 124.419.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiff argued below that reconsideration was warranted, for reasons that we have previously
addressed and rejected in this opinion. Because plaintiff failed to show that the trial court’s
original decision granting summary disposition was erroneous, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. In re Beglinger Trust, 221 Mich
App 273, 279; 561 NW2d 130 (1997).
In light of our ruling that plaintiff failed to provide notice as required by MCL 124.419,
defendant’s alternative argument regarding governmental immunity is moot. Mettler Walloon,
LLC v Melrose Twp, 281 Mich App 184, 221; 761 NW2d 293 (2008).
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Affirmed. Defendant, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCL 7.219.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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